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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
Boards of directors monitor and incentivize CEOs to make decisions that maximize 
shareholder value; however, research has been inconsistent in identifying the relationship 
between board composition and monitoring effectiveness (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 
1998).  Integrating an economic perspective (agency theory) with a socio-psychological 
perspective (upper echelon theory), this paper examines how outsiders’ and insiders’ power 
bases relate to pay-for-performance by proposing and empirically examining a multi-dimensional 
model of board power bases: ownership, prestige, and structural.  I argue that board structural 
and composition characteristics can be used as proxy indicators of board power. Using data from 
37, 066 directors of 950 firms resulting in 3,581 firm-year observations between 2000-2006, I 
find the ratio of the average outsider’s prestige power to insiders’ associates positively with total 
compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity in partial support of my hypothesis.  Although 
contrary to my expectations, I find the ratios of the average outsiders’ ownership and structural 
power bases to insiders’ are insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance, supplemental 
analysis reveals that these relationships become significant as context changes.   Thus, I extend 
my theoretical framework to the role of context in the board power and monitoring effectiveness 
relationship; specifically, I conceptualize context in terms of environmental (e.g., government 
regulation, world events, institutional pressures), firm (e.g., size and performance), board (e.g., 
size, level of board independence), and CEO (e.g., ownership and tenure) characteristics.  
Overall, this study contributes to research by illustrating that board power is relevant to 
monitoring effectiveness; however, this relationship is contextual. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Executive Compensation:  The Economic Value vs. Weak Governance? 
Popular press claims the public is outraged about increases in executive pay (Kuhnen & 
Niessen, 2012), but are CEOs overpaid in reality?  CEO pay increased from an average of 
approximately $4.1 million in 1995 to about $16 million in 2000, and then declined to an average 
of about $8 million in 2006 (Kaplan, 2008).  Considering this trend in CEO pay, corporate 
governance scholars question how compensation reflects the manager’s contribution to 
improving the firm’s financial performance (e.g., Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hill 
& Phan, 1991; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990; Wowak, Hambrick, & Henderson, 2011).   
Scholars debate whether changes in executive pay reflect paying for CEO marginal value or 
problems of ineffective corporate governance.  While proponents for the economic value 
argument suggest that CEOs are receiving, and should continue to receive, increased pay for 
their increased marginal effort and skill, proponents for the weak governance argument suggest 
that CEOs manipulate boards into giving them increased pay for less effort.  
The economic value argument considers that pay has been determined by the market, was 
similar to increases of other key groups, and reflects pay for increased value. Just as CEO pay of 
SP 500 increased three to four times between 1994-2005 (Kaplan & Rau, 2008), reflecting  
growth in the U.S. economy (Kaplan, 2008),  pay of other key players has also increased: private 
equity and venture capital investors increasing almost ten times and that of attorneys increasing 
almost two and a half times (Kaplan & Rau, 2008). But key to their argument is that CEOs 
should receive more pay because their leadership resulted in improved stock performance 
(Kaplan & Rau, 2008).  If pay and performance are linked then, criticism of ineffective board of 
director monitoring is unjustified, as evidenced by the fact that boards have continued to make 
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effective monitoring decisions, such as terminating poorly performing CEOs. Approximately one 
out of every 6 CEOs has been terminated since 1998 compared with one of out of 10 in the 
1970s (Kaplan & Minton, 2008) 
In contrast, proponents for the weak governance argument suggest that pay has increased 
without performance, serving as evidence that boards of directors have been ineffective.  These 
critics argue excessive compensation results from the ineffectiveness of the firm’s corporate 
governance structure, the failure of monitoring mechanisms, and the lack of alignment between 
compensation and shareholder goals (Colvin, 2010).   Although executive compensation has 
risen significantly during the last decade, firm financial performance has not increased at a 
similar rate (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). Executive pay increased 29% from 2009 to 2010, and cash 
bonuses increased 38% despite a 9% unemployment rate in the U.S (Joshi, 2011); however, 
executive compensation consultants find no correlation between pay and shareholder returns 
(Stodola, 2011). For example, Bank of New York Mellon’s CEO Robert Kelly received a 73% 
increase in pay, while shareholder return was 9% (Stodola, 2011). Results indicate managerial 
compensation does not always reflect changes in the firm’s financial status (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), such that less than 5% of CEO pay can be explained as 
resulting from performance (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  Despite the fact that 
pay began to decrease in 2001, this decline has been attributed to the overall economic recession 
and not to improved corporate governance (Colvin, 2010).  Some managerial critics argue this 
excessive growth in pay is managers’ fault; they are able to manipulate financial reporting and 
earnings to benefit themselves, while some board critics argue this excessive growth is due to 
ineffective board decisions (Colvin, 2010).   
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This study contributes to corporate governance research by considering that the reason why 
this debate over CEO pay continues is because we have not fully considered how 
conceptualizing board power using structural and composition characteristics can clarify whether 
monitoring is effective, including when increased pay may be associated with improved 
performance.  Although board members’ characteristics affect their decisions (Finkelstein & 
Boyd, 1998), research has not fully considered how board characteristics may influence the 
development of different board power bases that increase the potential for one board member to 
be more likely than another board member to influence decisions associated with monitoring 
effectiveness.  Research may benefit by considering a broadened, yet integrated, perspective that 
looks beyond traditional governance mechanisms (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) to utilizing a multi-
dimensional model of board power to understand how, when and why pay and performance are 
linked. 
 
1.2.    Research Questions 
Within the agency context, board power affects who is more likely to influence decisions 
relevant to monitoring effectiveness.  Effective monitoring aligns managerial goals with those of 
shareholders, reducing total compensation and increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(Hartzell & Starks, 2003).  Executive compensation has been examined in terms of the CEO’s 
power relative to the board (e.g., Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1988), but has not been examined in 
terms of board members’ power relative to each other.  Research has considered how power 
differentials between CEOs and boards affect compensation decisions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1988; Hill & Phan, 1991). While the study of board power within top management teams has 
been considered in terms of their effect on strategic decisions (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992), the study 
of how the distribution of power within the board affects monitoring is limited. Thus, scholars 
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have called for more research examining board power (e.g., Boyd, Haynes, and Zona, 2010; 
Hambrick et al., 2009).  Finkelstein’s (1992) model of top management team (TMT) power 
considers how powerful TMT members can exert their will within TMTs; however, a power 
struggle between outsiders and insiders also exists within the board of directors about who 
controls the CEO.  If boards represent owners, then powerful boards will negate the effects of 
insiders’ (e.g., TMT, CEO) power. More specifically, if insiders’ power enables managers to 
make decisions in their self-interests (Finkelstein, 1992), then powerful outsiders should reduce 
this discretion of managers.  Thus, studying board power within the board may shed insight into 
board monitoring and executive compensation decisions because the power to change CEO 
behavior to benefit shareholders is the central aspect of a board’s monitoring responsibility. 
Board power provides a conceptual bridge to link board structural and composition 
characteristics to examine pay-for-performance.  Following Finkelstein (1992), I define power as 
the “capacity of individual actors to exert their will” (p. 506). However, I define board power as 
the capacity of the board to control the CEO, specifically by compelling the CEO to act in 
alignment with shareholder interests. By integrating agency and upper echelon theories, I derive 
certain indicators of the potential for individual board members to influence compensation 
decisions.  These indicators fall within two categories:  structural characteristics informed by 
agency theory and demographic indicators informed by upper echelon theory.  Thus, I propose 
and argue board structural and demographic characteristics can serve as proxy indicators for the 
potential for board member power to increase, making it more likely that powerful board 
members will be associated with monitoring effectiveness. Therefore, my research questions are: 
a) how do board power bases effect the influence members have on monitoring and executive 
compensation? and b) how do power bases influence outsiders’ and insiders’ monitoring 
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effectiveness?  Typically, board monitoring has been examined using single board characteristics 
variables as proxies (e.g., ownership concentration; number of outsiders), but results are 
inconsistent and causality is inconclusive (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998).  This may 
be due to assumptions made about these board characteristics and their potential influence on 
decisions.  Since monitoring is about the relationship between boards and CEOs, there is a sense 
of fluidity in ability of the board to get the CEO to do what it wants the CEO to do.  Therefore, 
examining power as a multi-dimensional construct, using board characteristics as proxy 
indicators for board power, captures the influence and relationship between the monitor and 
monitored; understanding monitoring is about the distribution of power, or the capacity to 
control the CEO that cannot be fully captured using single variable proxies.  Collectively, 
though, these measures create a way to consider the potential of the board to control the CEO, or 
to monitor. 
 
1.3.  Research Contribution 
What makes board monitoring successful, and even necessary, has been consistently debated 
in the literature using contrasting theoretical frameworks (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  My study 
contributes to this debate by considering how theoretical perspectives can help us understand 
implications of power for corporate governance, specifically in the context of executive 
compensation. Linking social psychology perspectives on power with strategy perspectives on 
corporate governance, this study contributes theoretically to executive compensation and 
governance research by clarifying the inconsistent relationship between board classification (e.g., 
outsiders or insiders) on monitoring effectiveness and executive compensation, and by 
examining how board power bases influence the effect that board classification has on 
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monitoring effectiveness.  By integrating an economic perspective (agency theory) and a socio-
psychological perspective (upper echelon theory), I model an integrated agency-upper echelon 
theoretical view of board power, suggesting a new behavioral perspective on monitoring 
effectiveness and compensation.   While the economic perspective explains how pay affects 
managers’ willingness to accept risk, the social psychology perspective explains how individual 
characteristics can result in managerial pay decisions having either positive or negative 
consequences (Finkelstein et al., 2009). This dissertation addresses scholar’s concerns that 
variables used as proxies of board vigilance are not actually representative of that vigilance, but 
rather have the potential to influence the degree of vigilance (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
Specifically, I argue that board characteristics are indicators of board power bases that may 
influence monitoring effectiveness. 
In addition to its theoretical contribution, this study contributes empirically to corporate 
governance research by extending Finkelstein’s (1992) model of TMT power to the context of 
boards of directors.  Finkelstein et al., (2009) call for research to develop a model of board power 
specific to the context of compensation because they suggest that Finkelstein’s (1992)’s top 
management team power dimensions have been applied to numerous contexts, such as 
compensation, for which this power model may not have been intended. Therefore, I extend 
Finkelstein (1992) by proposing and empirically examining a multi-dimensional model of board 
power to clarify inconsistencies surrounding the relationship between board outsiders and 
insiders on monitoring effectiveness and executive pay.  
This dissertation contributes to corporate governance research by developing a new 
method to examine board power. Specifically, I utilize board characteristics as proxy indicators 
of the potential presence of board power bases.  While agency theory informs the board power 
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construct in terms of the potential to resolve the agency conflict, upper echelon theory informs 
the construct in terms of relevant board characteristics that may make an individual more likely 
to become powerful over the CEO. In so doing, I demonstrate that the predictive nature of board 
power for strategic decision-making is contextual, depending on how power is conceptualized. I 
empirically examine power as an antecedent to executive compensation and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity using longitudinal data for 950 firms from 2000-2006.  
 
1.4.  Organization of Dissertation 
My primary purpose with this dissertation is to examine how board power effects 
monitoring and pay-for-performance sensitivity by conceptualizing a multi-dimensional model 
of board power and proposing a new way to empirically examine board power bases. This paper 
is divided as follows: Chapter 2 Board Monitoring, Executive Compensation, and Power 
Literature Review; Chapter 3 A Multi-Dimensional Model of Board Power; Chapter 4 
Methodology; Chapter 5 Analysis; Chapter 6 Discussion; and, Chapter 7 Conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2. BOARD MONITORING, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION,  AND 
POWER  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.  Theoretical Foundations:  Agency and Upper Echelon Theories 
Understanding what managers do and how they do it is essential to evaluating the 
effectiveness of any leadership structure (Carroll & Gillen, 1987). However, the results of 
research on the association between board monitoring and executive compensation have been 
inconsistent when only agency theory is utilized (Boyd, Haynes, & Zona, 2010).  Because 
agency theory may be limited as an all-inclusive universal theory to explain corporate 
governance outcomes, some scholars have considered integrating agency theory with other 
theories to understand the contextual implications of agency conditions (e.g., Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). Specifically, I suggest that by integrating agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) perspectives on the principal-agent conflict with upper echelon theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) perspectives about how human characteristics influence decisions, I can develop a 
model of board power using board structural and composition characteristics as proxy indicators 
of the potential for powerful board members to influence monitoring effectiveness. 
At the heart of executive compensation decisions are power struggles to determine the 
optimal compensation contract. These conflicts include managers’ power struggles with board 
members and board members’ power struggles with each other.  An examination of how board 
members influence decisions depends on which theoretical foundation is used (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003).  Determining which members’ goals are prioritized depends on how this conflict 
is resolved, which is a function of the power play within the board.   By considering key 
assumptions, the units of analysis, and research foci, I argue that these theories can be integrated 
to create a power model that is relevant to monitoring effectiveness.  These theories are relevant 
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because of their importance in monitoring decisions, their ability to highlight the board’s role in 
resolving the agency conflict, and their ability to identify potential indicators that can serve as 
proxy indicators for power (Table 1).  
 First, agency and upper echelon theories have varying perspectives on how decisions 
affect monitoring. Focusing on decisions relevant to the compensation contract, agency theory 
considers how managers make decisions that differ from those of shareholders; thus, boards 
make incentive and monitoring decisions to align managerial and shareholder interests (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  Focusing on the type of decision making, upper echelon theory is relevant to 
examining decisions with a behavioral element, such as reward decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). 
Second, integrating agency and upper echelon theories focuses on the board as a main 
unit of analysis because board members are the key decision makers in the executive 
compensation context.  The agency theory’s unit of analysis is the contract between the agent 
and the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989), a unit that is relevant with regards to 
decisions.  In contrast, the upper echelon theory’s unit of analysis is the top management team as 
the dominant coalition (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which is relevant to understanding decision 
makers. These units of analysis result in different research foci based on the particular theory as 
follows:   a) agency theory: how the agency conflict develops, affects performance, and is 
resolved through monitoring and incentive alignment (Eisenhardt, 1989); and b) upper echelon 
theory:  whether top managers matter as a result of their influence on strategic decisions and 
outcomes (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995).  
Third, an integrated agency–upper echelon theoretical model can explain the 
relationships involved in power decisions and can identify variables that accurately capture the 
10 
 
key factors affecting outcomes. Relevant to human motivation and decision making, agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) assumes that humans act in their own self-interest and are 
limited rationally in their decision making by what they know; however, agency theory also 
clarifies that managers acting in their own self-interest can jeopardize shareholder wealth 
because managers and shareholders differ in their goals and risk preferences.  Focusing on the 
relationship between the board and the chief executive officer, agency theory assumes that 
information asymmetry between boards and CEOs inhibits monitoring effectiveness (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Hambrick & Mason’s upper echelon theory (1984), which is relevant to understanding 
how individuals make decisions, argues that background and demographic characteristics reflect 
the decision maker’s values and cognitive bases, which predict strategic outcomes and decisions.  
Through its focus on the decision maker, upper echelon theory explains how background 
characteristics influence an individual’s general knowledge base, which affects monitoring 
decisions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).   
 In summary, I therefore use an integrated theoretical framework that includes both 
agency theory, which frames my research questions by examining the effectiveness of 
monitoring, and upper echelon theory, which frames my questions in terms of which 
characteristics of board members affect their decisions.  By helping understand the context in 
which pay decisions are determined by the board, agency theory focuses on how board members 
make decisions about compensation, exert control over information and decisions, and focus on 
optimal contracting to minimize uncertainty.  Upper echelon theory then lends insight into the 
decision makers themselves by focusing on the relationship of individual demographic 
characteristics regarding pay decisions. I note, however, that each theory’s limitations may be 
somewhat, although not completely, covered by the other theory.  Whereas agency theory is 
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limited in explaining situations in which managers do not act in ways that benefit their own self-
interest, upper echelon theory’s focus on differing characteristics helps me understand that 
situation.  Upper echelon theory notes its own limitation in that demographic characteristics are 
more complex in meaning than what they represent; for example, a person’s educational 
background reflects not only motivation but also social economic status (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984).  In the next section, I review the previous literature regarding board monitoring and 
executive compensation. 
 
2.2.    Board Monitoring and Executive Compensation 
The core issue in agency theory is the separation of ownership and control (Berle & 
Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  According to agency theory, the principal-agent 
relationship is characterized by differences in goals and risk preferences on the part of the CEO 
(the agent) and shareholders (the principal) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Shareholders delegate 
their decision-making authority to boards, relying on the boards to make decisions in the 
shareholders’ best interests.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) focused on the “behavioral 
implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between owners and managers of the 
firm (308)” to present a theory of the ownership structure of the firm (305) that can “explain how 
the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield 
this result” (p. 307).  
Board monitoring and incentive alignment are governance mechanisms intended to 
control managerial behavior (Beatty & Zajac, 1994).  Whereas CEOs are risk-averse, 
shareholders are risk-neutral; therefore, boards monitor and use incentives to motivate managers 
to act in alignment with shareholder interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). Board monitoring refers to the 
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board’s actions to assess managerial ability and effort in pursuing firm financial goals (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990) and to review managerial decisions that may not positively affect shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).  However, board members differ in their monitoring decisions (Cutting 
& Kouzmin, 2002).   
Although boards are primarily responsible for hiring and firing CEOs, their role in 
designing executive compensation contracts has significant effects on performance (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990); thus, incentive alignment results from contracts that align managerial interests 
with those of shareholders so that CEOs do not act in their own self-interest and diminish 
shareholder value (Eisenhardt, 1989).  More importantly, the “optimal level of monitoring [is] 
based on the incentive gap between the principal and the agent” (Beatty & Zajac, 1994, p. 317); 
thus, different internal governance mechanisms (e.g., representation by outsiders on the board) 
and equity ownership by managers can substitute for each other in minimizing managerial 
opportunism by aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders (Rediker & Seth, 1995). 
 To align managerial interests with those of shareholders, boards monitor the CEO and 
create an optimal balance of short- and long-term compensation components that will provide 
incentives for agents to motivate managers to bear some degree of risk (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) 
and make profit-maximizing decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989).   The final compensation contract 
should illustrate the efficient organization of information and minimize risk-bearing costs to the 
firm through incentive alignment and the optimal structuring of control mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Because of the “incentive effect” resulting from the structure of compensation packages 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003), boards have the potential to “stimulate [the CEO’s] extraordinary 
effort, encourage aggressive but prudent risk-taking, and promote a long-term horizon” (Wowak 
& Hambrick, 2010, p. 804). However, the effectiveness of incentive-based compensation 
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involving stock options depends on strategic, motivational, and stakeholder factors within the 
firm’s competitive environment (Brandes, Dharwadkar, & Lemesis, 2003).  Hence, board power, 
or the potential for the board to control the CEO, is reflected in the final compensation contract 
and its relationship to performance. 
Board monitoring effectiveness decreases in conditions of information asymmetry 
(Jensen, 2005) and risk uncertainty; thus, boards utilize outcome-based contracts that consist of a 
larger portion of stock-based incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nagar, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) to 
align the agent’s interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). In contrast, behavioral-based contracts consist of a larger proportion 
of short-term compensation, such as the yearly salary, than of stock-based compensation because 
the board is in a position to more actively monitor the CEO. With weaker monitoring, boards 
design outcome-based contracts that shift risk to the CEO as motivation to make decisions that 
are aligned with maximizing shareholder value (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, as board 
monitoring becomes stronger, boards tend to design behavioral-based contracts because the 
directors have more access to relevant monitoring information (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the next 
section, I elaborate on how boards’ structural and compositional characteristics relate to 
monitoring.  
 
2.2.1.  Board Structure and Composition 
Board structure refers to the “formal organization of the board of directors; its major 
dimensions are size, the division of labor between the board chair and the CEO, and board 
committees” (Finkelstein et al., 2009, p. 229). Whereas the majority of research on boards 
considers the board of directors’ structure and composition (Zahra & Pearce, 1989), I suggest 
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that considering board structure in the context of the distribution of power would extend this 
research. 
First, board structure refers to the structural characteristics of boards and is related to 
monitoring, i.e., board size, leadership roles, the number of meetings, and committee structure 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009).  The way in which boards are structured (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 
1999) and the frequency of board interaction (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) relate to compensation.   
Firm performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, is positively associated with board size (Yermack, 
1995) but negatively associated with the number of board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). 
Second, board composition refers to compositional characteristics and is related to 
monitoring, i.e., board affiliation (insider, outsider), age, tenure, experience, demographic 
characteristics, and equity ownership. Compensation is related to board composition (Bhagat & 
Black, 1998), board and CEO tenure (Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990), and director equity 
ownership (Boyd, 1994). Although board classification is relevant to the monitoring process, the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance has been inconclusive (Daily, 
Johnson, & Dalton, 1999). Some studies find a positive relationship between outsiders and 
increased firm value (e.g., Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2001; Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; MacAvoy & Millstein, 1999), whereas other studies find a negative effect (e.g., Bhagat & 
Black, 1991), no relationship (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), or little relationship (Daily et al., 
1998).  
 
2.2.2. The Outsider vs. Insider Monitoring Debate 
Scholars debate whether outsiders or insiders are more effective monitors. I define insider 
directors as those directors related to the firm either through employment or through familial 
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relationships and outsider directors as those directors having no familial or professional 
relationship other than their board role with the firm (e.g., risk metrics).  Whereas the tenure of 
insiders is associated with maintaining the firm’s strategic direction, the tenure of outsiders is 
associated with changing this direction (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Wiersman & Bantel, 
1993). Although insiders are less likely to challenge the CEO when faced with employment risk 
(Johnson, 1996) and when there is a minimal number of insiders on the board (Combs, Kretch, 
Perryman, & Donahue, 2007), insiders have been known both to replace CEOs when firm 
performance declines (Ocasio, 1994) and to decline to adopt poison pills (Johnson, Ellstrand, 
Dalton, & Dalton, 1994).  
This debate is contextual; outsiders and insiders differ in their monitoring depending on 
the context of the decisions. Although the potential exists for insider loyalty to the CEO to 
interfere with monitoring (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Helland and Sykuta, 2005), insiders bring 
an informational advantage about internal firm operations that assists in the monitoring process.   
For example, insiders are positively associated with long-term R&D investments (Baysinger, 
Kosnik, & Turk, 1991) and can benefit monitoring because of their specialized knowledge of the 
firm’s strategy (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990).  Conversely, although outsider knowledge about 
the firm is limited (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), this lack of connection to the firm makes outsiders 
more objective monitors because they are less committed to maintaining the status quo 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Outsiders are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs, are 
positively associated with making strategic change decisions (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 
2007), and are associated with a decreased likelihood of bankruptcy (Daily & Dalton, 1994).  
Because monitoring involves assessing the firm’s financial operations, research shows that 
outsiders are associated with increased accounting conservatism (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007), 
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increased focus on financial performance (Johnson et al., 1993), and an increased likelihood of 
dismissing poorly performing CEOs (Weisbach, 1988).   
Although differences in compensation decisions by outsiders and insiders have been 
established in the previous literature, the results vary. Contrary to his expectations, Boyd (1994) 
found that insiders were associated with reduced total executive compensation.  Converse to 
what theory would predict, Daily et al. (1998) found that a higher portion of CEOs on the 
compensation committee were associated with decreased changes in total pay.  When firms are 
not performing well, outsiders are associated with CEO compensation contracts that are more 
aligned with shareholder interest (Mishra & Nielsen, 1999). When firms grow through 
acquisitions, outsiders make adjustments to the executive’s compensation contract based on 
shareholder value rather than firm size (Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 2002).  Although the 
board’s primary role is to provide the optimal contract that maximizes shareholder value (Core, 
Guay, & Larcker, 2003), managerial power can negate this effect.   Managerial power influences 
pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003) in that powerful managers are able to manipulate contracts and 
extract rent (e.g., Morse, Nanda & Seru, 2008).  Therefore, I suggest that understanding how 
power bases affect the potential of a board member to control the CEO may clarify the 
relationship between outsiders and insiders and executive compensation.  To the best of my 
knowledge, no study has sought to capture this relationship in terms of power constructs 
developed using factor analysis and structural equation modeling.  In the next section, I review 
power literature in the context of corporate governance. 
2.3.  Power in the Corporate Governance Context 
 Power influences decision making (Child, 1997) and corporate governance; however, the 
effects of power on decisions vary based on how power is conceptualized. Power is the “capacity 
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to exercise influence,” with influence defined as a “transaction in which one person (or group) 
acts in such a way as to change the behavior of an individual (or group) in some intended fashion 
... [influence] is the demonstrated use of power” (Katz & Kahn, 1966, p. 550). Power can be “a 
force, a set of potential influence through which events can be affected” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 7).   
Power concerns the ability to influence change and achieve desired goals (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003; Horner, 2010; Pfeiffer, 1981), prompting psychological change, which is defined 
as “any alteration of the state of some system a over time (French & Raven, 1959, p. 151). 
One important caveat of any study of board power is that unless we know that the power 
was implemented, we can only say that these power bases are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions in this study of board power and pay for performance.  Somech and Drach-Zahavy 
(2002) distinguish power as the “inferred potential of one person (the agent) to cause another 
person (the target) to act in accordance with the agent's wishes” (Bass, 1990), whereas influence 
behavior refers to "the agent's actual behavior, which causes behavioral or attitudinal change in 
the target” (Raven & Rubin, 1983; Stahelski & Paynton, 1995). Katz & Kahn (1966) argue that 
power can exist even if it is not exerted; however, influence must be activated to exist.  Influence 
behaviors illustrating this superior-subordinate power dynamic exists can be exerted in the two 
following ways: upwards, in which a subordinate acts to transform the organization’s objective 
by changing the individual or group above it in some way; or downwards, in which a superior 
acts to transform the organization’s objective by changing the individual or group below it in 
some way (Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002).   
Because power can involve “potential influence” without actually having to take action 
toward another person (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 7), I suggest that using structural and compositional 
board characteristics can serve as proxies to indicate whether board members may be more likely 
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to influence monitoring.  The individual’s power stems from his power base, with “base” 
describing the source of power that results from the relationship between the individual or group 
with power and the object of that power (French & Raven, 1959).   The way in which power is 
distributed between boards and CEOs (Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1994) affects board vigilance, 
i.e., the actions the board takes to protect the firm and shareholder value, while also providing 
links to resources in the firm’s environment (Bucholtz, Powell, & Young. 1998). 
 
2.4.    A  New Model of Board Power for Corporate Governance Research? 
Power is not an uni-dimensional construct, but rather its implications depend on how 
power is conceptualized multi-dimensionally; therefore, I present a model of board power 
specific to the monitoring context that differs from previous power models in corporate 
governance research. Boyd’s (1994) model of board control and Finkelstein’s (1992) model of 
top management team power are leading examples in the corporate governance literature that 
model power and its relationship to decision making.  Power research evolved from the work of 
French and Raven (1959) who developed a power typology defining five power types:  1) 
coercive describing perceptions of potential punishment; 2) reward power describing perceptions 
of rewards; 3) legitimate power describing perceptions of formal, hierarchical authority; 4) 
expert power describing perceptions of expertise or knowledge; and, 5) referent power 
describing perceptions of identification with the target person, or group. By integrating French & 
Raven’s social power bases model with Boyd (1994) and Finkelstein (1992), I demonstrate how 
a model of board power can extend their work, and contribute a new way to conceptually and 
empirically examine how board power impacts pay (Table 2). 
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 First, my study defines board power, specific to the monitoring of executive pay focusing 
on the board as the unit of analysis.  Although both Boyd (1994) and Finkelstein (1992) based 
their power models in agency theory, Boyd’s unit of analysis was the board of directors and 
Finkelstein’s was the top management team.   Thus, their definitions of power and its objective 
vary.  Boyd defines power in terms of the board’s control of the CEO to align the interest of 
managers with those of shareholders, while Finkelstein defines power as the capacity of the top 
management team to exert its’ will with the objective to control the board of directors and reduce 
managerial risk and uncertainty.  Finkelstein explained that the study of power required 
examining power distributions among members of a group’s coalition (e.g., top management 
team) to fully understand power ramifications when power is decentralized within a group.   
Extending their work, I base my work in agency theory and upper echelon theory and I define 
board power as the capacity of the board to compel the CEO to act in alignment with 
shareholder interests; thus, the goal of powerful boards is to control the CEO.  
Second, power models vary in terms of their relationship to decisions.  Boyd (1994) 
examined the effect of board control on executive compensation, and found that compensation 
increased when board control decreased. More importantly, he found that specific board 
characteristics can proxy for indicators of board control; specifically, board control was 
negatively associated with director compensation and CEO duality, but positively associated 
with board equity ownership, increased ownership groups’ representation, and insiders’ presence 
on the board.  While Boyd focused on control over executive compensation decisions, 
Finkelstein’s model of power was applied to strategic decisions; specifically, diversification.  
Extending their work, I examine board power in the context of executive pay. 
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Third, power models vary in terms of their dimensionality, and constructs.    While Boyd 
presented a uni-dimensional model of board control, Finkelstein presented a multi-dimensional 
model of top management team power that can be applied to the top manager context, and more 
importantly, that can be used to measure power: structural power referring to hierarchical 
authority determined by formal organizational position;  ownership power referring to “strength 
of the manager’s position in the agent-principal relationship (p. 509)” increasing managerial 
control over boards; expert power referring to the extent to which the manager  increases their 
ability to interact with the firm’s task environment; and, prestige power referring to associations 
with the membership elite that can reduce uncertainty. Finkelstein’s work on top management 
team power has been extended into the relationship between CEO power and firm performance.  
Extending French & Raven (1959), Finkelstein (1992), and Boyd (1994), I develop a multi-
dimensional model of board power:  structural, ownership and prestige.   
 Fourth, power models vary in terms of consequences from power.  Boyd’s model of 
board control increases board’s monitoring effectiveness, reduces informational uncertainty, 
reduces managerial opportunism, and reduces excessive compensation.   In contrast, 
Finkelstein’s model increases executive control over the board, reducing managerial risk and 
uncertainty.  French and Raven’s model focuses on power’s implications for the degree of 
monitoring required.  Integrating and extending their work, I suggest that my model of board 
power increases the board’s control over the CEO and increases pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Thus, I find a place to contribute something new to research.  While Boyd (1994) 
contributed a control model of CEO and board relations, Finkelstein (1992) contributed a multi-
dimensional model of top management team power, and French and Raven (1959) contributed a 
multi-dimensional model of social power bases, I contribute a multi-dimensional model of board 
21 
 
of director’s power with a unique focus on monitoring in the executive compensation context. 
Similar to Finkelstein, I argue that the dominant coalition that holds the most power can reduce 
uncertainty in board decision-making; however, I differ in that my focus is to conceptualize the 
dominant coalition as the board of directors, whereas Finkelstein’s focus was to conceptualize 
the dominant coalition as the top management team.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
CHAPTER 3. A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF BOARD POWER 
3.1.    A Multi-Dimensional Model of Board Power 
 Linking pay to performance is one way that boards effectively monitor CEOs.  This 
approach may include reducing excessive pay for a poorly performing CEO or increasing pay for 
a highly performing CEO (Hartzell & Starks, 2003) and is affected by board characteristics. 
Individual board member characteristics influence the style and degree to which boards monitor 
managers, thus affecting compensation decisions (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009) 
(Figure 1). 
Modeling board power can help explain how board characteristics influence the 
likelihood of board members to monitor managers and can contribute to corporate governance 
research.  By modeling board power in terms of board structural and compositional 
characteristics, I contribute to the previous literature by utilizing board characteristics as proxy 
indicators for the potential presence of powerful board members to take action and control the 
CEO (Figure 2).   
Power can increase when board members are more likely to make decisions that are 
relevant to the monitoring process.  Power bases may be strengthened by board member 
characteristics that affect the board’s monitoring behaviors and thus reduce information 
asymmetry between the board and CEO.  Thus, a model of board power must link board 
characteristics to the board’s monitoring role and compensation decisions.  In this paper, I argue 
that power is contextual; therefore, board power bases may be conceptualized using board 
structural and compositional characteristics.     
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3.2.    The Board of Directors’ Power Bases 
Examining how power influences variations in compensation only by focusing on either 
the CEO or the board is restrictive because the distribution of power between the board and the 
CEO affects decision processes that affect compensation decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009).   
Within the context of this paper, I restrict my discussion to the board’s power or potential 
capacity to systemically influence and control the CEO through monitoring and incentive 
alignment.  The board’s influence on the CEO is exerted directly through monitoring or 
passively through incentive-based compensation (Daily & Johnson, 1997).  
By integrating French and Raven’s power bases with Finkelstein’s conceptualization of 
top management team power, I develop a multidimensional power model that includes the 
following three key bases, or sources, for the board’s power to potentially effect change on the 
agent: ownership, structural,  and prestige (Table 3). Ownership power enables the board to 
potentially control CEO behavior by influencing decisions that affect the firm’s equity sources.  
Structural power allows the board to potentially control the CEO by influencing decisions 
connected to the board’s organizational structure.  Prestige power allows the board to control the 
CEO by potentially increasing the board member’s motivation to monitor the CEO to protect the 
board member’s reputation outside the firm.   
 
3.2.1.    Ownership Power 
Board ownership power refers to the ability of board members to potentially influence 
decisions that affect shareholder value. Finkelstein (1992) argued that top management team 
ownership power increases relative to the strength of the manager’s position in the principal-
agent relationship; specifically, the top management team member’s ownership power increases 
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if the total director ownership power decreases, managerial ownership increases, and the 
manager is the founder of the firm or related to the firm.  Extending this view to the board 
context, I argue that the board’s ownership power increases as the strength of its position in the 
agent-principal relationship increases, specifically through increased equity ownership. Board 
members with ownership power have a financial interest in monitoring the CEO to maximize 
firm profitability (Perry, 1999).   
Board ownership power affects the resolution of agency conflict because of its impact on 
monitoring decisions. Board ownership power aligns board member interests with those of 
shareholders, increasing the likelihood that board members may be more efficient monitors of 
managerial decisions (Booth, Cornett, & Tehrania, 1992; Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986) through formal means such as equity ownership and informal means such as 
status in the firm (Daily & Johnson, 1997).  The ownership power of individual board members 
is more likely to increase when the following structural and compositional board characteristics 
are present: board ownership increases relative to the CEO; board owners are present on the 
compensation committee or the nomination committee; and board owners are not related to, 
employed by, or founders of the firm.  
 Equity Difference Between Directors and CEOs. Ownership gives board members the 
right to determine who will become board members through their proxy vote (Westphal & Zajac, 
1995).  Specifically, ownership power increases the board member’s knowledge of shareholder 
goals and objectives (e.g., interest alignment), thus giving board members the motivation to 
communicate those goals and objectives to the board based on similarity.  As ownership power 
increases, board members increase their capacity to make equity decisions through their voting 
rights. As board members’ equity grows relative to the CEO, board power to influence the 
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monitoring process increases. Directors are motivated by equity ownership (Bhagat and Black, 
2001) to be more engaged monitors and are more likely to replace a poorly performing CEO; 
consequently, director ownership is positively associated with firm performance (Bhagat, Carey, 
Elson, 1999) and market value (Morck et al., 1988). 
 Compensation Committee Ownership.  The executive compensation decision-making 
process takes place primarily within the compensation committee (Singh & Harianto, 1989); 
however, previous studies indicate that the presence of a compensation committee is associated 
both with reduced pay and increased pay (Main & Johnson, 1993), suggesting that researchers 
should further examine the characteristics of these committees to resolve the disparity.   Because 
the role of this committee is to make executive compensation decisions that are aligned with 
shareholder interests (Fisher, 1986), I suggest that ownership power increases with the presence 
of board members on the compensation committee because of their capacity to control decisions 
relevant to compensation and their shared goals with stockholders.  
 Nomination Committee Ownership. Although the purpose of the nomination committee is 
to identify and select new directors, member characteristics affect the committee’s decision-
making process differently.  For example, the demographic characteristics of nomination 
committee members result in different nomination decisions based on demographics (Bilimoria 
& Piderit, 1994).   Powerful CEOs tend to select directors who have similar demographic 
characteristics to them;  consequently, this demographic similarity is associated with increased 
pay (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). As with demographic characteristics, board member ownership 
characteristics affect their nominating decisions. Although shareholders can select directors 
through their voting rights, in reality their influence is limited (Vafeas, 1999) because the 
nomination committee determines the slate of directors.   I suggest that the ownership of the 
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nomination committee members strengthens board ownership power because these board 
members with ownership power are more likely to influence decisions that not only benefit 
shareholders, as in the selection of directors, but are also aligned with shareholder interests 
because their interests are similar.  
 Unrelated Board Ownership.  When board members are related to the CEO or the 
founder of the firm, CEO ownership power increases the CEO’s capacity to control board 
decisions (Finkelstein, 1992).  Using this logic, I suggest that director ownership power increases 
as CEO ownership power decreases, which occurs when the board member is not related to the 
CEO or top management team members and is not the founder of the firm.  This scenario 
increases the likelihood that the board member will control the CEO through his/her position in 
the principal-agent relationship.   
Outsiders and insiders differ in the impact of their ownership power on monitoring and 
compensation decisions. Inside director ownership enhances earnings information (Warfield, 
Wild and Wild, 1995), increases updated management forecasting (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005), 
and decreases the potential for market decline when firms are interlocked with fraudulent firms 
(Kang, 2008).  However, because inside director owners are concerned about employment risk 
and are less likely to challenge CEOs (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), I suggest that insiders will 
be less effective in monitoring as their ownership power increases.  More importantly, both the 
Securities Exchange Commission and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gave outsiders legitimate 
authority to make compensation decisions by requiring that compensation committees be 
composed of outside directors. Therefore, I anticipate that with greater ownership power than 
insiders, outsiders will effectively influence the compensation-setting process.  When outsider 
ownership power is greater than that of insiders, I anticipate a more actively engaged board with 
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an interest in protecting its equity stake in the firm’s success. I therefore propose the following 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1: The ratio of the average outsider’s ownership power to the average insider’s 
ownership power associates negatively with total compensation and positively with pay-for-
performance sensitivity. 
 
3.2.2.    Prestige Power 
Board prestige power refers to directors’ reputations in the firm’s external environment 
(Finkelstein, 1992) as effective monitors of the CEO based on their board experiences. 
Finkelstein (1992) conceptualized top management team power in terms of its prestige or 
“status” external to the firm.  Specifically, he argued that the board members’ reputation 
influenced how stakeholders perceived them and thus had the potential to increase the top 
management team member’s influence in decisions.  Prestigious top management team members 
are members of the managerial elite, consisting of “those individuals who occupy formally 
defined positions of authority at the head of a social organization or institution.”  More 
importantly, Finkelstein argued that the reason why prestige increased the top management 
team’s influence was because prestige increased their awareness of what was happening in the 
firm’s environment, thus “facilitating the absorption of uncertainty… both informationally and 
symbolically” (p.510).   
Board prestige power affects the resolution of the agency conflict because of its potential 
impact on monitoring decisions. The prestigious power of individual board members is more 
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likely to increase when the following board structural and composition characteristics related to 
the board’s quantity and quality of board experiences are present. 
The Quantity of Board Experience  
Accumulated Board Seats. Because individual boundary-spanning capability influences 
decision making (Mintzberg, 1973), prestige power increases the board’s capacity to access 
knowledge about the firm’s perceptions by other firms and about practices and processes used by 
other firms by increasing board seats (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Rosenstein 
& Wyatt, 1994).  When a larger number of linkages exist among firms amid conditions of 
environmental uncertainty, information exchanged among these networks increases, benefiting 
the monitoring process (Boyd, 1990; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal and Zajac, 1997) 
and influencing decisions (Davis, 1991). Firms are open systems whose success is affected by 
the characteristics and players in their environment (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Serving on other 
boards of directors, being a member of the managerial elite (Giddens, 1979), and graduating 
from highly ranked universities and colleges enhances the director’s professional reputation, 
facilitating access to information not available to other directors (Finkelstein, 1992). As this 
reputation increases, highly performing CEOs (Gilson, 1990) and board members are asked to 
serve on additional boards (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003).  The CEO is motivated to 
protect his/her reputation because of the messages that are publicly available about his/her 
performance (Pharoah, 2003). Thus, prestige power affects board monitoring and compensation 
decisions because board members want to protect their reputations outside of the firm, increasing 
their motivation to effectively monitor management (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). 
The Quality of Board Experience   
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When board members interact with those external to the firm, they gain information 
about current trends, issues, and solutions in their task environment (e.g., Kefalas & Schoderbek, 
1973; Levitt and March, 1988; Pfeiffer and Salancik, 1978). Board members use their 
experiences on other boards to advise other board members (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) about 
how other firms have addressed problems (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  I consider the quality of 
the board experience in the following three ways:  a) increasing board independence, b) 
decreasing compensation, and c) increased experience on boards with high S&P ratings. 
Board Experience Increasing Board Independence. As the percentage of outsiders on a 
board increases, boards are increasingly able to make objective disciplinary decisions regarding 
CEOs, whereas insiders are more likely to challenge the CEO (Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 
1994).  For example, Boeker (1992) found that outsiders are more likely to dismiss a CEO who 
is not performing well.  Moreover, board independence has been associated with smaller 
increases in pay (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989).  Thus, board members who have served on 
boards in which the percentages of outsiders increased will have benefited from decisions that 
are aligned with improved monitoring behavior.  Consequently, these members’ knowledge of 
effective board monitoring will pass through to the new board (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).   
Board Experience Decreasing Executive Compensation. Boards that decide to decrease 
an executive’s compensation are making decisions that are aligned with shareholder interests.   
Because managerial pay is publicly available, other boards are able to discern whether potential 
board members have experience as effective monitors by decreasing pay and will be sought more 
frequently for their active monitoring experience (Zajac & Westphal, 1996).  
Board Experience on Boards with High S&P Credit Ratings. Board members who have 
served on boards with higher S&P credit ratings may have increased knowledge about financial 
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operations (Finkelstein, 1992), which increases the board member’s capacity to make decisions 
that affect the CEO’s behavior.   
Prestige power affects the resolution of agency conflict by motivating boards to 
effectively monitor to protect their reputation. In addition, prestige power provides the board 
with the capacity to advise and/or counter the CEO regarding potential resources in the firm’s 
environment that may enhance the firm’s success, thus enhancing board member reputation.  
Prestigiously powerful board members may be more likely to influence other board member 
decisions because of the perception that the powerful board members’ knowledge is superior 
based on reputation and membership in the managerial elite.  
Although outsiders and insiders may be similar in their desire to protect their reputations, 
I suggest that the outsiders’ prestige power will have a greater effect on monitoring and 
compensation decisions because outsiders’ reputations are associated with their connections 
outside the firm that increase their access to resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The board’s 
potential to effectively evaluate the CEO can be inhibited by the CEO’s “celebrity status,” 
specifically when journalists attribute firm success to the CEO’s actions rather than those arising 
from the firm’s situational context (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004, p. 638); however,  
outsiders’ access to resources and the fact that they are less affiliated with the firm suggests that 
independent directors are likely to be more objective monitors of managerial performance (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Klein, 2002).  Specifically, independent directors are more likely to challenge 
managerial decisions that can jeopardize firm profitability (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Thus, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: The ratio of the average outsider’s prestige power to the average insider’s 
prestige power associates negatively with total compensation and positively with pay-for-
performance sensitivity. 
 
3.2.3.    Structural Power 
Organizational structure affects the individual’s capacity to influence the decision-
making process, particularly with regard to his/her organizational position (Gillen & 
Carroll,1985) and tenure (Jackson, Joshi, & Earhardt, 2003). Referring to hierarchal authority or 
position in an organization (Finkelstein, 1992; Hambrick, 1981; Perrow, 1970), structural power 
enhances the ability of individuals to potentially influence compensation decisions.   
Board structural power, referring to the hierarchical decision-making authority 
recognized by other board members and the CEO, affects the resolution of the agency conflict by 
increasing the potential for the board member to influence monitoring decisions.   Structurally 
powerful boards are more likely to reduce information asymmetry between the CEO and the 
board and to make more effective pay-for-performance decisions.  Board structural power 
changes as board structural and compositional characteristics change (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 
1996). Specifically, I suggest that board hierarchical authority, compensation committee and 
nomination committee seniority, and overlapping committee membership can serve as indicators 
of the potential for a board member to be structurally powerful enough to influence  
compensation decisions and reduce the potential for managerial influence. 
Board Hierarchical Authority.  Board structural power increases as the CEO’s control of 
the board decreases. When the CEO is also the board chairman, this CEO duality creates a 
conflict of interest that is negatively associated with monitoring effectiveness (Jensen & 
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Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and firm performance (Rechner & Dalton, 1991), thus 
reducing board control (Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1989). When the CEO chairs the board, 
s/he controls decisions regarding the board’s meeting agenda and discussion, thus increasing 
managerial power (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 
1994) and the potential for managerial opportunism and entrenchment (Fama & Jensen, 1983).   
Conversely, when a non-CEO board member chairs the board, the board is in a superior position 
of decision-making authority and control because the board decides what to discuss and what 
information is needed (Horner, 2010), such as increasing the number of meetings (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  In studies of compensation, CEO duality is negatively associated with board control (e.g., 
Boyd, 1994). 
Compensation Committee Seniority.  Tenure on the compensation committee can serve as 
a proxy indicator of the potential for a board member to influence compensation decisions.  The 
compensation committee proposes to the larger board the way in which the CEO’s pay should be 
structured (Singh & Harianto, 1989b); therefore, its structure and composition significantly 
affect the board’s structural power base (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  Longer tenure increases the 
diversity of perspectives and the sources of information (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999) to the 
board and potentially provides the longer-tenured group with access to relevant information and 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), such as the history of compensation practices. Because 
compensation committee tenure is associated with increased awareness about previous 
compensation decisions, I suggest that the board members’ structural power increases as their 
tenure on the compensation committee increases.  Other board members may be more likely to 
consider the opinions of board members whose tenure on the committee exceeds their own.  
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Nomination Committee Seniority. Tenure on the nomination committee can serve as a 
proxy indicator of board members who are more likely to be structurally powerful because of 
their influence in the nomination process, which is associated with pay decisions (Westphal & 
Zajc, 1995).  Specifically, this tenure increases the board member’s knowledge of how the 
nomination committee works, as well as institutional knowledge regarding the nomination 
process.  This knowledge increases the board member’s capacity to influence director selection, 
which ultimately affects compensation. Because this knowledge increases with tenure, the 
structural power is greatest for senior committee members with the lengthiest tenure.   
Overlapping Committee Membership. Overlapping membership potentially exposes 
individual directors to more decisions relevant to the board’s monitoring role, thus making 
directors with overlapping membership more likely to be structurally powerful. Dalton et al. 
(1998) argued that the “critical processes and decisions of boards of directors do not derive from 
the board at large, but rather in subcommittees” (p. 284). When members are part of the board’s 
committee structure, their structural power increases because board committees influence the 
firm’s performance (Henke, 1986).  The board’s committee responsibilities regarding decision 
making are as follows:  the audit committee is primarily responsible for monitoring the firm’s 
financial reporting; the compensation committee determines the CEO’s compensation package;  
and the nominating committee makes decisions regarding which individuals should be on the 
board.  Thus, overlapping membership on these committees makes individual members more 
likely to increase their structural power because of their potential ability to influence monitoring 
decisions.  Moreover, participation in a greater number of committees makes an individual more 
able to effectively assess the CEO’s performance.   
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Although board structural power increases the potential for the board to control the CEO, 
the impact of outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power varies.  I suggest that when outsiders’ 
structural power is greater than that of insiders, monitoring effectiveness increases. 
Compensation committees with more insiders are perceived to be more likely to award greater 
compensation packages to managers (Lowenstein, 1994), whereas compensation committees 
with more outsiders are perceived to award lower compensation packages (Daily et al., 1998). 
More importantly, I suggest that a board’s structural power increases as board members’ 
legitimate authority increases. Outsiders’ structural power relative to insiders was strengthened 
by government regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’s requirements for 
independent auditing committees and the New York Stock Exchange’s emphasis on 
compensation, nominating, and auditing committees that are composed of “non-executives” 
(e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009; Kessner, 1988).  Further, outsiders on the audit committee are 
associated with more financial restatements (Carcello & Neal, 2002), more financially literate 
directors (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005), and reduced accounting accruals (Klein, 2002).  Thus, I 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The ratio of the average outsider’s structural power to the average 
insider’s structural power associates negatively with total compensation and positively with 
pay-for- performance sensitivity.   
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY  
4.1.   Sample 
My sample consists of companies from the Standard and Poor (S&P) 1500 for the period 
2000-2006.  Compensation data comes from Compustat Execucomp, firm financial information 
comes from Compustat’s Industrial Annual and CRSP databases, institutional ownership data 
comes from CDA/Spectrum Thomson Financial’s 13F database, and directors’ data comes from 
the RiskMetrics database. Missing data in Compustat and Risk Metrics resulted in 37,066 
director year observations yielding an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of 950 firms and 
3,581 firm-year observations. Biographical data about directors came from the S&P Net 
Advantage database, and was supplemented from information from the Standard and Poor’s 
Register of Directors and Corporations, LexisNexis, company annual reports, and SEC filings. 
Additional education information was collected from University records, New York Times news 
stories, and obituaries to complete the dataset that included educational data from S&P’s 
Register of Directors and Corporations. Because I did not limit my sample on any specific 
criteria, my sample is considered to be reasonably “randomly selected”, allowing me to make 
generalizations from my findings. Additional information about sample characteristics is 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
4.2.   Dependent Variables 
 In this paper, I examine the effects of board power on two main dependent variables that 
proxy for different aspects of executive compensation and its relationship to firm performance.  
 Total Compensation. This variable includes the CEO’s total compensation inclusive of 
salary, bonus, long-term incentives, and options. 
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 ∆ 
Pay-for-performance Sensitivity.  Following Yermack (1995), I measure pay-for-
performance sensitivity as:  
 (shares represented by option award) 
(shares outstanding at start of the year) 
                ∆ = e
-dt 
 Φ{ln(P/E) +T(r-d + σ
2
/2)/( σ√T)}
1
 
 
4.3.   Independent Variables 
 Board power bases were measured along three dimensions: ownership, structural, and 
prestige. 
 
4.3.1. Ownership Power 
 Ownership power was calculated using the following 4 variables: 
Difference in Director-CEO Ownership.  CEO ownership increases the power of the 
CEO to influence decisions (Zald, 1969), including decisions impacting their termination (Daily 
& Johnson, 1997) and managerial opportunism (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998); thus, board power 
increases when director’s ownership power is greater than that of CEOs. I measure the difference 
in ownership between directors and CEOs as the difference between the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by the director and the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the 
CEO.  A higher number indicates the board  has more ownership power over the CEO. 
Compensation committee ownership. Ownership by members of the compensation 
committee is associated with variations in compensation decisions (Daily et al., 1998; Boyd, 
                                                 
1 P=market price of stock on date option was granted; E=exercise price of the option grant; d=ln(1+dividend per share); r = log(1 
+ interest rate), interest rate is interest on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds during last month of the year; T = life of options, time 
period until date option grant expires; If the option grant expiration date was not available, I  set the life of options to 10 years; σ 
= standard Black-Scholes volatility calculated over 60 months. 
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1994); therefore, I calculate compensation committee ownership as the percentage of total 
outstanding shares by individual members of the compensation committee.  
Nomination committee ownership. I calculate nomination committee ownership as the 
percentage of total outstanding shares by individual members of the nomination committee.  
Unrelated ownership.  Finkelstein (1992) argued that TMT’s ownership power to 
influence directors increased when the ownership of TMT members who were related or 
founders of the firm increases.  Using similar logic, I suggest then that the ownership power of 
directors to influence the CEO increases as the ownership of board members who are not related, 
not founders of the firm, and not employees of the firm increase. Therefore, I calculate this 
variable as the percentage of outstanding shares owned by board members who are not related, 
founders, or employees of the firm. 
 
4.3.2. Prestige Power 
Prestige power was calculated using the board member’s accumulated board seats, 
average S&P credit rating for boards on which they served, experience on boards that decreased 
executive compensation, and experience on boards that increased board independence. 
Accumulated board seats.  Accumulated board seats were measured using the total 
number of board seats that the individual has held since 1995.    
S&P Credit Rating.   S&P credit ratings indicate how well a firm is performing; 
therefore, the average S&P credit rating of all boards on which the board member served 
indicates the board member’s service on firms external to the firm, and is an indicator of prestige 
(Finkelstein, 1992). This variable is calculated as the average S&P credit rating of firms on 
which board members served following Finkelstein (1992).  
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Board experience decreasing executive compensation. Board members who have 
experience on boards who decreased executive compensation are believed to be more active 
monitors (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Therefore, following Zajac & Westphal (1996), I assign 
each board member a 1 for each board on which they decreased executive compensation from  
year t-2 to t-1.  Then, I total this number for each board member.  I then calculate board 
experience decreasing executive compensation for each board member by dividing the number 
representing their own individual board experience by the total number of boards on which the 
entire board had experience decreasing executive compensation. 
Board experience increasing board independence. Board members who were on boards 
on which the percentage of outsiders increased are believed to be more effective monitors (Zajac 
& Westphal, 1996). Therefore, following Zajac & Westphal (1996), I assign each board member 
a 1 for each board on which the percentage of outsiders increased from  year t-2 to t-1.  Then, I 
total this number for each board member to arrive at the total number representing the total 
number of boards on which the entire board had experience increasing board independence.  I 
then calculate board experience increasing board independence  for each board member by 
dividing the number representing their own individual board experience by the total number of 
boards on which the entire board had experience increasing board independence.  
 
4.3.3. Structural Power 
 Structural power is calculated using the following four variables: overlapping committee 
membership, compensation committee seniority, nomination committee seniority, and board 
hierarchical authority. 
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 Overlapping compensation committee membership. Because structural power increases as 
the board member’s access to compensation decisions within the board increases, I suggest that 
the board member’s structural power increases when the board member is a member of both the 
audit and compensation committees and/or when the board member is member of both the 
nomination and compensation committees. This variable is calculated as 3 if the board member 
is on all 3 committees; 2 if the board member is either on both the audit and compensation 
committees or both the compensation and nomination committees; and, 1 if the board member 
does not have overlapping membership either on the audit and compensation committees or on 
the nomination and compensation committees. 
 Compensation committee seniority.  Structural power increases as the tenure of the board 
member on the compensation committee increases. This variable is determined  using the tenure 
of each member of the compensation committee on the overall board by rank-ordering  
compensation committee members so that the compensation committee member with the least 
firm tenure is scored 1 and the compensation committee member with the highest tenure is given 
the highest number. 
 Nomination committee seniority. Structural power increases as the seniority of 
individuals on the nomination committee increases. This variable is determined  using the tenure 
of each member of the nomination committee on the overall board by rank-ordering nomination 
committee members so that the nomination committee member with the least tenure is scored 1 
and the nomination committee member with the highest tenure is given the highest number. 
 Hierarchical Authority.  Board structural power increases with hierarchical authority that 
allows the board member to control the CEO. Therefore, I develop a ranking of board titles 
(Appendix B), such that non-CEO board members who chair the board are ranked higher than 
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board members who do not rank committees or the board. I then rank order the board using these 
numbers, and calculate the percentage of the board that falls below the focal board member. 
Thus, board members with higher percentages indicate higher hierarchical authority than board 
members with lower percentages. 
 
4.4.  Control Variables 
 Firm size.  Larger firms are associated with increased managerial opportunism  (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985) and executive compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1989); therefore, I 
control for firm size as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  
 Firm profitability.  I control for the firm’s financial performance using return on assets as 
the ratio of the firm’s net income to total assets since higher performance is associated with 
increased compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1989).  
 Market growth.  Higher market growth is associated with increased compensation; 
therefore, I control for market growth using Tobin’s q as the market value to the book value of 
equity.  
 Liquidity. I control for liquidity as the ratio of the firm’s current assets to current 
liabilities.  
 Leverage. I control for leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  
Institutional Ownership.  Ownership concentration is associated with efficient managerial 
decision-making (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002). Institutional ownership 
concentration reduces executive compensation and increases long-term incentive-based pay 
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998) and is associated with monitoring effectiveness (Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1986; Berle and Means, 1932); therefore, I control for total institutional ownership as 
the total ownership by institutional investors. 
Large Owners. I control for large institutional ownership as the total ownership of the 
institutional investor with the most ownership of all institutional owners in the firm because large 
owners influence monitoring effectiveness (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008; 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Specifically, large owners are associated with lower levels of 
compensation, greater salary proportion of the pay mix, and  less contingent compensation 
(Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005). 
CEO change.  I control for the change of the CEO using a binary variable coded 1 if a 
new CEO started in the focal year. 
CEO salary exceeding $1 million. Since firms enjoy tax benefits as long as the CEO’s 
salary is less than $1 million, I control for salary exceeding $1 million as a dichotomous variable 
where 1 indicates the CEO’s salary was greater than $1 million.  
Firm Risk. I control for the firm’s systemic risk using beta to measure the variance of the 
firm’s stock price relative to the market.  
Lagged compensation. Since the CEO’s prior year’s compensation impacts the following 
year’s compensation, I control for the CEO’s compensation at (t-1). 
Industry. I control for industry- effects using 2- digit SIC classification dummy codes.  
Post-Sarbanes Oxley. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 affected how boards should 
be structured, I control for time following this Act with 1 if the year is beyond 2002. 
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4.5.    Method 
Panel data has been used to consider how corporate governance mechanisms impact 
compensation and pay-for-performance (e.g., Finkelstein and Boyd 1989; Dharwadkar et al., 
2008).  While cross-sectional data approaches consider changes in firms at one point in time, 
cross-sectional time series data allows me to consider how firms change over a period of time, 
and how firms differ in executive compensation. To test for multicollinearity, I ran an ordinary 
least squares regression using the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, and found no severe 
indications of a problem.  Average VIF levels fell below the 5.0 multicollinearity level indicating 
multicollinearity was not significantly present (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh, 1980).  Because my 
sample tested positive for some autocorrelation present, a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
robust variance-covariance estimator was used to adjust the estimation of the variance of the 
parameters in my model.
2
 Conducting  White’s Test (White, 1980) and Breusch-Pagan Test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979), I found heteroscedasticity in my data; therefore, I ran my model 
using a generalized least squares  regression, which adjusts standard errors in correcting for 
heteroscedasticity.  I control for potential outliers by winsorizing my variables at p=0.01.  Prior 
to conducting my analyses, I conducted the Shapiro Wilk’s W test for normal distribution to 
assess if my variables were normally distributed, and adjusted some variables to their natural 
logs as indicated in the variables section. To address concerns for endogeneity, I lagged my 
independent variables by one year (t-1) to examine the effects of board power on compensation 
at time t.     
 
                                                 
2
  I  examined whether my residuals are iid through my box graph and qnorm graphs of residuals pre and post 
variable transformations. This graph indicates that residuals are not iid, and thus, the robust vce estimator was 
needed because the observations are not independent (Appendix C). 
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4.5.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis: Principal Components vs. Principal Factors Analysis 
 Principal components factor analysis and principal factor analysis are methods used in 
exploratory factor analysis to extract common factors; however, these methods differ in terms of 
approach, and therefore, the researcher must consider the purpose for extracting factors prior to 
choosing the correct method.  Principal components factor analysis is mostly a data reduction 
technique that creates composite measures by using all the variance of the variables, while 
principal factor analysis is a factor extraction method that creates factors using only the shared 
variance among the variables (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Because principal factor analysis 
considers the “underlying structure caused by the latent variables (Costello & Osborne, 2005, 
p.2) and principal component factor analysis does not, I choose to utilize those factors predicted 
through the principal factor analysis method in my regressions.  However, in this section, I first 
replicate the principal components factor analysis process used by Finkelstein (1992) to 
demonstrate validity and show that the variables load onto 3 distinct factors using principal 
components factor analysis, thus demonstrating my study extends his work theoretically to the 
board context.  Second, I then discuss the principal factor analysis technique, and demonstrate 
construct validity with this technique. 
 
Principal Components Factor Analysis  
In the second stage of my study, I initially extracted three dimensions to measure board 
power and evaluated their measurements in terms of their validity.  I conducted an exploratory 
principal components factor analysis restricting factors to those with eigenvalues of at least 1 
(Table 4).  Principal components analysis limits the error associated with using a single variable 
measurement through creating composite factors using the entire variance of each variable 
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(Costello & Osborne, 2005).  Following Finkelstein (1992) who used principal components 
analysis with a promax oblique rotation because he expected power dimensions to correlate with 
each other, I conducted a promax oblique rotation because I expect my power dimensions to 
correlate somewhat with each other, as they all are indicative of board power.  Consequently, my 
principal components factor analysis resulted in three dimensions explaining approximately 53% 
variance in my data. 
3
 The three factors included: a) structural power: overlapping compensation 
committee  membership with the audit and/or nomination committees; compensation committee 
seniority,  nomination committee seniority, and board hierarchical authority; b) ownership 
power:  difference between the director’s ownership and the CEO’s ownership, compensation 
committee ownership; nomination committee ownership, and the percentage of ownership by 
directors who are unrelated, founders, or employees of the firm; and, c) prestige power: S&P 
credit ratings, accumulated board seats, experience decreasing executive compensation, and 
experience increasing board independence. 
 
Principal Factor Analysis 
 As with the principal components factor analysis, dimensions created by principal factors 
analysis demonstrate validity, I find that variables load distinctly onto three dimensions (Table 
5).   These final three factors included: a) ownership power:  difference between the director’s 
ownership and the CEO’s ownership, ownership by members of the compensation committee; 
ownership by members of the nomination committee, and the percentage of ownership of 
                                                 
3
 The use of principal components analysis has been used by corporate governance scholars to examine how 
governance indicators may load onto single factors. Dey (2008) conducted an exploratory principal components 
analysis on 22 governance variables that resulted in 7 governance indicators: 1) governance and functioning of 
board of directors; 2) executive compensation; 3) equity-based director compensation; 4) “independence of the 
auditor, structure, and functioning of the audit committee”; 5)board’s control over financial reporting quality.  
Exploratory factor analysis was also used by Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna (2007) who found 14 governance factors 
from 39 indicators. 
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members not related , founder, or employee of the firm; b) prestige power: accumulate board 
seats, S&P credit rating, effective board practices (increased outsider percentage), and effective 
board practices (decreased executive compensation); and,  c) structural power: overlapping 
compensation committee  membership with audit and/or nomination committees, compensation 
committee status, nomination committee status, and board hierarchical authority.   As indicated 
in Table 6, my model demonstrates construct validity because all my loadings are greater than 
.40 and load onto a single factor. 
My power dimensions demonstrate internal consistency as indicated by the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of reliability assessing how different measures are similar in measuring a latent 
construct. Alphas greater than or equal to 0.60 are considered an acceptable level of reliability 
(Nunnally, 1967).   I found that each power base had a Cronbach alpha > .60 (Prestige: 0.66; 
Structural: 0.70; Ownership:0.69), establishing internal consistency within my model. Similarly, 
I find that the overall board power construct has a Cronbach alpha of 0.60.   Thus, my 
dimensions demonstrate construct, internal and discriminant validity. 
 
4.5.2. Descriptive Correlations and Power 
In this section, I examined the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables I use 
to measure power (Table 7).  Comparing the correlations of items measuring power and the main 
dependent variables in with our power constructs in Table 7,  I  provide some initial insight. into 
the relationship between compensation outcomes and my variables composing ownership, 
prestige and structural power.  First, In terms of ownership power, I find total compensation is 
negatively associated with ownership on the compensation committee (r =- 0.034, p < 0.001), 
ownership on the nomination committee (r = -0.023, p < 0.001) and unrelated ownership (r = -
46 
 
0.031, p < 0.001), but not significantly related to the difference between director and CEO 
ownership (r = 0.007, p > 0.10).  Pay-for-performance is positively associated with ownership 
on the compensation committee (r = 0.022, p < 0.001), ownership on the nomination committee 
(r = 0.027, p < 0.001),  and unrelated ownership (r =0.033, p < 0.001) , but negatively associated 
with the difference between director ownership and CEO ownership (r = -0.052, p < 0.001).   
When I examine the correlations of variables used to examine Prestige Power, I find that 
total compensation is negatively related to effective board practice decreasing compensation (r = 
-0.027, p < 0.001), accumulated board seats (r = -0.068, p < 0.001), and S&P credit rating 
experience (r = -0.071, p < 0.001), but not related to effective board practice increasing board 
independence (r = 0.002, p > 0.10).  However, we find that pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
positively associated with effective board practice decreasing compensation (r = 0.025, p < 
0.001), effective board practice increasing board independence ( r = 0.009, p < 0.10),  
accumulated board seats (r = 0.147, p < 0.001), and S&P credit rating experience (r = 0.156, p < 
0.001).  Finally, when I examine the correlation relations  of variables used to examine structural 
power, in terms of its variables and as a construct, I find total compensation is positively 
associated with nomination committee seniority (r = 0.028, p < 0.001) and hierarchical status (r 
= 0.015, p < 0.01), negatively associated with overlapping committee membership (r = -0.013, 
p< 0.05), and not associated with compensation committee seniority (r = -0.008, p> 0.10). 
However, I find pay-for-performance is negatively associated with compensation committee 
seniority (r = -0.033, p < 0.001), nomination committee seniority(r = - 0.078, p < 0.001), 
hierarchical authority (r = -0.040, p < 0.001), but positively related to overlapping membership 
(r = 0.010, p < 0.05).    
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Finally, because no factors have a correlation greater than 0.65, the correlations among 
the factors are low,  indicating my dimensions demonstrate discriminant validity (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007; Finkelstein, 1992) (Table 8).   In Tables 8a-8c, I examine how each power 
dimension correlates with the other power dimensions when considering the board as one group, 
as well as when considering insiders as distinct from outsiders.   In Table 8, I find that all three 
dimensions are correlated with each other, as expected.   Interestingly, I note that prestige power 
is negatively associated with ownership power (r = -0.013, p < 0.01), but positively associated 
with structural power (r = 0.226, p < 0.001).  Structural power, however, is positively associated 
with ownership power(r = 0.102, p < 0.001).  As the study examines how outsiders and insiders 
differ in regards to their power relationship to monitoring, I examine how outsiders’ power 
dimensions correlate with each other in Table 8b,  while looking at how insiders’ power 
dimensions correlate with each other in Table 8c . 
 
4.5.3. Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Structural Equation Modeling 
In order to establish model fit, I utilized structural equation modeling procedures to 
conduct my confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).   I consider multiple goodness of fit statistics:  
Chi-square for overall model fit (χ
2 
); root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA);  
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI); standardized root mean square residual (SRMR); and, comparative fit 
index considering how the Chi-square changes when compared with a null model (CFI).  The 
coefficient of determination (CD) is an indicator of the percentage of the latent construct 
explained by its predictors. This CFA across all models also demonstrated factor loadings > 0.40, 
further illustrating convergent validity with my EFA on all of my constructs (Table 9). In 
addition I note my paths from my observed variables are all significant at p = 0.00. 
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In order to further examine model fit, I examine model fit statistics on single factor 
models and the three factor model. Then, I compare fit statistics across all my models.  
 
Single Factor Models 
First, I conduct my CFA for single factor models: ownership (Figure 3), prestige (Figure 
4), and structural (Figure 5).  Single factor models demonstrate model fit for each one-factor 
model: ownership, structural, and prestige power bases.  Although I note that the Chi-squared 
statistic is large, and does not reflect “strong fit”, I suggest the Chi-squared statistic is not an 
appropriate goodness of fit statistic indicator for my sample because of my sample’s large size. 
Specifically, I argue the Chi-squared statistics are sensitive to larger samples (Shreiber, Stage, 
King, Nora, & Barlow, 2006). Because I have a large number of observations (n > 37,000) and 
parameters to be estimated, my Chi-squared statistic will automatically be large.  I thus conclude 
the other goodness-of-fit tests are more likely to accurately reflect the true fit of my models.  
Overall, I compare fit across one-factor and three-factor models and find my models demonstrate 
that they have reasonably good fit. 
 
Three Factor Models 
When I combine the models together into a three factor model, I find the model 
demonstrates reasonably good fit  (Figure 6 and 7).   Although my Chi-square of 5628 (p  < 
0.001) for the model indicates some concerns with model fit, two additional goodness of fit 
statistics indicate that my confirmatory factor analysis in Figure 6  demonstrates adequate model 
fit [ RMSEA=0.054; SRMSR=0.033), while one additional goodness of fit statistic is .02 less 
than the cutoff for accepted fit [CFI=0.932] as indicated in my path diagram.  
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Deciding which GFI index to use is consistently debated in the literature (Stage, King, Nora, 
& Barlow, 2006).  Although my χ
2
 test indicates poor fit with χ
2
 =5628 (p.=0.00), the  χ
2
 test is 
sensitive to large sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999); therefore, as my sample size for my factor 
analysis is over 37,000 observations, I do not consider χ
2
 to be an appropriate test of goodness of 
fit for my sample.   My other goodness-of-fit sensitivity test statistics minimize the sensitivity to 
large samples that I noted with the χ
2
 statistic, illustrating a goodness-of-fit that is robust to 
larger sample size.  Thus, I find my three model indicates reasonably good fit according to my 
SRMR =0.034 and RMSEA=0.054, which is below the SRMR=0.08 and RMSEA=0.06-0.08 
recommended by Stage, King, Nora, & Barlow (2006). 
 
4.5.4. Calculating Power Scores 
4.5.4.1.   Ownership Power 
After calculating each individual’s ownership power factor score using the principal factor 
analysis method, I then calculate the average outsider ownership power and average insider 
ownership power as:  
 
                                   
                                                         
                    
 
              where i= number of outside board members  
 
  
                                  
                                                        
                   
 
             where i= number of inside board members 
I then develop a  ratio to represent when outsiders’ ownership power is greater than insiders. 
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4.5.4.2.  Prestige Power 
After calculating each individual’s prestige power factor score using the principal factor analysis 
method, I then calculate the average outsider prestige power and average insider prestige power 
as:  
                                   
                                                        
                    
 
                                                                        where i= number of outside board members 
 
  
                                 
                                                      
                   
 
                                                                        where i= number of inside board members 
I then develop a ratio to represent when outsider prestige power is greater than insiders. 
 
                
         
        
  
                               
                              
 
 
 
4.5.4.3.  Structural Power 
After calculating each individual’s structural power factor score using the principal factor 
analysis method, I then calculate the average outsider structural power and average insider 
structural power as:  
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                                                                        where i= number of inside board members 
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I then develop a ratio to represent when outsider structural power is greater than insiders. 
 
                  
         
        
  
                                 
                                
 
 
4.6.   Random or fixed-effects Model Selection 
In determining whether to run a random or fixed-effects model, I considered the issue 
theoretically and statistically. The Hausmann test examines whether fixed-effects, random-
effects, or both estimators are consistent.  If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, I conclude 
that either method works fine, and the resulting estimators should be consistent and similar.  
However, if the test rejects the null hypothesis of consistency, I find the fixed-effects estimator is 
consistent, while the random-effects estimator is not, resulting in different results under both 
models.  
Due to my Hausmann test findings, I report and discuss the fixed-effects regression 
method findings from my analysis because the Hausmann test indicates random-effects 
estimators are not consistent and the estimators are biased (χ
2
=187.22, p=0.00). The fixed-effects 
method will hold constant all the time-invariant observable factors of the fixed effect.  In this 
case, I include industry and year fixed-effects in my model, which is based on the assumption 
that industry effects do not change over time.   
 I acknowledge that the choice to use the fixed-effects method has some limitations. 
Primarily, with the fixed-effects method, I lose the ability to consider how unobserved 
heterogeneity in my data can affect my results. In contrast to my fixed-effects model, the 
random-effects model with industry controls allows the model to consider industry changes over 
time.   Practically, this means I allow the effect of industry to vary over time with the random-
effects method, such that the effect of the industry may be important in the effects on 
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compensation in one time period, but not important in the other time period. Therefore, I also 
present my random-effects regression results in the Robustness section of my discussion,  and 
find my results remain basically similar.   
 
4.6.1. Regression Model 
Finally, I consider how outsider power relative to insider power affects my results: 
Executive Compensationit = α + β1Outsiders/Insiders Ownership Powerit + β2Outsiders/Insiders Prestige 
Powerit + β3Outsiders/Insiders Structural Powerit + ∑
11
k=1 βk Xit + Ɛit   
              where k=control variables; i=firm i; t=year 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 
5.1.    Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 In the first stage of my study, I gathered summary descriptive and correlation statistics 
among my variables. The descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and 
correlations, for all variables in my regression analyses are provided in Table 10. We see that the 
average total CEO compensation was $5.48M (standard deviation (s.d.) is $6.12M), salary 
proportion was 25%, contingent compensation long-term incentive pay (LTIP) was 44%, 
contingent compensation including long-term incentive pay and bonus (LTIP-Bonus) was 56%, 
and pay-for-performance sensitivity is $1.56.  In terms of equity ownership, I find that the 
average overall institutional ownership is 69% (s.d. 17.6%) and average largest institutional 
owner is 9.08 % (s.d. of 4.00%).   In line with previous research (e.g., Dharwadkar, Goranova, 
Brandes, and Khan, 2008), the correlation statistics indicate that firm size (r = 0.332), growth (r 
= 0.255),  profitability (r = 0.140), risk (r = 0.055),  institutional ownership (r = 0.040),  salary 
exceeding $1 million (r=0.355),  the previous year’s compensation (r =0.664), and contingent 
compensation (r = 0.232)  are positively correlated with total compensation, while liquidity (r = 
-0.070), salary proportion of the pay mix (r = -0.468),  and the largest institutional owner are 
negatively associated with total compensation (-0.100).   I find that pay-for-performance 
sensitivity is negatively associated with firm size (r = -0.147), firm performance (r = -0.184), 
leverage (r = -0.170), risk (r = -0.240), salary exceeding $1 M (r = -0.149), the post Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) (r = - 0.093),  the lagged salary proportion of the pay mix (r = - 
0.105),  and positively associated with market growth (r = 0.113), liquidity (r = 0.246), 
institutional ownership (r = 0.068), largest owner (r = 0.088), lagged total compensation (r = 
0.035), and contingent compensation (r = 0.232).  I find that the salary proportion of 
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compensation is negatively associated with firm size (r =- 0.193), market growth (r = -0.208), 
firm profitability (r = -0.152), risk (r = -0.039), institutional ownership (r = -0.174), salary 
exceeding $1 M (r = -0.180), post SOX (r = -0.075), previous year’s compensation (r = -0.366), 
and contingent compensation (r = -0.287), but positively associated with liquidity (r = 0.041), 
largest owner (r = 0.054), and previous year’s salary proportion of the pay mix (r = 0.553).  
Contingent compensation (LTIP+Bonus) is positively associated with firm size (r = 0.033),  
market growth (r = 0.311), firm performance (r = 0.077), liquidity (r = 0.107), institutional 
ownership (r = 0.086), previous year’s compensation (r = 0.203),  and previous year’s 
contingent-based pay (r = 0.504), but negatively associated with leverage (r = -0.137),  risk (r = 
-0.158), largest owner (r = -0.039), post SOX (r = -0.178), and previous year’s salary proportion 
(r = -0.329). 
 In examining the correlations of the power ratios, we find that the ratio of the average 
outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is negatively associated with total compensation (r = -
0.039, p < 0.05), but insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (r = -0.021, 
p > 0.10). The ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is not significantly 
associated with total compensation (r = -0.004, p > 0.10), but positively associated with pay-for-
performance sensitivity (r = 0.043, p < 0.01).  Finally, the ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ structural power is not associated with total compensation (r = 0.018, p > 0.10), but is 
negatively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (r = -0.056, p < 0.001). 
 
5.2.    Results: Total Compensation and Pay-for-performance Sensitivity 
 We examine the direct effects of power on total executive compensation  and pay-for-
performance sensitivity in Table 11.  In Model 1, I run baseline model of control variables on 
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total compensation.  I find that firm size (β = 0.36, p < 0.001), growth (β = 0.21, p < 0.001), 
institutional ownership (β = 0.03, p < 0.05), and post SOX (β = 0.06, p < 0.05) are positively 
associated with compensation, while CEO change (β = -0.03, p < 0.05) and CEO tenure (β = -
0.05, p < 0.10) are negatively associated with compensation.  In Model 6, I run a baseline model 
of control variables on pay-for-performance sensitivity, and find that firm size (β = -0.29, p < 
0.05)  and post SOX (β = -0.06, p < 0.10) are negatively associated with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, while the largest institutional owner (β = 0.04, p < 0.10) and salary exceeding $1 M 
(β = 0.03, p < 0.05) are positively related. 
 
5.2.1. Ownership Power  
 In Hypothesis 1, I suggest that board members with ownership power are more likely to 
impact monitoring effectiveness.  Specifically, I argue that the ratio of the average ownership 
power of outsiders’ to insiders’ is negatively associated with total compensation, but positively 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity.   
In Model 2, I examine how ownership power impacts total compensation and in Model 7, 
how ownership power impacts pay-for-performance sensitivity. When I examine the ratio of the 
ownership power of outsiders’ to insiders in Model 2, I find the ratio of the average ownership 
power of outsiders to insiders’(β = 0.01, p > 0.10) is not significantly related to total 
compensation.   In Model 7, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power to 
insiders’ (β = 0.00, p > 0.10)  is not related to pay-for-performance. Thus, I find no support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
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5.2.2. Prestige Power 
In Hypothesis 2, I suggest that board members with prestige power are more likely to 
impact monitoring effectiveness.   Specifically, I argue that the ratio of the average prestige 
power of outsiders’ to insiders’ is negatively associated with total compensation, but positively 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
In Model 3, I examine how prestige power impacts total compensation and in Model 8, 
how prestige power impacts pay-for-performance sensitivity.  When I examine the ratio of the 
prestige power of outsiders’ to insiders’ in Model 3, I find the ratio of the average prestige power 
of outsiders’ to insiders’(β = 0.07, p < 0.001) is positively associated with compensation.  In 
Model 8, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige power to insiders’ (β = 0.04, p < 
0.05) is positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity. Thus, I find partial support 
for Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.2.3. Structural Power 
In Hypothesis 3, I suggest the capacity for board members who are structurally powerful 
are more likely to impact monitoring effectiveness.  Specifically, I argue that the ratio of the 
average outsiders’ structural power to insiders’ is negatively associated with total compensation, 
but positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
In Model 4, I examine how structural power impacts total compensation and in Model 9, 
how structural power impacts pay-for-performance sensitivity.  In Model 4, I find total 
compensation is positively associated with the ratio of the average structural power of outsiders’ 
to insiders’ (β = 0.04, p < 0.05). In Model 9, I find the ratio of the average structural power of 
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outsiders’ to insiders’ (β = -0.01, p > 0.10) is not significantly related to pay-for-performance.  
Thus, I find no support for hypothesis 3. 
 
5.2.4.  Full Model 
Our results remain almost similar when I examine ownership, prestige, and structural  
power variables simultaneously on compensation and on pay-for-performance. When I examine 
the ratios of outsiders’ and insiders’ ownership, prestige, and structural power together in Model 
5 on total compensation, I find total compensation is positively, but insignificantly associated 
with the ratio of the average ownership power of outsiders’ to insiders’ (β = 0.01, p > 0.10) and 
the ratio of the average structural power of outsiders’ to insiders’ (β = 0.03, p > 0.10),  while the 
ratio of the average prestige power of outsiders’ to insiders’ (β = 0.07, p < 0.001)  is significantly 
positively related.  In Model 10, I find that pay-for-performance sensitivity is not related to the 
ratio of the outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power (β = 0.01, p > 0.10), nor structural power(β = 
- 0.02, p > 0.10); however, it is positively associated with the ratio pertaining to prestige power 
(β = 0.04, p < 0.05) .   
 
5.3.   Winsorized Power Ratios  
We run the regression analyses again winsorizing the power ratios at p = 0.01, and find the 
results remain similar (Table 12).  The ratio of the average prestige power of outsiders’ to 
insiders’ is positively associated with total compensation (β = 0.06, p < 0.001) and pay-for-
performance sensitivity (β = 0.04, p < 0.05).   Although the ratio of the average structural power 
of outsiders’ to insiders is positively associated with total compensation in the individual model 
(β = 0.04, p < 0.05), the result is no longer significant in the full model (β = 0.02, p > 0.10).  The 
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ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is not significantly associated with 
compensation (β = 0.02, p > 0.10), nor with pay-for-performance (β = 0.01, p > 0.10). 
 
5.4.    Robustness Checks 
5.4.1. Random-Effects Model:  Total Compensation and Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
The random-effects model allows me to consider industry changes over time, as well as 
the ability to make inferences about the larger population.  For robustness, I run my regressions 
on total compensation and pay-for-performance again using random-effects with industry 
controls, and find that my results remain mostly the same with two exceptions; specifically, the 
ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is negatively associated with pay-for-
performance sensitivity and the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is 
positively associated with total compensation in the winsorized model (Appendix D). In Tables 
D 17-18, I present the results of the random-effects panel data analyses of ownership, prestige, 
and structural power with compensation and pay-for-performance.    
I examine the direct effects in Table D-17. As with the fixed-effects models, the ratio of 
the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is positively associated with both total 
compensation  (β = 0.04, p < 0.01)   and pay-for-performance  (β = 0.04, p < 0.05) and the 
average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is significantly related to total compensation  (β = 
0.02 p < 0.05)  in the isolated model, but not in the full model.  However, different from the 
fixed-effects model, the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is negatively 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = -0.04, p < 0.05).    
I examine the winsorized power ratios in Table D-18. In contrast to the fixed-effects 
model, the random-effects model shows that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power 
59 
 
is significantly positively associated with total compensation (β = 0.02, p < 0.10) in the 
winsorized model, although having a similar insignificant relationship with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity  (β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  
 Non-Linear Relationships. In contrast to the fixed-effects regression analysis, the 
random-effects regression (Table D-19) demonstrates that the ratio of the average outsiders’ 
ownership power to insiders’ (β = 0.04, p < 0.05; β =  -0.03, p < 0.05) has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with compensation, but insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance (β = -
0.00, p > 0.10; β =  -0.01, p > 0.10).  However, the average outsiders’ prestige power to does not 
have a non-linear relationship with total compensation insiders’ (β = 0.02, p> 0.10; β =  0.05, p < 
0.001), nor pay-for-performance sensitivity(β = 0.01, p > 0.10; β =  0.06, p < 0.01).  Although 
the average outsiders to insiders’ structural power does not have a non-linear relationship with 
total compensation (β = 0.00, p > 0.10; β =  0.01, p  > 0.10) it has a U-shaped relationship with 
pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = -0.04, p < 0.10; β =  0.05, p < 0.05).  
 
5.4.2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) 
As an additional robustness test, I run an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with 
industry and year fixed-effects (Appendix E).  In Table E-20, I find that the ratio of the average 
outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is positively associated with total compensation (β = 0.03, 
p < 0.01) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.04, p < 0.10), while the ratio of the average 
outsiders to insiders’ structural power is negatively associated with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (β = -0.03, p < 0.10). 
In Table E-21, I examine my winsorized power ratios and find that the ratio of the 
outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is negatively associated with pay-for-performance 
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sensitivity (β = -0.03, p < 0.10) and the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power 
is positively associated with total compensation (β = 0.03, p < 0.01), but not pay-for-
performance sensitivity (β = 0.03, p > 0.10).  I find total compensation is insignificantly related 
to the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) and the ratio of the 
average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power (β = 0.01, p > 0.10).  In contrast to the fixed and 
random-effects models, the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is not 
significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.03, p > 0.10). 
 
5.4.3. Change in Total Compensation 
 As a final robustness test for my regressions, I ran my fixed-effects regressions using 
change in total compensation (Appendix F) as my dependent variable, and find that total 
compensation is negatively, but insignificantly associated with the ratio of outsiders’ ownership 
power to insiders’ (β = -0.01, p > 0.10) , positively associated with the ratio of outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ (β = 0.11, p < 0.001) , and insignificantly associated with the ratio of 
outsiders’ structural power to insiders (β = 0.01, p > 0.10) (Table F-22).  These results are similar 
in my winsorized model (Table F-23). 
 In contrast to the fixed-effects regression model, the random-effects regression shows 
that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power to insiders’ (β = 0.02, p < 0.05) is 
positively associated with change in total compensation, while the ratio of the average outsiders’ 
to insiders’ prestige power is not significantly associated (β = 0.03, p > 0.10) (Table F-24).  The 
ratio of the average outsiders’ structural power to insiders’(β = -0.01, p > 0.10) is insignificantly 
associated with change in total compensation. These results are similar in my winsorized model 
(Table F-25). 
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5.4.4. Considering Alternative Items for Prestige Dimension 
To examine whether additional items representing either educational expertise or industry 
experience may load onto the prestige dimension, I conduct my principal factor analysis using 
education status , accumulated industry experience, and ratio of director tenure to CEO tenure 
(Appendix G).  
Education status.  Receiving a degree, particularly an advanced degree, from a high-
ranking university or college places a board member in the managerial elite, elevating his/her 
reputation and status (Finkelstein, 1992).  Advanced training signals the board member’s 
superior ability (D’Aveni, 1990). The more board members’ graduating from elite universities 
and colleges, the greater the board’s prestige power and access to information relevant to the 
monitoring process.  I suggest, however, that ranking educational institutions is largely a matter 
of cultural and geographic perception; therefore, scholars should be cautious in concluding that 
graduates of institutions not on U.S.- based colleges and universities ranking lists are less 
prestigious.  Rather, I suggest that the level of degree is an equitable signal of prestigious power 
because an advanced degree correlates education and knowledge that allows the board member 
to decrease uncertainty in the board’s decision-making process.  
Following Finkelstein (1992), I initially calculated the board’s average elite education 
status by compiling each individual member’s education status measured on a scale of 0-3 with 0 
indicating no formal higher education; 1 indicating the board member received neither an 
undergraduate nor graduate degree from an elite institution; 2 indicating the board member 
received either an undergraduate or graduate degree from an elite institution; or 3 indicating the 
board member received both an undergraduate and graduate degree from an elite institution. 
However, because I noticed that some board members received their degrees outside the U.S., I 
62 
 
suggest this measure will underestimate the prestige status of the board member’s education 
level.  Rather, I followed (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), and used the education status of the 
individual where 1 indicates less than a bachelor’s degree; 2 indicates less than a master’s 
degree; 3 indicates less than a doctoral degree; and 4 indicates a doctoral degree. 
 Results  indicate that expertise education does not load onto one of the three dimensions, 
but rather is as an unique measure that may suggest the presence of a potential fourth dimension. 
 Industry Experience. Experience in the industry is relevant to monitoring effectiveness.  
Calculating industry experience as the total number of years of experience a board member has 
in the firm’s 2-digit SIC code, I consider how industry experience affects compensation.  I find 
that this measure does not load positively onto any of the three dimensions; however, it loads 
negatively onto the prestige dimension, suggesting that future research may want to consider 
further variables that will collectively create a solid expertise dimension using four new 
variables.  I can hypothesize that the fourth dimension may involve additional variables that will 
correlated negatively with the prestige dimension, but be internally consistent as a measure of 
overall board power.  Because a director’s experience in the same industry as the focal firm may 
increase their capacity to influence the control of information and decisions, I calculate industry 
experience as the total number of years of that director in the focal industry.   
Education status.  Following Finkelstein (1992), we initially calculated the board’s 
average elite education status by compiling each individual member’s education status measured 
on a scale of 0-3 with 0 indicating no formal higher education; 1 indicating the board member 
received neither an undergraduate nor graduate degree from an elite institution; 2 indicating the 
board member received either an undergraduate or graduate degree from an elite institution; or 3 
indicating the board member received both an undergraduate and graduate degree from an elite 
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institution. However, because we noticed that some board members received their degrees 
outside the U.S., we suggest this measure will underestimate the prestige status of the board 
member’s education level.  Rather, we followed (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), and used the 
education status of the individual where 1 indicates less than a bachelor’s degree; 2 indicates less 
than a master’s degree; 3 indicates less than a doctoral degree; and 4 indicates a doctoral degree. 
Ratio of director tenure to CEO tenure. The greater the director’s tenure relative to the 
CEO, the more they may have the capacity to influence the CEO. Therefore, I calculate the ratio 
of the director’s tenure to the CEO as the total number of years the director has been director of 
the focal firm to the total number of years the CEO as served as CEO. 
Overall, the principal factors analysis illustrates that these three variables do not load in 
the same direction onto one of the three power dimensions considered in this study; however, the 
findings may indicate that further research should explore the existence of a potential fourth or 
fifth dimension.   Because industry experience loads negatively (-0.57) onto the prestige 
dimension, this finding may be indicative of a fourth power dimension that may be negatively 
correlated to the prestige dimension (e.g., possibly some type of expertise or informational power 
dimension).  In addition, both the ratio of the director tenure to CEO tenure and educational 
status indicate that they are unique (uniqueness > 0.90), and may load onto a completely 
different power dimension to be explored in future studies.  
Overall, my findings indicate that education status does not load (factor loading  < 0.40) onto 
any of the three dimensions: ownership, structural, prestige.   Because accumulated industry 
experience loads negatively onto the prestige dimension, I interpret this finding to be indicative 
of the potential for another power dimension that may correlate negatively with the prestige 
dimension.  Together, these two variables indicate the presence of a potential 4
th
 or 5
th
 dimension 
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to further be explored with variables similar theoretically to them in future studies.  However,  
since these two variables do not load in the same direction onto any of the three dimensions, I  do 
not consider them to be part of the three power dimensions examined in this study.    
 
5.5.   Supplemental Analysis 
I conduct supplementary analyses to examine executive compensation structure, as well 
as contextual implications, such as different types of relationship with compensation 
decisions(e.g., non-linearity, interactions between outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases), firm 
characteristics (e.g., firm size and firm performance), context outside the firm (e.g., pre and post 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, the World Trade Center Attacks of 2001, industry mimetic 
pressures), board characteristics (e.g., degree of outsiders present, board size), and CEO 
characteristics (e.g., CEO ownership, tenure). Finally, I extend the model to other types of 
decisions (e.g., mergers and acquisitions).  These analyses will give me further insight into the 
relationship between powerful outsiders and insiders with monitoring effectiveness.  
 
5.5.1.   Non-Linearity 
Wagner, Stimpert, & Fubara (1998) found that the presence of either insiders or outsiders 
was non-linearly related to performance.   In this section, I examine whether the relationship 
between power and compensation is curvilinear, rather than linear, when the average outsider’s 
power is greater than the average insider’s power (Appendix H).  There does not appear to be a 
non-linear relationship between the power ratios and monitoring effectiveness: between the ratio 
of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power and compensation (β = 0.03, p > 0.10; β = 
- 0.02, p > 0.10) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.03, p > 0.10; β = - 0.02, p > 0.10); 
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between prestige power and compensation (β = 0.05, p < 0.05; β =  0.04, p < 0.05) or pay-for-
performance sensitivity (β = 0.02, p > 0.10; β = 0.05, p < 0.05); and, the ratio of the average 
outsiders’ structural power to insiders’ power and total compensation (β = 0.01, p > 0.10; β =  
0.04, p < 0.05) or pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = - 0.03, p > 0.10; β = 0.03, p < 0.10) 
(Table H-26). These results are similar in my winsorized models (Table H-27). 
 
5.5.2.   Hierarchical Linear Modeling  
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) techniques allow us to examine variables by adding 
them gradually to the model. In this section, I first examine descriptive statistics for the HLM 
regression analysis, followed by my fixed-effects regression analysis. Specifically, I use the 
variables for the average outsider on the board.  
 
5.5.2.1.  Correlation Statistics 
Ownership Power. First, I examine the four individual variables for ownership power (Table 
I-28).  Three prestige variables are negatively correlated with total compensation and positively 
with pay-for-performance sensitivity: ownership on the compensation committee (r  = - 0.117, p 
< 0.001; r  = 0.071, p < 0.001),  ownership on the nomination committee (r  = - 0.109, p < 0.001; 
r  = 0.045, p < 0.01), and ownership of members not related, founder, or employees (r  = - 0.115, 
p < 0.001; r  = 0.070, p < 0.001). However, the equity difference with that of the CEO is 
positively correlated with total compensation (r  = 0.029, p < 0.10) and negatively with pay-for-
performance sensitivity (r  = - 0.084, p < 0.001).  
Prestige Power. Three variables for prestige power are negatively correlated with total 
compensation and positively with pay-for-performance sensitivity:  accumulated board seats (r  = 
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- 0.120, p < 0.001; r  = 0.313, p < 0.001);  effective board practice decreasing total compensation 
(r  = -0.060, p < 0.001; r  = 0.055, p < 0.001); and S&P credit rating (r  =- 0.143, p < 0.001; r  = 
0.343, p < 0.001). However, effective board practice increasing board independence is not 
significantly associated with total compensation (r  = 0.006, p > 0.10), but it is positively 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (r  = 0.032, p < 0.05). 
Structural Power.  Total compensation is negatively but insignificantly associated with 
overlapping committee membership (r  = -0.025, p > 0.10) and seniority on the compensation 
committee (r  = -0.016, p > 0.10) and positively but insignificantly associated with seniority on 
the nomination committee  (r  = 0.066, p > 0.10).   However, hierarchical status is positively 
associated with total compensation (r  = 0.051, p < 0.001) and negatively associated with pay-
for-performance sensitivity  (r  = -0.056, p < 0.001).  Although nomination committee seniority 
is not significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity (r  = -0.155, p > 0.10), pay-
for-performance sensitivity is positively associated with overlapping committee membership  (r  
= 0.052, p < 0.001) and negatively associated with seniority on the compensation committee  (r  
= -0.050, p < 0.001). 
 
 
5.5.2.2.  HLM Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis 
Ownership Power. The variables used to examine ownership power are not significantly 
associated with total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity: the ownership of 
members not related, founders, or employees (β = -0.01, p > 0.10;  β = 0.03, p > 0.10); ownership 
on the compensation committee (β = -0.01, p > 0.10;  β = -0.02, p > 0.10); ownership on the 
nomination committee (β = 0.01, p > 0.10;  β = -0.01, p > 0.10); and equity difference with that 
of the CEO (β = 0.05, p > 0.10;  β = 0.01, p > 0.10) (Table I-29).  
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Prestige Power. Three variables used to examine prestige power are not significantly 
associated with total compensation, nor pay-for-performance sensitivity: accumulated board 
seats (β = 0.02, p > 0.10;  β = 0.03, p > 0.10);  S&P credit rating (β = 0.01, p > 0.10;  β = 0.06, p 
> 0.10);  and effective board practice increasing board independence (β = -0.01, p > 0.10;  β = -
0.00, p > 0.10).  However, effective board practice decreasing total compensation is negatively 
and significantly associated with total compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = -
0.08, p < 0.001;  β = - 0.06, p < 0.001).  
Structural Power.  The following two variables used to examine structural power are not 
significantly associated with total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity: seniority on 
the nomination committee (β = -0.00, p > 0.10;  β = -0.03, p > 0.10) and hierarchical status (β = -
0.02, p > 0.10;  β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  However, overlapping committee membership is positively 
associated with total compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.05, p < 0.05;  β = 
0.06, p < 0.10), whereas seniority on the compensation committee is not significantly associated 
with total compensation (β = 0.00, p > 0.10) but is negatively associated with pay-for-
performance sensitivity (β = -0.03, p < 0.10).  
Full Model. Our results remain similar in the full model (Model 5) for total compensation; 
however, the results differ slightly in the full model for pay-for-performance sensitivity (Model 
10).  We find that seniority on the compensation committee is negatively but no longer 
significantly associated with pay for performance (β = -0.03, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.2.3. HLM Random-Effects Regression Analysis 
Ownership Power. The ownership of members not related, founders, or employees (β = -
0.01, p > 0.10;  β = 0.03, p > 0.10) and ownership on the compensation committee (β = -0.02, p > 
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0.10;  β = -0.02, p > 0.10)  are insignificantly associated with total compensation and pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  Ownership on the nomination committee (β = 0.01, p < 0.10;  β = -0.01, 
p > 0.10) and equity difference with that of the CEO (β = 0.04, p < 0.05;  β = -0.00, p > 0.10)   
are positively associated with total compensation but not significantly associated with pay-for-
performance sensitivity (Table I-30). 
Prestige Power. The following two variables used to examine prestige power are not 
significantly associated with total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity: accumulated 
board seats (β = 0.03, p > 0.10; β = 0.05, p > 0.10) and effective board practice increasing board 
independence (β = 0.00, p > 0.10; β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  The variable S&P credit rating is not 
significantly associated with total compensation (β = 0.02, p >0.10) but is positively associated 
with pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.10, p < 0.05). However, effective board practice 
decreasing total compensation is negatively and significantly associated with total compensation 
and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = -0.10, p < 0.001; β = - 0.06, p < 0.001).  
Structural Power.  Overlapping committee membership is positively associated with total 
compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.03, p < 0.10;  β = 0.07, p < 0.05).  
Seniority on the compensation committee (β = -0.01, p > 0.10;  β = - 0.05, p < 0.01) and on the 
nomination committee (β = -0.00, p > 0.10;  β = - 0.05, p < 0.01) are insignificantly associated 
with total compensation but are negatively and significantly associated with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  Hierarchical status (β = -0.01, p >0.10;  β = - 0.00, p >0.10) is not significantly 
associated with total compensation or with pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 Full Models.  In our full model (Model 5), the equity difference with that of the CEO (β 
=0.04, p < 0.05) and overlapping committee membership (β = 0.04, p < 0.05) are positively 
associated with total compensation, whereas effective board practice decreasing total 
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compensation (β = -0.10, p < 0.001) is negatively associated.  In Model 10, we find that the S&P 
credit rating (β = 0.09, p < 0.05) is positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
whereas seniority on the compensation committee (β = -0.04, p < 0.05) and nomination 
committee  (β = -0.04, p < 0.05) are negatively associated. The remaining variables are 
insignificantly associated with total compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 
5.5.3.   Interaction Effects Between Outsiders and Insiders’ Power 
Although my main study uses the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ power bases to 
consider how board power and monitoring effectiveness are related, I conduct a supplementary 
analysis examining the interaction of outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases (Appendix J).  One 
advantage of the interaction effects is that this measure has lower standard errors. In addition, 
interaction effects provide another contextual insight into the implications of power; specifically, 
is it possible that the relationship between outsiders’ power and monitoring effectiveness 
depends on the degree of insiders’ power present?  If two variables interact as substitutes, the 
benefit of one variable lessens as the other variable increases (Siggelkow, 2002).  Whereas the 
average outsiders’ ownership power does not interact with that of the average insiders’ power to 
significantly affect total compensation (β=0.04, p > 0.10) or pay-for-performance sensitivity (β=-
0.03, p > 0.10) (Table J-31), the interaction of the average outsiders’ prestige power with that of 
the insiders is negatively associated with total compensation (β=-0.05, p  < 0.001) and pay-for-
performance sensitivity (β=-0.03, p < 0.10).The interaction of the average outsiders’ and the 
insiders’ structural power is negatively associated with total compensation (β=-0.03, p < 0.05) 
and pay-for-performance sensitivity ( β=-0.02, p < 0.10).  The winsorized models remain similar 
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(Table J-32).The random-effects regression results are presented in Tables J-33 and J-34. I 
further discuss interaction effects in the discussion section of this paper. 
 
5.5.4.   Behavioral and Outcomes-Based Contracts 
As uncertainty in outcome changes, boards adjust the structure of the compensation package 
to reflect these conditions and to present the most optimal contract to maximize shareholder 
profitability.  Eisenhardt (1989) argues that short-term compensation should be assigned when 
information asymmetry between the board and the CEO is minimal, whereas long-term 
compensation should be assigned when information asymmetry increases and the board does not 
always know what the agent is doing.  In my supplemental analysis, I consider how ownership, 
prestige and structural powers influence whether the executive’s compensation package is 
structured as a behavioral-based or outcome-based compensation package. I use salary 
proportion as a proxy for behavioral contracting and contingent compensation as a proxy for 
outcome-based contracts, finding that the effects of power on short-term compensation and long-
term compensation vary depending on the power base of insiders and outsiders.  I examine the 
association of power to the following short-term and long-term components: 
Salary Percentage. This variable measures the short-term compensation of the CEO in 
terms of the ratio of the CEO’s salary to total compensation. 
Contingent Compensation.   Long-term compensation, inclusive of bonus, is the ratio of 
options plus bonus to total compensation. 
Short-term compensation decreases when the average outsiders’ prestige and structural 
power bases increase relative to those of the insiders but is not affected when outsiders’ 
ownership power increases relative to that of the insiders. Conversely, long-term compensation 
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increases when the average outsiders’ prestige power increases relative to that of the insiders but 
is not affected when the average outsiders’ ownership and structural power bases increase 
relative to those of  the insiders (Appendix K). 
In Table K-35, I find that the average outsiders’ ownership power relative to the average 
insiders’ ownership power is not significantly associated with the salary proportion of the pay 
mix (β = 0.01, p > 0.10) or contingent compensation (β = -0.00, p > 0.10).  As outsiders’ prestige 
power increases relative to insiders’ power, short-term compensation decreases (β = -0.09, p < 
0.001) and long-term compensation increases (β = 0.05, p < 0.10).  As outsiders’ structural 
power increases relative to insiders’ structural power, short-term compensation decreases (β = -
0.04, p < 0.10) but is insignificantly associated with contingent compensation (β = 0.01, p > 
0.10).   
Finally, my results remain basically the same in my full model. The average outsiders’ 
ownership power relative to insiders’ power is not significantly associated with short-term 
compensation (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) or with long-term compensation (β = -0.00, p > 0.10). The 
average outsiders’ prestige power relative to insiders’ power is negatively associated with the 
salary proportion of the pay mix (β = -0.08, p < 0.001) but is positively associated with 
contingent compensation(β = 0.05, p < 0.10).   When both ownership and prestige power are 
considered in the same model, the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is 
not significantly associated with the salary proportion of the pay mix (β = -0.03, p > 0.10) or 
contingent compensation  (β = 0.02, p > 0.10).  These results are similar when I winsorize my 
power ratios at p=0.01 (Table K-36). 
When I examine the relationship between board power base ratios and short-term and 
long-term compensation using a random-effects model, my results remain basically the same 
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(Table K-37), although the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is 
negatively associated with short-term compensation (β = -0.03, p < 0.05) and positively 
associated with long-term compensation (β = 0.03, p < 0.10). Again, when I winsorize my power 
ratios at p=0.01, these results remain the same (Table K-38).   
Finally, I summarize these fixed-effects and random-effects regression results in Table K-
39.  Whereas the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is negatively 
associated with behavioral-based compensation and positively associated with contingent-based 
pay, structural power is negatively associated with behavioral-based pay. 
5.5.4.1.   Alternative Long Term Compensation (LTIP) 
To further examine the relationship between board power and pay decisions, I run my  
analysis again by creating a ratio of the long-term incentive components of compensation, not 
including bonus, by total compensation (Appendix L).  My results remain the same (Table L-40). 
Although the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power base (β = 0.02, p > 
0.10)  and structural power base (β = -0.01, p > 0.10) are not significantly associated with 
contingent-based pay, prestige power continues to be positively associated (β = 0.06, p < 0.05). 
 However, my results change when I winsorize my power ratios at p=0.01 (Table L-41).  
Specifically, although the results for prestige power and structural power do not change, the ratio 
of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is positively associated with this variable 
proxying for contingent-based pay in the full model (β = 0.05, p < 0.10), but not when 
considered in the isolated model 7 (β = 0.05, p > 0.10).  
 When I examine the relationship between power bases and this alternative form of 
contingent-based pay using a random-effects model (Table L-42), I find that my results remain 
similar to my fixed-effects model; however, the ratio of the average outsiders’’ to insiders’ 
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structural power base is negatively associated with contingent-based pay in this model. These 
results remain consistent when I winsorize my data at p = 0.01 (Table L-43). 
 These results suggest that further research may want to consider the relationship between 
power and contingent compensation by separating the effects of bonus-based pay and long-term 
incentive-payments, as well as considering theoretically why a random-effects model differs.  In 
addition, outliers may be affecting my results. Random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects models 
handle unobserved heterogeneity associated with time invariant variables differently.  RE 
assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is independent of my regressors and thus can be included 
in a time-invariant model, while fixed-effects assumes that unobserved heterogeneity is not 
independent of my regressors and should be controlled for.  Thus, these results suggest both that 
the ownership power ratio is time-invariant, and its information is being removed from the 
analysis with a fixed-effects model, but is being considered in a random-effects model and is 
found to be relevant.  
 
5.5.5.   Pre- and Post-The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
 The time period in which the firm is examined may affect the relationship between board 
power and monitoring effectiveness differently.   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)  was 
passed to increase monitoring effectiveness and minimize managerial opportunism by requiring 
firm corporate governance practices to comply with certain requirements. 
 
5.5.5.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
 In this section of my supplemental analysis, I examine whether the results obtained for 
board power are affected pre- and post-SOX (Appendix M). 
74 
 
 First, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power does affect our 
results differently pre- and post-SOX (Table M-44).  Specifically, I find that the average 
outsiders’ ownership power to insiders’ power ratio is not significantly associated with total 
compensation pre-SOX (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) or post-SOX (β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  No significant 
association exists with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX (β = -0.01, p > 0.10) or post-
SOX (β = 0.03, p > 0.10).  
 Second, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power affects our results 
differently pre- and post-SOX. Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ power is positively associated with total compensation pre-SOX (β = 0.07, p < 
0.05) and insignificantly associated post-SOX (β = 0.01, p >0.10) and is positively associated 
with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX (β = 0.06, p < 0.10) but insignificantly associated 
post-SOX (β = - 0.01, p >0.10).   
Third, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power does not affect our 
results differently pre- and post-SOX.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ 
structural power to insiders’ power increases but is not significantly associated with total 
compensation pre-SOX (β = 0.01, p > 0.10) or post-SOX (β = 0.02 p > 0.10) or significantly 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX (β = -0.02, p > 0.10) or post-SOX (β = 
-0.03, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.5.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
 In this section, because of the increased public accountability post-SOX, I examine 
whether outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases interacted differently pre- and post-SOX (Table M-
44).   
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First, I find that the average outsiders’ and insiders’ ownership power bases interact 
differently to affect total compensation pre-SOX (β = 0.10, p < 0.001) but not post-SOX (β = -
0.02, p > 0.10).  No significant association exists with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX 
(β = -0.05, p > 0.10) but a significant negative interaction exists post-SOX (β = -0.03, p < 0.10).  
 Second, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power affects 
our results differently pre- and post -SOX. Specifically, I find that the average outsiders’ prestige 
power interacts with that of insiders’ power negatively to affect total compensation pre-SOX (β 
= -0.05,p < 0.01) and insignificantly post-SOX (β = -0.03,p >0.10) and interacts significantly to 
affect pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX (β = -0.06,p < 0.05) and post-SOX (β = - 0.05,p  
< 0.05).  
Third, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power interactions affect 
our results differently pre- and post-SOX.  Specifically, I find that the average outsiders’ 
structural power interacts with that of insiders’ power negatively and significantly affects total 
compensation pre-SOX (β = -0.05, p < 0.10) but insignificantly post-SOX (β = -0.05 p > 0.10). 
This interaction is insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-SOX (β = -
0.01, p > 0.10) but significantly post-SOX (β = -0.05, p < 0.05) in the isolated model (Model 19). 
  
5.5.6.   Pre- and Post- World Trade Center Attacks 
 The World Trade Center (WTC) attacks changed the competitive landscape and 
economic climate because of increased uncertainty and fear. In this section of my supplemental 
analysis, I examine whether the board power results are different before and after the WTC 
attacks (Appendix N).   
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5.5.6.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
 First, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power does not affect my 
results differently before and after the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks (Table N-46). 
Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power to insiders’ power is 
insignificantly associated with total compensation pre-WTC (β = 0.05, p > 0.10) and post-WTC 
(β = -0.02 p > 0.10).  Similarly, an insignificant relationship exists with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity pre-WTC (β = - 0.03, p > 0.10) and post-WTC (β = 0.01, p > 0.10).  
 Second, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power affects 
our results differently pre- and post-WTC.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average 
outsiders’ prestige power to insiders’ power is positively associated with total compensation pre-
WTC (β = 0.12, p < 0.001) but not post-WTC (β = 0.01,p  > 0.10) and is positively associated 
with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-WTC (β = 0.08,p < 0.10) but not post-WTC (β = 0.01,p  
> 0.10).   
Third, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power affects 
our results differently pre- and post-WTC.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average 
outsiders’ structural power to the average insiders’ power is not significantly associated with 
total compensation pre-WTC (β = -0.02 p > 0.10) but is significantly associated post-WTC (β = 
0.05 p < 0.05). The ratio is not significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-
WTC (β = -0.05 p > 0.10) or post-WTC (β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.6.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
Specifically, I find that the average outsiders’ ownership power relative to insiders’ 
power interacts positively to affect total compensation pre-WTC (β = 0.13, p < 0.001) but not 
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post-WTC (β = 0.01 p > 0.10) (Table N-47).  An insignificant relationship exists with pay-for-
performance sensitivity pre-WTC (β = - 0.04, p > 0.10) and post-WTC (β = -0.01, p > 0.10).   
 Second, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power affects our results 
differently before and after the WTC attacks.  Specifically, I find that the average outsiders’ 
prestige power to insiders’ power interacts negatively to affect total compensation pre-WTC (β = 
-0.08, p < 0.001) but not post-WTC (β = -0.03,p  > 0.10) and interacts negatively to affect pay-
for-performance sensitivity pre-WTC (β = -0.06,p < 0.10) and post-WTC (β = -0.06,p  < 0.05).   
Third, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power affects our results 
differently before and after the WTC attacks.  Specifically, I find that the average outsiders’ 
structural power interacts with that of insiders negatively to affect total compensation pre-WTC 
(β = -0.05 p < 0.10) but not significantly post-WTC (β = - 0.01 p > 0.10). The power ratio is not 
significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity pre-WTC (β = 0.00 p > 0.10) but is 
negatively associated post-WTC (β = -0.03, p < 0.10).    
 
5.5.7.   Industry Mimetic Pressures 
Industry mimetic forces may affect board monitoring practices.  Deephouse (1996) examined 
the way in which organizational isomorphism, i.e., when organizations adopt characteristics that 
are similar to other firms, increased organizational legitimacy using a sample of commercial 
banks.  Deephouse measured strategic isomorphism using the method by Finkelstein & 
Hambrick (1990) to measure strategic conformity, or “the extent to which an organization’s 
strategies resembled the conventional, normal strategies in an industry.”   Finkelstein & 
Hambrick (1990) measured strategic conformity, or “the degree to which a firm’s strategy 
matches the average strategic profile of its competitors in the same industry” by taking each 
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strategic dimension and standardizing it by industry.  The researchers then took the absolute 
difference between the firm’s score on a dimension and the average score for all firms in that 
sample.  Following this method, Deephouse (1996) took each key asset strategy, or the way in 
which firms allocate resources to a specific market (Chandler, 1962), and “compared [each asset 
strategy] to the industry mean value for that variable and expressed as a standard deviation. The 
absolute values of the standard deviations for all the strategy variables were totaled for each 
bank, giving a holistic and parsimonious measure of deviation.  Multiplying by -1 created a scale 
on which more positive numbers indicated greater conformity (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990, p. 
1029).” 
Following these aforementioned methods, I compared the total compensation and pay for 
performance values to the industry mean value for each variable by standardizing both the 
compensation and pay-for-performance variables y the industry using data in the sample only. I 
then took the absolute difference between each firm’s score on both total compensation and pay-
for-performance sensitivity and the average for all firms in this sample.  I split the sample into 
those firms whose values fell within 1 standard deviation (SD) of the industry value, indicating 
greater similarity to the industry mean value, and those firms beyond 1 SD of the industry mean 
value, indicating variations further from the industry average (Appendix O).   
 
5.5.7.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
 First, I find in the sub-samples both within 1 SD and beyond 1 SD, the results for the 
relationship between the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power are similar to my main 
findings (e.g., insignificant) (Appendix O: Table O-48).  These results indicate that the 
relationship of the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power to the average insiders’ power 
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on total compensation and pay for performance is not related to institutional mimetic pressures 
(Models 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, and 20). 
 Second, I find that the results for the relationship between the average outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ power are similar in both sub-samples (Models 3,5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 18, and 20).  
These results indicate that the effect of the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige power to 
insiders’ power on total compensation and pay for performance is not related to institutional 
mimetic pressures.  
 However, I find differing sub-sample results regarding the relationship between the 
average outsiders’ structural power to the average insiders’ power and total compensation. 
Although the structural power ratio is not significantly associated with total compensation in the 
<1 SD subsample, this ratio is positively associated in the >1 SD subsample (Model 9) (β = 0.04 
p < 0.10).  However, there is no significant difference between the < 1SD and > 1SD subsamples 
with regard to pay for performance. 
First, I find in the sub-samples both within 1 SD and beyond 1 SD, the results for the 
relationship between the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power are similar to my main 
findings (e.g., insignificant) (Appendix O: Table O-48).  These results indicate that the 
relationship of the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power to the average insiders’ power 
on total compensation and pay for performance is not related to institutional mimetic pressures 
(Models 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, and 20). 
 Second, I find that the results for the relationship between the average outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ power are similar in both sub-samples (Models 3,5, 8, 10, 13, 15, 18, and 20).  
These results indicate that the effect of the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige power to 
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insiders’ power on total compensation and pay for performance is not related to institutional 
mimetic pressures.  
 However, I find differing sub-sample results regarding the relationship between the 
average outsiders’ structural power to the average insiders’ power and total compensation. 
Although the structural power ratio is not significantly associated with total compensation in the 
<1 SD subsample, this ratio is positively associated in the >1 SD subsample (Model 9) (β = 0.04 
p < 0.10).  However, there is no significant difference between the < 1SD and > 1SD subsamples 
with regard to pay for performance. 
 
5.5.7.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
Because a significant relationship is not found when firms are similar, I examine their 
interactions to see if these results may change as the degree of outsiders’ and insiders’ power 
changes (Table N-49). The only significant difference that exists is the interaction of outsiders’ 
and insiders’ structural power bases in the > 1 SD subsample (β = -0.03, p < 0.10) (Model 19).   
 
5.5.7.3.   Random-Effects Models 
 Interestingly, when I run my models again using a random-effects model, I find that my 
results change (Table O-50).  Specifically, I find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige 
power is positively associated with total compensation when mimetic forces are present (β = 0.08 
p < 0.001) (Table O-50, Model5).  In addition, I find that outsiders’ ownership power interacts 
with insiders’ power to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity when industry mimetic forces are 
not present (β = -0.08 p < 0.05) (Table O-51, Model 20), suggesting a substitution effect in that 
pay-for-performance sensitivity increases both when outsiders’ ownership power is high and 
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insiders’ ownership power is low, and when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ 
ownership power is high. 
   
5.5.8.   Firm Size 
 Firm size may affect the monitoring effectiveness of board power; therefore, I examine in 
this supplemental analysis how firm size proxied by total assets may affect this relationship. I 
divide the sample into large and small firms by splitting the sample using the median per year for 
total assets, and examine the relationship between power and monitoring (Appendix P). 
 
5.5.8.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
The ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power and structural power 
bases are not significantly associated with total compensation and pay for performance in both 
the large- and small-firm sub-samples (Table P -52).  The ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power is positively associated with total compensation in both the large and 
small firms. However, although the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is 
positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity in small firms (β = 0.06, p < 0.10), 
this ratio is not significantly associated in larger firms (β = 0.02, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.8.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’  and Insiders’ Power Bases  
 In this section, I consider whether the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ power 
bases may be contingent on firm size (Table P-53).  These results reveal that understanding the 
relationship between outsiders’ board power and monitoring is contingent on the presence of 
insiders’ board power and the firm’s size. Overall, these results then suggest that the size of the 
82 
 
firm is relevant to understanding how power and monitoring are affected. We find that the 
interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases differs in large vs. smaller-sized firms; 
specifically, the relationship is contingent on whether firms are larger.   
 First, we find that outsiders’ and insiders’ ownership power interacts to affect total 
compensation (β = 0.10, p < 0.01) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = -0.16, p < 0.001) in 
large firms but is not significant in smaller firms.   
 Second, I find that although the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige 
power bases is similar in both large and small firms in regards to total compensation, these 
factors interact with each other negatively to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity(β = 0.14, p < 
0.01) in larger firms. 
 Finally, I find that structural power interacts similarly regardless of firm size; however, 
the interaction is significant in smaller firms (β = -0.03, p < 0.10) for pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.   
 
5.5.9.   High-Performing vs. Low-Performing Firms 
 Firm performance may affect the monitoring effectiveness of board power; therefore, I 
examine in this supplemental analysis the way in which return on assets (ROA) may affect this 
relationship. I divide the sample into high- and low-performing firms and examine the 
relationship between power and monitoring (Appendix Q). 
 
5.5.9.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
Specifically, I find that the relationship between the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ 
ownership and structural power does not vary in high- versus low-performing firms for total 
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compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity (Table Q-54).  Although the relationship 
between the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power and total compensation is similar in 
high- and low-performing firms, the relationship between outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power 
and pay-for-performance sensitivity differs.  The ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ 
prestige power is not significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity in low-
performing firms (β = 0.04 p > 0.10); however, it is positively and significantly associated in 
high-performing firms (β = 0.06 p < 0.05).  
 
5.5.9.2.   Interactions: Outsider * Insider Power Bases  
 In Table Q-55, I examine the interactions between outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases, 
finding that the relationship between power bases and total compensation does not change 
significantly in low- versus high-performing firms; however, the relationship with pay for 
performance does change.   Although the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership 
power is insignificantly associated with pay for performance in both high- and low-performing 
firms, the outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power bases interact (β = -0.09 p < 0.01) to affect pay 
for performance in high-performing firms but not in low-performing firms.  Outsiders’ and 
insiders’ structural power bases interact to affect pay for performance in low-performing firms (β 
= -0.06  p < 0.05) but not in high-performing firms (β = 0.01 p > 0.10). 
 
5.5.10.   Most Powerful Board Member 
 The degree of power may be relevant to board monitoring effectiveness. Although 
institutional ownership is considered to be an effective corporate governance monitoring 
mechanism, Dharwadkar et al. (2008) found that the characteristics of monitors, specifically 
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large owners and their portfolio characteristics, provide a more accurate assessment of 
monitoring effectiveness.  Similarly, I consider whether board members’ degree of power affects 
their monitoring.  Thus, I consider whether the most powerful board member in terms of 
ownership, prestige, or structure affects the results (Appendix R).   
5.5.10.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
I find that the ratio of the most powerful outsider to insider in terms of ownership is not 
significantly related to total compensation (β = 0.00 p > 0.10) or to pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (β = 0.01, p > 0.10) (Table R-56).  The ratio of the most prestigiously powerful 
outsider to the most powerful insider associates positively with total compensation (β = 0.10, p < 
0.001) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.04, p < 0.10). The ratio of the most structurally 
powerful outsider to the most powerful insider board member is positively associated with total 
compensation (β = 0.04, p < 0.05) but not related to pay for performance (β = -0.01, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.10.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
The most prestigiously powerful outsider interacts with the most prestigiously powerful 
insider (β = -0.05 p< 0.01) so that compensation is suppressed when both outsiders’ and insiders’ 
prestige power is higher, suggesting a complementary effect (Table R-57).  The factors 
negatively interact to affect pay for performance (β = -0.03, p<.0.10), suggesting a substitution 
effect in that pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher both when outsiders’ prestige power is 
higher and insiders’ prestige power is lower and when outsiders’ prestige power is lower and 
insiders’ prestige power is higher. 
Structural. The most structurally powerful outsider negatively interacts with the most 
structurally powerful insider to affect compensation (β = -0.03 p < 0.05) and pay-for-
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performance sensitivity (β = -0.02,  p > 0.10).  Total compensation is suppressed both when 
outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power is higher, suggesting a complementary effect, whereas a 
substitution effect exists with pay for performance.   
My results are similar to those of my main model, indicating that the degree of power 
possessed by the board member does not provide additional insight into monitoring 
effectiveness. Total compensation is not affected by the most powerful board member in terms of 
ownership power but is affected by the most prestigiously and most structurally powerful board 
members.  Pay for performance is not affected by the most powerful board member in terms of 
ownership and structural power bases but is affected by the most prestigiously powerful board 
member.   
 
5.5.11.   The Percentage of Outsiders on the Board 
 In this section, I examine whether the number of outsiders on the board affects the 
relationship between board power and monitoring (Appendix S).  
 
5.5.11.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power 
to the average insiders’ ownership power is insignificantly associated with total compensation 
whether outsiders are less (β = 0.01, p > 0.10)  or more present (β = 0.04,  p > 0.10).  Similarly, 
an insignificant relationship exists with pay-for-performance sensitivity whether outsiders are 
less (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) or more present (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) (Table S-58).  
 Prestige.   Although the relationship between the ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power and total compensation does not change when outsiders are less (β = 
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0.06, p <0.10) or more present (β = 0.06, p < 0.05), the relationship with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity does change.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ power is positively but insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity when outsiders are less present (β = 0.05, p > 0.10), whereas the ratio is significantly 
associated when outsiders are more present (β = 0.07, p  < 0.05).   
Structural. I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power affects our 
results differently when outsiders are less or more present.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of 
the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is not significantly associated with total 
compensation whether outsiders are less (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) or more present (β = 0.03, p >0.10), 
whereas the ratio is negatively significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity 
when outsiders are more present (β = -0.06, p < 0.05) but not less present (β = 0.02, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.11.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
In this section, I examine whether the number of outsiders on the board affects the 
relationship between board power and monitoring as an interaction (Table S-59). 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that outsiders’ ownership power interacts with insiders’ 
power when outsiders are more present (β = 0.09,  p < 0.01) but not when outsiders are less 
present (β =-0.00,  p > 0.10) to affect compensation.  Similarly, outsiders’ ownership power 
interacts with insiders’ power when outsiders are more present (β = - 0.16,  p < 0.001) but not 
when outsiders are less present (β = 0.01,  p > 0.10) to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 Prestige.   Specifically, I find that the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ 
prestige power affects compensation similarly when outsiders are less present (β = -0.06,  p < 
0.05) and more present (β =-0.05,  p < 0.05). Similarly, I find that the interaction between 
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outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power affects pay for performance similarly when outsiders are 
less present (β = -0.05,  p > 0.10) and more present (β =-0.01,  p > 0.10).      
Structural. Specifically, I find that outsiders’ structural power insignificantly interacts 
with insiders’ power similarly when outsiders are less present (β = -0.03,  p > 0.10) or more 
present (β =-0.03,  p > 0.10) to affect compensation.  However, outsiders’ structural power 
interacts with insiders’ power when outsiders are more present (β = - 0.06,  p < 0.05) but not less 
present (β = 0.00,  p > 0.10) to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 
5.5.12.   Board Size 
 In this section, I examine whether the size of the board affects the relationship between 
board power and monitoring (Appendix T).  
 
5.5.12.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power 
to insiders’ power is insignificantly associated with total compensation when boards are smaller 
(β = -0.02, p > 0.10) or larger (β = 0.02,  p > 0.10) (Table T-60).  Similarly, an insignificant 
relationship exists with pay-for-performance sensitivity whether boards are smaller (β = -0.00, p 
> 0.10) or larger (β = 0.03,  p > 0.10) .  
 Prestige.   Although the relationship between the ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power and total compensation does not change when boards are smaller (β = 
0.06, p <0.10) or larger (β = 0.07, p < 0.01), the relationship with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity does change.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige 
power to insiders’ power is positively but insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance 
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sensitivity when boards are smaller (β = 0.04,p > 0.10), whereas the ratio is significantly 
associated when boards are larger (β = 0.08, p  < 0.05).   
Structural. I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power affects our 
results differently when boards are smaller or larger.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the 
average outsiders’ structural power to insiders’ power is significantly associated with total 
compensation when boards are smaller (β = 0.09 p < 0.05)  but not larger (β = -0.01 p >0.10),  
whereas the ratio is negatively significantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity 
when boards are larger (β = -0.05 p < 0.10) but not smaller (β = 0.01, p > 0.10). 
 
5.5.12.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and * Insiders’ Power Bases  
In section, I examine whether board size affects the relationship between board power 
and monitoring as an interaction (Table T-61). 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that outsiders’ ownership power does not significantly 
interact with insiders’ power when boards are smaller (β = 0.07, p >0.10) or larger(β =-0.00,  p > 
0.10) to affect compensation.  Similarly, outsiders’ ownership power does not interact with 
insiders’ when boards are smaller (β = - 0.05, p >0.10) or larger (β = 0.02, p > 0.10) to affect 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 Prestige.   Specifically, I find that the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ 
prestige power affects compensation similarly when boards are smaller (β = -0.07,  p < 0.01) and 
larger (β =-0.10,  p < 0.01). However, outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power interact to affect 
pay for performance when boards are smaller (β = -0.05,  p < 0.10) but not larger (β =-0.03,  p > 
0.10).   
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Structural. Specifically, I find that outsiders’ structural power interacts with insiders’ power 
when boards are larger (β = -0.03, p < 0.10) but not smaller (β =0.03,  p > 0.10) to affect 
compensation.  Similarly, outsiders’ structural power interacts with insiders’ power when boards 
are larger (β = - 0.02, p < 0.10) but not smaller (β = -0.03, p > 0.10) to affect pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  
 
5.5.13.   Incentive Alignment: CEO Ownership and Ownership Power 
 In  this section, I examine whether the results change depending on the degree of 
managerial incentive alignment proxied by either the degree of CEO ownership (Section 
5.5.13.1) or ownership power (Section 5.5.13.2) (Appendix U). 
 
5.5.13.1.   CEO Ownership  
5.5.13.1.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
In this section, I examine whether CEO ownership affects the relationship between board 
power and monitoring  (Table U-62). 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the average outsiders’ ownership power 
to insiders’ ownership power is insignificantly associated with total compensation when CEO 
ownership is lower (β = -0.01, p > 0.10) or higher (β = -0.02,  p > 0.10).  Similarly, an 
insignificant relationship exists with pay-for-performance sensitivity whether CEO ownership is 
lower (β = -0.02, p > 0.10) or higher (β = 0.04,  p > 0.10).  
 Prestige.   Although the relationship between the ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power and total compensation is insignificant when CEO ownership is lower (β 
= 0.02, p >0.10), it is positively associated when CEO ownership is higher (β = 0.08, p < 0.01). 
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Similarly, although the relationship between the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ 
prestige power and pay-for-performance sensitivity is insignificant when CEO ownership is 
lower (β = 0.01, p >0.10), it is positively associated when CEO ownership is higher (β = 0.08, p 
< 0.05). 
Structural. I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power affects our 
results differently when CEO ownership is low or high  Specifically, I find that the ratio of the 
average outsiders’ structural power to insiders’ structural power is significantly associated with 
total compensation when CEO ownership is lower (β = 0.06 p < 0.05) but not higher (β = -0.00 p 
>0.10), whereas the ratio is insignificantly associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity when 
CEO ownership is lower (β = -0.03 p > 0.10) or higher (β = 0.01, p > 0.10).  
 
5.5.13.1.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Bases  
In this section, I examine whether board size affects the relationship between board 
power and monitoring as an interaction (Table U-63). 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that outsiders’ ownership power does not significantly 
interacts with insiders’ ownership power when CEO ownership is lower (β = -0.03, p >0.10) or 
higher (β =0.00,  p > 0.10) to affect compensation.  Similarly,   outsiders’ ownership power does 
not interact with insiders’ ownership power when CEO ownership is lower (β = 0.03,  p >0.10) 
or higher (β = -0.00,  p > 0.10) to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 Prestige.   Specifically, I find that the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ 
prestige power affects compensation similarly when CEO ownership is lower (β = -0.03,  p < 
0.10) or higher (β =-0.06,  p < 0.05). However, outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power interact to 
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affect pay for performance when CEO ownership is higher (β = -0.05, p < 0.10) but not lower (β 
=-0.02,  p > 0.10).      
Structural. Specifically, I find that outsiders’ structural power interacts with insiders’ 
structural power when CEO ownership is lower (β = -0.07, p < 0.01) but not higher (β =-0.01, p 
> 0.10) to affect compensation.  Similarly, outsiders’ structural power interacts with insiders’ 
structural power when CEO ownership is lower (β = - 0.06, p < 0.05) but not higher (β = 0.01, p 
> 0.10) to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 
5.5.13.2.   CEO Ownership Deciles 
 In this section, I separate the data into CEO ownership deciles and quartiles, finding that 
the relationship between board power changes based on the level of CEO ownership. 
Total Compensation. First, I examine deciles. Specifically, I find that the ratio of outsiders’ 
to insiders’ ownership power is negatively associated with total compensation in the 3
rd
 (β = - 
0.09,  p < 0.01) and 8
th
 decile (β = - 0.12,  p < 0.05) but insignificantly associated in the other 
deciles (Table U-64).  The average CEO ownership in the 1
st
 decile is 0.002%;  that in the 2
nd
 
decile is 0.03%;  that in the 3
rd
 decile is 0.07%;  that in the 8
th
 decile is 0.88%; that in the 9
th
 
decile is 1.96%;  and that in the 10
th
 decile is 10.95%.  The ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power is positively associated with total compensation at the 10
th
 decile (β = 
0.17, p < 0.05). Finally, the average ratio of outsiders’ structural power to insiders’ structural 
power is positively associated with total compensation in the 1
st
 decile (β = 0.10, p < 0.05). 
Second, I examine the quartiles and find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power 
is negatively associated with compensation in the 1
st
 quartile (β = -0.05  p <0.10), whereas the 
ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is positively associated in the 4
th
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quartile (β = 0.12,  p < 0.05) and the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power 
is positively associated in the 1
st
 quartile (β = 0.09,  p < 0.01) (Table U-66). 
Pay-for-performance sensitivity. The ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership 
power is positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity at the 2
nd
 (β = 0.51,  p < 
0.05) and 3
rd
 deciles (β = 0.04,  p < 0.01) (Table U-65). The ratio of the average outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power is positively associated at the 9
th
 decile (β = 0.37,  p < 0.05). The ratio of 
the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is not significantly associated in any decile. 
Second, I examine the quartiles and find that ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige 
power is positively associated in the 4
th
 quartile (β = 0.11,  p <0.10) (Table U-67). 
 
 
5.5.13.3.   Insider/Outsider Ownership Power Ratio 
In this section, I examine whether the results change when I look at the degree to which 
managers’ incentives are aligned using the ratio of the average insiders’ to outsiders’ ownership 
power (Appendix V).  In the fixed-effects model, I find that this ratio is insignificantly associated 
with both total compensation (β = -0.05, p >0.10) and pay-for-performance sensitivity (β = 0.02,  
p >0.10) (Table V-68).  These results do not change significantly in the winsorized model (Table 
V-69). However, in the random-effects model, the results change.  The ratio of the insiders’ to 
outsiders’ ownership power is negatively associated with total compensation (β = -0.04, p < 
0.05) but insignificantly with pay for performance (β = 0.03, p > 0.10) (Table V-70). These 
results do not change significantly with the winsorized model (Table V-71). I find similar results 
when using an OLS model (Table V-72).  The ratio of the average insiders’ to outsiders’ 
ownership power is negatively associated with total compensation (β = -0.04,  p < 0.05) and not 
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significantly associated with pay for performance (β = 0.03,  p > 0.10). These results are similar 
in the winsorized model (Table V-73). 
 
5.5.14.   CEO Tenure 
 Although ownership and structural power bases had an insignificant relationship with 
compensation and pay for performance in the first portion of my study, I examine in the 
supplemental analysis whether CEO entrenchment may affect this relationship (Appendix W). 
As CEO power increases, CEOs may become more entrenched, as proxied by increased CEO 
tenure and increased firm performance.   With increased tenure as the CEO, managers’ 
bargaining power with the board increases (Mitchell, 2010); thus, CEOs are able to negotiate a 
compensation contract with the board that is preferable with regard to the CEO’s interests and 
minimizes the CEO’s risk.  Using CEO tenure as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, I 
examine the relationship between each power base and pay for performance in conditions with 
high and low CEO tenure. 
 
5.5.14.1.   Ratios: Outsiders’ to Insiders’ Power Bases 
 First, I find that ratio of outsiders’ ownership power to insiders’  is insignificantly 
associated with total compensation when CEO tenure is low (β =-0.01,  p > 0.10) or high (β = 
0.01, p > 0.10), but negatively with pay for performance when CEO tenure is low (β = -0.08, p < 
0.05 ) , but not when CEO tenure is high (β = 0.01, p > 0.10 )   (Table W-74).   
 Second, I find that the average outsiders’ prestige power to insiders’ prestige power is 
positively and significantly associated with total compensation when CEO tenure is low or high. 
However, when CEO tenure increases, the average outsiders’ prestige power relative to insiders’ 
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prestige power is not related to pay-for-performance sensitivity. Specifically, I find that the ratio 
of the outsiders’ prestige power to insiders’ power is positively associated with total 
compensation when CEO tenure is low (β = 0.07, p < 0.05) and high (β = 0.07, p < 0.05 ) but 
insignificantly associated with pay for performance when CEO tenure is low (β = 0.05, p > 0.10) 
or high (β = 0.05, p > 0.10).   
 Third, I find that the average outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is significantly 
related to total compensation and pay for performance when CEO tenure is low but not related 
when CEO tenure is high. Specifically, I find that when CEO tenure is low, the ratio of the 
outsiders’ structural power to that of the insiders is significantly associated with total 
compensation (β = 0.05, p < 0.10) and pay for performance (β = -0.08 p < 0.01).  
 
5.5.14.2.   Interactions: Outsiders’ and * Insiders’ Power Bases  
In this section, I examine whether CEO tenure affects the relationship between board 
power and monitoring as an interaction (Table W-75). 
Ownership.  Specifically, I find that outsiders’ ownership power significantly interacts 
with insiders’ power when CEO tenure is lower (β = -0.06, p <0.10) but not higher (β =-0.00, p > 
0.10) to affect compensation.  Similarly,  outsiders’ ownership power interacts with insiders’ 
ownership power when CEO tenure is lower (β = -0.06, p >0.10) but not higher (β = -0.03, p > 
0.10) to affect pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
 Prestige.   Specifically, I find that the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ 
prestige power affects compensation similarly when CEO tenure is lower (β = -0.03,  p < 0.10) 
or higher (β =-0.05,  p < 0.10). However, outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power interact to affect 
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pay for performance when CEO tenure is higher (β = -0.05,  p < 0.10) but not lower(β =-0.01,  p 
> 0.10).    
Structural. Specifically, I find that outsiders’ structural power interacts with insiders’ power 
when CEO tenure is lower (β = -0.06, p < 0.01) but not higher (β =-0.01, p > 0.10) to affect 
compensation. Outsiders’ structural power does not interact with insiders’ power when CEO 
tenure is lower (β = - 0.04,  p > 0.10) nor higher (β = -0.00,  p > 0.10) to affect pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  
 
5.5.15.   Mergers and Acquisitions 
The relationship between power and the resolution of the agency conflict is relevant to 
merger and acquisitions (M & A) decisions because managers can make M & A deals that 
benefit themselves financially.  Because M & A decisions can result in larger firms and increased 
pay for the CEO, managers should be monitored carefully (Amihud & Lev, 1981); thus, 
examining the association between board power and shareholder value is relevant in the M&A 
context.  
In their study challenging Amihud & Lev’s (1981) conclusions that managers engage in 
unrelated mergers and acquisitions unless closely monitored, Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin (1998) 
reconsider Amihud & Lev’s findings concerning board vigilance, ownership, and corporate 
strategy.  Lane et al. consider arguments grounded in management theory that managers do not 
always act in their own self-interest to counter explanations grounded in agency theory, an 
economic perspective, that managers will act in their self-interest unless monitored.  The 
researchers “find no support for the standard agency theory predictions that management-
controlled firms are associated with strategically inferior levels of diversification and acquisition 
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types, lower levels of risk and lower levels of returns than are firms with large blockholders 
and/or firms with vigilant boards” (Lane et al., 1998, p. 571).   
Whereas trends in 2011 regarding boards included increased camaraderie between boards 
and shareholders, increased regulatory oversight, and an increased focus on stock performance as 
indicators of successful boards, Lewkow, Beller, Fisher, & Klingsberg (2012) recommended that 
boards should focus on M&A opportunities and risks.  Thus, in my supplementary analysis, I 
consider the way in which my power model relates to the monitoring of M&A activity and 
returns during my sample period.  Consistent with other studies examining M&A activity in the 
corporate governance context (e.g., Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010), I use event study 
analysis and examine the relationship between monitoring and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs).  I examine CARs using six event windows that range from 3  to 7 days surrounding the 
M &A announcement: a) (-1, +1), b) (-2, +1), c) (-2, +2), d)(-3, +3), e) (-1, +2), and, f) (-1, +3) 
(Appendix J).  Using multiple event windows allows me to consider the longer effects of board 
monitoring behavior while also considering shorter event windows that enter less unobserved 
error into the result than the longer window (Weston, Siu, & Johnson, 2001).  Consistent with 
prior research (e.g., Walters et al., 2007), abnormal returns were calculated on one day as AR=Rit 
–(αi + βiRmt).
4
 Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the total returns for the individual daily 
returns in the specified event window.  
To create the sample dataset for the M&A analysis, I use the companies in my main 
analysis dataset and find the CARs for these event windows by integrating data from the 
Eventus/CRSP and the Thomson Reuters M&A databases. This approach produced a dataset 
representing 1,477 M&A deals. In addition, I use the following controls that are similar to M&A 
                                                 
4
 Abnormal returns include the following: Rit =return on firm i’s stock for day t; Rmt = market return for day t; and αi 
= firm i’s expected return if the market portfolio does not change (Walters et al., 2007). 
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studies:  firm size, Tobin’s Q, firm financial performance, previous M&A experience, percentage 
acquired, whether the acquiring and target firm were in the same industry, whether the deal was 
considered a hostile takeover, institutional ownership, the percentage of ownership by the largest 
institutional owner, control for post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and board size. 
 
5.5.15.1.   Mergers and Acquisitions: Outsider/ Insider Power Ratios 
For the first event window (-1, +1), I find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ 
ownership, prestige, and structural power are insignificantly associated with CAR (Appendix X 
Table X-76).  In the second event window (-2, +1), the full model indicates the ratio of outsiders’ 
ownership power to insiders’ ownership (β = -0.05, p < 0.05) and the ratio of outsiders’ structural 
power to insiders’ structural power (β = -0.05, p < 0.10) are negatively associated (Table X-77). 
The third event window (-2, +2) also reveals the ratio of outsiders’ ownership power to insiders’ 
power is negatively associated (β = -0.04, p < 0.10) in the full model (Table X-78).   In the fourth 
event window (-3, +3), I find similar results in the full model in that the ratio of outsiders’ 
ownership power to insiders’ power is negatively associated with CAR (β = -0.04, p < 0.10) 
(Table X-79).  In the fifth event window (-1, +2), I find that the ratio of outsiders’ ownership 
power to insiders’ power is negatively associated with CAR in the isolated model (β = -0.04, p < 
0.10) (Model 2) but insignificantly associated in the full model (β = -0.04, p > 0.10) (Table X-
80).  In the sixth event window (-1, +3), I find that the ratio of outsiders’ ownership power to 
insiders’ power is negatively associated with CAR in the isolated model (β = -0.04, p < 0.10) 
(Model 2) but insignificantly associated in the full model (β = -0.04, p > 0.10) (Table X-81).   
 In Tables X-81– X-87, I run my analysis again, winsorizing my ownership variable at 
p=0.01, and find my results remain the same with the exception of the third event window (-2 + 
98 
 
2), the fifth event window (-1, +2), and the sixth event window (-1, +3).  In the third event 
window (-2, +2), the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is significant in 
the isolated model (β = -0.05, p < 0.10) (Model 2) but not in the full model (β = -0.05, p > 0.10)  
(Table X-84). In the fifth event window (-1, +2), the ratio of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ 
ownership power is significant in the isolated model (β = -0.06, p < 0.05) (Model 2) and the full 
model (β = -0.06, p < 0.10) (Model 5) (Table X-86). In the sixth event window (-1, +2), the ratio 
of the average outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership power is significant in the isolated model (β = -
0.07, p < 0.05) (Model 2) and the full model (β = -0.06, p < 0.10) (Model 5) (Table X-87). 
 
5.5.15.2.   Mergers and Acquisitions: Insider/Outsider Power Ratios 
To determine whether the results change if I examine the alignment of manager 
incentives, I run my analysis again using a winsorized insider-to-outsider ownership power ratio 
(Appendix Y). For the first event window (-1, +1), I find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ 
ownership, prestige, and structural power are insignificantly associated with CAR (Table Y-88).   
In the second event window (-2, +1), the full model indicates that the ratio of outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power (β = 0.06, p < 0.10) is positively associated (Table Y-89). In the third 
event window (-2, +2), I find that the ratios of outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership, prestige, and 
structural power are insignificantly associated with CAR (Table Y-90).  In the fourth event 
window (-3, +3), I find the ratio of insiders’ to outsiders’ ownership power is positively 
associated with CAR (β = 0.06, p < 0.10) (Table Y-91).  In the fifth event window (-1, +2), I find 
that the ratios of outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership, prestige, and structural power are 
insignificantly associated with CAR (Table Y-92).  In the sixth event window (-1, +3), I find that 
the ratio of insiders’ to outsiders’ ownership power is positively associated with CAR in the 
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isolated model (β = 0.07, p < 0.10) (Model 2) but insignificantly associated in the full model (β = 
0.06, p > 0.10) (Table Y-93).   
 
5.5.15.3.   Mergers and Acquisitions: Summary 
These findings indicate that board power is relevant to whether firms are engaging in M 
& A decisions that positively or negatively affect shareholder value.   Specifically, I find that the 
ratio of insiders’ to outsiders’ ownership power is positively associated with CARs, whereas the 
ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power and ownership power are negatively associated.  
My findings regarding ownership power are consistent with the previous literature in that 
managers with equity have greater incentives to make decisions that affect shareholder value 
(Finkelstein & Jackson, 2000).    
In reference to the negative relationship between structural power and CARs, I can 
speculate that these results may reflect compensation committee structure, confusing messages to 
the market during a risky decision-making period, the specific manner in which structural power 
was operationalized or the degree of managerial entrenchment.  First, CARs are related to the 
way in which the compensation committee is structured because of its control over golden 
parachutes, which affect the costs of monitoring the CEO and takeovers.  Citing mixed results in 
their review of studies examining the relationship between firm performance and golden 
parachutes, Davidson, Pilger, & Szakmary (1997) nevertheless note a relationship between the 
composition of the compensation committee by insiders and outsiders, and CARs; specifically, 
these researchers find that negative CARs result when affiliated outsiders, rather than 
independent outsiders, comprise the committee.  Future research should clarify the rationale 
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behind my results to develop a new database differentiating between affiliated outsiders and 
independent outsiders to examine whether my findings are consistent with other findings.  
Second, as outsiders acquire more structural power than insiders, outsiders are able to 
control decisions that can limit managerial opportunism.  However, increased structural power, 
such as in non-CEO duality situations with greater board control over board discussions, also 
results in less decision-making control for the CEO at a time of high risk for the firm. This 
scenario creates the potential for confused decision-making processes and diffused authority,  
which sends mixed messages to the market (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Miller & Friesen, 
1977).   
Third, the specific operationalization of the board structural power context is in the pay-
for-performance context, operationalized based on overlapping membership on the nominating 
and compensation committees, tenure on the nomination and compensation committees, and 
hierarchy on the board in relationship to the board’s ability to control the CEO. An interesting 
extension to the paper will be to operationalize a structural power construct that involves 
membership and/or tenure on the auditing committee, as well as an additional power expertise 
power base considering the financial expertise of the board member.  I anticipate that a structural 
power construct operationalized using variables relevant to M & A valuation activity would be 
positively associated with CARs.  Moreover, managerial entrenchment as proxied by CEO tenure 
may affect these results.   Walters, Kroll, & Wright (2007) found that CEO tenure is positively 
associated with firm performance when managers are less tenured and negatively associated with 
performance as tenure increases. The researchers suggest that these results may be linked to 
longer-tenured CEOs becoming more complacent regarding their knowledge of M&A and firm 
growth (Kroll et al., 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). More interestingly, longer-tenured 
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CEOs have more influence on boards (Zajac & Westphal, 1996); thus, although outsiders may 
have more structural power, the outsiders remain somewhat dependent on the CEO for 
information that can be manipulated.   
Finally, although this paper considers the linear relationship between board power bases 
and CARs as supplemental analyses, it may be possible that the relationship can be non-linear; 
this possibility should be explored in future research.  Board monitoring and M&A outcomes are 
affected by characteristics such as CEO tenure that create a non-linear relationship with 
performance (e.g., Walters et al., 2007).  
 
5.6.  Economic Significance 
Although my study indicates that the relationship of power to monitoring effectiveness is 
contextual, in this section I report the economic significance of my power ratios without 
considering contextual implications. As the ratio of the average outsiders’ prestige power to that 
of insiders increases by 1 unit, there is a 7 % increase in total compensation and a 4 % increase 
in pay-for-performance sensitivity. Because managers’ work contributes to shareholder wealth, 
managers’ earnings will increase as shareholders’ wealth increases. In this example, instead of 
making $1.56 for every $1,000 shareholders make, managers will make $1.68.  As the ratio of 
the average outsiders’ ownership power to that of insiders increases by 1 unit, there is a 1% 
increase in total compensation and no increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity.  As the ratio 
of the average outsiders’ structural power to that of insiders increases by 1 unit, there is a 4% 
increase in total compensation and a  1% decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
Assessing monitoring effectiveness by considering the multidimensional nature of board 
power, as proxied by board structural and compositional characteristics, provides insight into 
understanding pay for performance.   The ability to evaluate whether boards are effective 
requires an understanding of how board characteristics affect monitoring. Although research has 
been inconclusive concerning this relationship (Daily et al., 1998), board power provides a 
conceptual bridge to examine how board characteristics potentially result in conflicting goals, 
loyalties, and risk preferences that affect the distribution of power within boards and thus 
influence monitoring effectiveness.  Therefore, I argue that research has been inconsistent on the 
association between board outsiders/insiders and monitoring effectiveness because we have not 
considered the influence of power bases within boards.  Although managerial and board power 
are largely referenced conceptually in corporate governance research, to the best of my 
knowledge, no research has attempted to theoretically and empirically model board power as a 
multi-dimensional construct in the executive compensation context to reconcile this 
inconsistency.  
By integrating agency and upper echelon theories, this study attempts to clarify the 
inconsistent link between board composition (e.g., classification as outsider or insider) and pay 
performance implications (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988) by presenting a power framework 
that can explain whether board members are potentially able to effectively influence pay for 
performance.  More specifically, I suggest that board structural and compositional characteristics 
can serve as proxy indicators for different bases of power within boards. These bases were 
empirically validated and then used to examine the following two research questions: a) how do 
board power bases affect members’ influence on monitoring and executive compensation? and b) 
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how do power bases influence outsiders’ and insiders’ monitoring effectiveness?   In examining 
these questions, I extend Finkelstein’s (1992) model of top management team power to the 
context of a board of directors’ monitoring responsibilities.  Moreover, this study contributes to 
corporate governance research by demonstrating that board power bases are important 
components in conceptualizing and assessing monitoring.  Overall, my findings indicate that 
board power bases affect the influence of outsiders’ and insiders’ monitoring effectiveness 
differently; however, the influence of power bases is contextual, depending not only on 
environmental, firm, board, and CEO characteristics but also on how powerful outsiders and 
insiders are relative to each other. 
First, my findings indicate that monitoring effectiveness improves as outsiders become more 
powerful compared to insiders; however, this relationship is contextual based on environmental, 
firm, board, and CEO characteristics. In my main study,  I find that the ratio of outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power is positively associated with pay for performance, while the ratios of 
outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership and structural power bases are not significantly related. Why 
are the ownership and structural power ratios not significant? In my supplemental analyses, I 
find that the reason why the ratios of outsiders’ to insiders’ ownership and structural powers may 
not have been significant is because this relationship changes as environmental (e.g., government 
regulation, world/economic events, institutional forces), firm, (e.g., size, performance) board 
(e.g., size, level of independence), and CEO characteristics (e.g., equity and tenure) change. 
Second, my supplementary analyses indicate that outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases 
interact as substitutes or complements to affect monitoring, depending on context. For example, 
we find a significant substitution effect in large firms, not smaller firms, when we examine 
outsiders’ ownership power relative to that of insiders, indicating that managerial incentive 
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alignment is important to consider in examining the relationship of board power to monitoring.   
Thus, the overall finding that boards become more effective as outsiders’ power bases grow 
relative to insiders’ power bases is consistent with the previous research indicating that boards, 
when more powerful, are more likely to combat managerial influence (e.g., Walsh & Seward, 
1990); however, an extended contribution of my study is the finding that this relationship is 
contextual. .  
 
6.1.   Board Power Theoretical Framework Extended:  Contextual Implications 
 Overall, this study demonstrates that board power is a multi-dimensional construct and 
that each dimension has different implications for monitoring when we consider outsiders’ power 
bases relative to those of insiders. Without first considering any unique contextual conditions 
(e.g., environmental characteristics) in my initial regression models, I find that as outsiders’ 
prestige increases relative to insiders’ prestige, pay for performance increases, whereas 
ownership and structural power have no significant relationship. Why does prestige power have 
such a large, significant effect and ownership have such a weak, insignificant effect?  Prestige 
power is perceived by individuals as someone having power over them more than ownership is 
perceived in this way (Finkelstein, 1992); thus, I suggest that these findings indicate how other 
board members may perceive power will affect monitoring effectiveness. After finding that 
perceived power was more correlated with prestige power (r=0.42, p <0.001) than with 
ownership power (r=0.17, p < 0.001), Finkelstein (1992) explained that it is conceivable that 
ownership power would be the least type of power associated with perceived power because 
“managers with ownership power, though still powerful, may be less involved in the actual 
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management of firms since perceived power is based on managerial influence in strategic 
decision making (p. 523-524).” 
 
6.1.1. Contextual Theoretical Framework: Environment, Firm,  Board, and CEO 
 This study provides an interesting extension to board power and monitoring research, 
specifically by providing a theoretical framework to explore the role of context in understanding 
how power affects board monitoring effectiveness.  Specifically, this study finds that context can 
influence board power bases differently by affecting the level of discretion managers use to 
influence outcomes.  Managerial discretion is positively associated with total compensation, 
contingent-based pay, advertising intensity, and CEO turnover, but negatively associated with 
firm age and a stable strategic direction (Rajoplan & Finkelstein, 1992).  In this section, I extend 
my board power theoretical framework to context in terms of four primary contextual groupings: 
environmental, firm, board, and CEO characteristics (Table 13). 
Contextual implications may vary based on whether the context examined involves changes 
that are internal or external to the firm.  Whereas CEO entrenchment, as proxied by CEO tenure, 
is a within-the-firm internal condition, legislation, firm performance, industrial pressures, and 
world events are also affected by events external to the firm (e.g., war, global issues, and 
economic climate).   
 
6.1.1.1.   Contextual Theoretical Framework: Environmental Characteristics 
Environmental characteristics, such as governmental regulations, world and/or economic 
events, and institutional forces, affect the way in which board power affects monitoring 
effectiveness.  Forces and/or events within the firm’s environmental context affect managerial 
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discretion, or the latitude of managers to influence outcomes (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  
The characteristics of the firm’s environment, such as product differentiation, industry structure, 
demand instability, legal constraints, or outside forces may increase or decrease the effect of 
managers depending on the environmental context (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). These 
contextual considerations are relevant to executive pay decisions because firms may have to pay 
managers more to compensate them for providing leadership in an environment characterized by 
more complex and riskier competitive conditions (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). 
First, governmental regulations affecting corporate governance practices impose legal 
requirements and consequences for failing to abide by these regulations. Because of their 
constraints on managerial action, legal requirements can reduce managerial discretion, which in 
turn affects pay-for-performance sensitivity. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was intended to 
improve corporate governance by increasing regulations that require boards to be more effective 
and objective monitors both in terms of their structure (e.g., board independence) and practices 
(e.g., financial reporting). As a result, public accountability for boards increased and boards 
changed their executive pay practices to include less contingent-based pay and more salary-
component pay immediately following SOX (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2007).  My results indicate 
that reduced contingent-based pay following SOX may have inadvertently negatively affected 
pay-for-performance sensitivity because there were fewer incentives for managers to take riskier 
actions at a time when publicity surrounding performance had increased.  
Second, world and economic events affect the firm’s competitive landscape and reduce 
managerial discretion because of changes in consumer behavior that affect firm profitability; 
however, these changes may be industry-specific.   The World Trade Center attacks of 2001 
provide an example of how firm profitability was negatively affected by a world event that 
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resulted in fear and uncertainty and influenced consumer behavior (e.g., travel decisions, 
including airlines and transportation).  Although boards may have to compensate managers to 
take more risks in an uncertain environment and directors may be more active monitors during 
times of greater uncertainty (Goodstein, Guatam, & Boeker, 1994), there is a limit to what CEOs 
can and cannot control in uncertain environments; therefore, there may be less of an association 
with pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Thirdly, institutional forces in the firm’s industry may limit managerial discretion. 
Institutional isomorphism results when firms make decisions similar to other firms in the same 
industry to enhance legitimacy, rendering managerial action futile. As institutional isomorphism 
increases, variation in executive pay decreases. When these institutional mimetic forces are 
strong, executive action matters less; managers have less discretion because firm “performance 
[is]...affected by forces beyond a leader’s control” (Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972, p. 121). 
Bertrand & Schoar (2003) found that a 5% variance in firm performance was linked to 
managerial efforts after controlling for industry, year, and firm fixed-effects. The design of 
compensation contracts is affected by forces in the firm’s institutional context.  Brandes, 
Dharwadkar, & Das (2005) integrated agency and institutional theories, building on Lawrence et 
al.’s (2001) multi-stage model of institutionalization to demonstrate how the adoption of 
incentive-based compensation is influenced at each stage.  Specifically, these researchers 
indicate that mimetic forces, passed through board interlocks, influence the adoption of stock 
options in the first stage, whereas the second stage of stability is characterized by firms that 
appear similar to each other after adopting these plans.  Finally, in the deinstitutionalization 
stage, agents and/or principals may try to influence regulators to eliminate incentive-based 
compensation if ineffective.  
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Amid conditions characterized by more institutional pressures, we may observe that certain 
board power bases are more influential than others. For example, prestige power increases the 
potential for directors to interact more with members of the managerial elite.  As directors 
interact more frequently through increased directorships and/or interlocks, a “capitalist class 
culture” develops (Useem, 1979, 1984) and the potential for board practices to pass among firms 
increases (Davis, 1991).   
Finally, additional environmental characteristics that can be examined in this context include 
product market competition and market growth, which increase managerial discretion. Thus, we 
would expect to see greater pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 
6.1.1.2.   Contextual Theoretical Framework: Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics influence the way in which board power affects monitoring 
effectiveness.  The characteristics of an organization, including the firm’s size, age, culture, 
capital intensity, resource availability, or forces from players inside the firm, may affect 
managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
First, firm size affects the firm’s operations by influencing the level of difficulty for the 
manager to control outcomes and for the board to monitor managers.  The potential for 
managerial opportunism increases in larger firms (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), which is positively 
associated compensation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1989).   Some board power bases may be 
more affected than others by a firm’s size. Smaller firms are associated with more managerial 
discretion because the manager has a greater ability to control an outcome in situations with less 
uncertainty. Thus, we expect to see more behavioral-based compensation and active boards in 
smaller firms.  Boards may be more involved in smaller firms because management teams may 
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be less diverse in skills (Finkelstein et al., 2009); thus, we may observe a greater association 
between structural power and pay for performance.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that 
“higher pay-performance sensitivities for small firms could reflect that CEOs are more 
influential in smaller companies” (p. 260). In contrast, larger firms are associated with greater 
uncertainty, a greater risk of managerial opportunism, and a greater need for more effective 
monitoring. We would expect to see a larger amount of contingent-based pay and more aligned 
incentives; thus, we may note a greater association between ownership power and pay for 
performance in larger firms.  
Second, the level of a firm’s current performance will affect the impact of power on 
monitoring effectiveness. Compensation increases as firm performance increases (Gomez-Mejia 
& Welbourne, 1989).  In lower-performing firms, CEOs have less bargaining power but may 
have a greater commitment to change the firm’s current strategic direction (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993).  Similarly, board members themselves may perform 
differently in a low-performing versus high-performing firm.  Because outside directors are 
motivated by a need to protect their reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983), outside directors are 
forced to incur a cost to their reputation by serving as a board member of a poorly performing 
firm; thus, we anticipate that more prestigious directors will not remain on a poorly performing 
firm’s boards. In contrast, CEOs of higher-performing firms have more bargaining power and 
may make stronger attempts to persuade boards. However, boards may not have to be as active in 
monitoring because managers are more committed to the status quo in higher-performing firms 
(Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993). Further, boards may have to pay more to 
recruit/retain a talented CEO, which depends on when the CEO was hired. 
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Finally, additional firm characteristics that can be examined in this context include the equity 
structure and the age of firms.  More concentrated ownership reduces managerial discretion and 
affects pay-for-performance sensitivity, whereas less concentrated ownership increases 
discretion, which is related to pay decisions (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002).  
Larger institutional owners affect monitoring effectiveness (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & 
Khan, 2008); these owners are associated with less total compensation, more behavioral-based 
compensation and less contingent-based compensation (Khan, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2005). 
Thus, when large owners are present, we may observe an association between board power bases 
and pay; therefore, we anticipate seeing large owners and board power bases, specifically board 
ownership power, interacting as substitutes in enhancing monitoring effectiveness. Further, 
board members may be more involved in a newer firm than in an older firm  (Zald, 1969). 
 
6.1.1.3.   Contextual Theoretical Framework:  Board Characteristics 
 Board characteristics, including the board’s size and its degree of independence, affect 
monitoring effectiveness. Although the board’s size, the percentage of outside directors and the 
percentage of inside ownership are associated with more firm litigation (e.g., lawsuits), boards 
whose directors sit on multiple boards are negatively associated (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002). 
First, board size affects the influence of board members in the monitoring process, and 
thus, the number of directors on the board may result in some power bases (e.g., prestige) being 
more prevalent on some boards as opposed to other boards.  Larger boards tend to be ineffective 
monitors associated with increased pay and reduced pay-for-performance sensitivity (Core et al., 
1997).  When boards increase in size, they become less willing to challenge the CEO and to 
demonstrate objectivity, contributing to faulty decision-making processes (Lipton & Lorsch, 
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1992). Larger boards are associated with more conflict and diversity on the board (Goodstein, 
Guatam, & Boeker, 1994). Although larger boards may have more directors serving on multiple 
boards, which enhances a board’s prestige power base, these directors may be overly committed 
and less involved in leadership roles on the focal firm’s board, thus reducing the outsiders’ 
structural power base.   
 Second, the degree of board independence is relevant to understanding the board’s bases 
of power.  Although board independence increases the potential for objective monitoring on the 
board, outsiders may be less focused on the focal firm if they have too many outside 
directorships.  Further, because boards with more outsiders will have less knowledge about the 
firm’s operations, there may be increased potential for the CEO to manipulate the board.  Thus, 
we anticipate that the level of independence on the board is highly relevant to explaining how the 
relationship between outsiders’ monitoring effectiveness and ownership, prestige, and structural 
power bases change. 
 Finally, additional board characteristics that can be examined in this context include CEO 
duality and the frequency of board meetings.   CEO duality increases managerial discretion and 
requires more active monitoring; therefore, we may observe that more structurally powerful 
boards are more engaged in a dual-chaired board than a non-CEO-chaired board.  Further, 
structural power may be more relevant on boards that meet more often, whereas ownership and 
prestige power may be more relevant on boards that meet less often because of their passive 
approach to monitoring through incentive alignment. 
 
6.1.1.4.   Contextual Theoretical Framework: CEO Characteristics 
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 CEO characteristics are relevant to understanding the impact of board power on 
monitoring effectiveness.  Managerial characteristics, including the CEO’s aspiration level, 
commitment to the status quo, ambition, and power base will affect the manager’s discretion 
(Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). First, managerial incentives align manager equity interest with 
those of shareholders so that managers make equity decisions that are in the best interests of 
shareholders.  When managerial incentives are aligned, this alignment reduces the need for 
active board monitoring and can substitute for board monitoring mechanisms (Beatty & Zajac, 
1994).  
Second, CEO tenure affects managerial decision making and the potential for managerial 
entrenchment.  With increased CEO tenure, CEO bargaining power increases; consequently,  
CEO tenure is associated with increased managerial pay, whereas the relationship between pay 
and stock returns decreases (Hill & Phan, 1991).  Although ownership power aligns board 
interests with those of shareholders, the need for active board monitoring as CEO tenure 
increases may be replaced by the CEO’s own interest alignment that occurs by his/her need for 
employment security.  Increased tenure may motivate CEOs to avoid making riskier decisions 
that threaten their employment because of what they could lose, as opposed to what they could 
gain (Coffee, 1988). CEOs become more conservative as CEO tenure increases and have a 
tendency to conform to the firm’s current strategic direction (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). 
Similarly, CEOs can become more entrenched, increasing their bargaining power over the board 
in terms of their compensation decisions. Managerial opportunism may be a problem at higher 
levels of CEO tenure (Shen & Cannella, 2002a).  Thus, we anticipate that the impact of 
ownership, prestige, and structural power bases on monitoring effectiveness will change as CEO 
tenure changes. 
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6.1.2. Contextual Theoretical Framework:  Interaction Effects 
Extending the board power theoretical framework to interactions among power bases 
(Table 14), I provide a theoretical framework that offers four quadrants predicting how outsiders’ 
and insiders’ power bases interact to affect monitoring.  Quadrants 1 and  3 provide insight into 
the potential for substitution effects, whereas quadrant 2 provides insight into the potential for 
complementary effects.  Because both outsiders’ and insiders’ power bases are low in quadrant 4, 
the potential for managerial opportunism and ineffective monitoring exists. 
In quadrant 1, the interaction of high outsiders’ power with low insiders’ power produces 
an overall potential for effective monitoring with minimal managerial opportunism and greater 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Directors are more incentivized and empowered to control 
managerial opportunism: ownership incentives are aligned for directors but for not for managers; 
prestige power motivates directors to protect their reputation when insiders are not similarly 
motivated, and structural power gives directors greater control and decision-making authority 
over managers. 
In quadrant 2, the interaction of high outsiders’ power and high insiders’ power produces 
an overall potential for effective monitoring that may appear as a complementary effect.  
Managerial opportunism is minimized and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity is possible 
because equity incentives are aligned for both directors and managers; both directors and 
managers are motivated to protect their reputation, and the board has a similar degree of 
structural oversight over the CEO, which may create a team approach to enhancing shareholder 
value.   
In quadrant 3, the interaction of low outsiders’ and high insiders’ power produces the 
potential for monitoring to be compromised; however, the potential also exists for a substitution 
114 
 
effect to take place that can enhance monitoring.  Although managerial opportunism may occur, 
it may be limited because ownership and reputation incentives are aligned for managers, not 
directors.  Because managers have structural control over decisions, however, the potential for 
the board to be manipulated by the CEO may exist.  
My supplementary analyses indicate that outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige and structural 
power bases interact with each other both with and without context considerations; however, the 
interaction of outsiders’ and insiders’ ownership power bases is contextual.  In this section, I 
examine the interactions independent of contextual implications and then discuss the contextual 
implications for interactions in the following sections.  Outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power 
bases interact with each other in a complementary way to suppress total compensation (Figure 
8a); however, these bases may have a substitution interaction effect with each other to enhance 
pay-for-performance sensitivity (Figure 8b).  Similarly, outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power 
indicate a complementary interaction effect to suppress compensation and a substitution effect to 
increase pay-for-performance sensitivity.  In regard to structural power, total compensation 
increases when insiders’ structural power is present and outsiders’ structural power is less 
present (Figure 8c). However, pay-for-performance increases both when outsiders’ structural 
power is high and insiders’ structural power is low and when outsiders’ structural power is low 
and insiders’ structural power is high (Figure 8d). 
Overall, the significance of these interaction results suggests that understanding the 
implications of outsiders or insiders’ power bases may depend on the degree to which the other 
group’s power is present. However, these interactions vary as context changes, a scenario that we 
explore further in the following sections.   
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A summary of initial regression analyses based on this contextual theoretical framework is 
presented in Table 15, and interaction effects based on supplementary regression analyses are 
provided in Table 16. 
 
6.2.   Ownership, Prestige, and Structural Power Implications 
6.2.1. Ownership Power is Relative: Context and Incentive Alignment 
Ownership power is relative, such that the relationship between outsiders’ ownership power 
and monitoring effectiveness depends on the firm’s context and the degree of insiders’ 
ownership power.  CEOs may not perceive outsiders’ ownership power as a threatening 
monitoring source of control (Finkelstein, 1992), which may explain why ownership power was 
not significantly associated with pay for performance in the main model (e.g., without context).  
Finkelstein (1992) found that of the three powers, ownership, structural, and prestige, ownership 
power was the least correlated with perceived power and hypothesized that TMT members did 
not perceive other TMT members with ownership power as actively participating in the process 
to influence decisions.  However, although ownership power is not significantly associated with 
pay for performance in my main analysis, my supplementary analysis lends support to the idea 
that the relationship between a board’s ownership base and monitoring is contextual, and 
specifically, based not only on environmental, firm, board, and CEO characteristics but also on 
the degree of insiders’ ownership power.  When insiders’ ownership power is high, managerial 
incentives are aligned, which decreases the need for board monitoring that is associated with 
high outsiders’ ownership power. 
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6.2.1.1.   Ownership Power and Environmental Characteristics: Government Regulation 
and World Events 
First, environmental conditions such as government regulation and world events affect how 
ownership power and monitoring are related. My findings indicate that a substitution effect takes 
place if we examine pre- and post-SOX, such that outsiders’ and insiders’ ownership power 
substitute for each other to suppress compensation pre-SOX and pre-WTC attacks.  During the 
pre-SOX period, total compensation is suppressed both when outsiders’ ownership power is high 
and insiders’ ownership power is low and when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ 
ownership power is high, indicating a substitution effect (Figure Z-9a).  However, increased 
regulatory oversight during the post-SOX era results in a positive association between outsiders’ 
ownership power and pay for performance, such that pay for performance increases when 
outsiders’ ownership power is high and insiders’ ownership power is low (Figure Z-9b).  Before 
the WTC attacks, a substitution interaction effect exists such that total compensation is 
suppressed both when outsiders’ ownership power is high and insiders’ ownership power is low 
and when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ ownership power is high (Figure Z-
10). 
 
6.2.1.2.   Ownership Power and Firm Characteristics: Firm Size 
Second, firm characteristics affect the relationship differently such that outsiders’ and 
insiders’ ownership power substitute for each other to suppress compensation and enhance PPS 
in large firms, but not in smaller firms.  We find that total compensation is suppressed when 
outsiders’ ownership power is high and insiders’ power is low, as well as when insiders’ power 
is high and outsiders’ power is low (Figure Z-12a). Pay-for-performance sensitivity is enhanced 
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both when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ ownership power is high and when 
outsider ownership power is high and insiders’ ownership power is low (Figure Z-12b).  
 
6.2.1.3.   Ownership Power and Board Characteristics: Board Independence  
Third, board characteristics affect this relationship because outsiders’ and insiders’ 
ownership power substitute for each other to suppress compensation and improve PPS when a 
larger proportion of the board are outsiders. When outsiders are more present, these power bases 
interact to have a substitution effect with total compensation; total compensation is suppressed 
both when outsiders’ ownership power is high and insiders’ ownership power is low and when 
outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ ownership power is high (Figure Z-13a).  
Similarly, pay for performance is higher both when outsiders’ ownership power is high and 
insiders’ ownership power is low and when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ 
ownership power is high (Figure Z-13b). 
 
6.2.1.4.   Ownership Power and CEO Characteristics:  CEO Tenure 
Finally, CEO characteristics affect this relationship because outsiders’ and insiders’ 
ownership power substitute for each other to suppress compensation and enhance pay-for-
performance sensitivity when CEO tenure is lower.  When CEO tenure is low, these power bases 
interact to create a substitution effect to affect total compensation; total compensation is 
suppressed both when outsiders’ ownership power is high and insiders’ ownership power is low 
and when outsiders’ ownership power is low and insiders’ ownership power is high (Figure Z-
14a).  However, pay-for-performance sensitivity is enhanced when outsiders’ ownership power 
is low and insiders’ ownership power is high (Figure Z-14b). 
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Why then does ownership have this effect when CEO tenure is low but not high?  When 
managerial entrenchment is less present, as in the case of lower CEO tenure, managers may take 
risks that may or may not benefit the firm financially at the beginning of their career, whereas 
managers may take fewer risks that result in average firm performance, similar to industry 
norms, as CEO tenure increases (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990); thus, board monitoring is 
needed and can have a significant influence at lesser degrees of tenure than when tenure 
increases.  Caution, knowledge regarding industrial norms, and a tendency to conform to the 
firm’s strategic direction increase with tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), thus aligning 
managerial interests, motivating managers to make more profitable decisions, and reducing the 
need for powerful outsiders with ownership power to monitor. Boards in which outsiders hold 
more ownership power than insiders have a greater investment in a firm’s financial success 
because of their interest alignment with shareholders (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2009).   As 
outsiders’ ownership power increases relative to insiders’ ownership power and managers are 
less entrenched, monitoring effectiveness improves because outsiders’ incentives to monitor 
increases at a time when CEOs may be less effective in manipulating the board.  As outsiders’ 
ownership power increases relative to insiders’ power when managerial entrenchment is more 
present, the board’s monitoring effectiveness may be compromised because they are subject to 
potential manipulation by the CEO. CEOs have more managerial discretion that comes with 
increased tenure and advanced firm-specific knowledge, thus increasing board costs to terminate 
the CEO and weakening monitoring effectiveness (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; Arthur, 2001).   
 
6.2.2. Prestige Power and the Reputation Incentive Effect 
6.2.2.1.   The Main Effects of Prestige Power 
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Board  prestige power increases as the perception of a board member’s reputation as an 
effective board monitor increases outside the firm. My findings indicate that board prestige 
power is positively associated with pay for performance because board members’ motivation to 
protect their reputation as effective monitors potentially increases (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Therefore, I refer to the relationship between board prestige power and monitoring as the 
reputation incentive effect.  
Specifically, I find that as outsiders’ prestige power increases relative to insiders’ prestige 
power, monitoring effectiveness improves, as demonstrated by a positive association with pay-
for-performance sensitivity; however, pay also increases.  CEOs may be paid more to incentivize 
them to take risks that benefit shareholders.  Moreover, this finding that outsiders are associated 
with increased pay is consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Boyd, 1994; Lambert et. al., 
1993). However, my findings also indicate that the increased pay associated with prestige power 
also correlates to monitoring improvements because pay-for-performance sensitivity increases.   
Despite the positive implications of reputational incentives, monitoring can be inhibited 
when insiders also become members of this elite group, as well as when prestige results in 
increased board responsibilities.   When both outsiders and insiders are part of an elite group, 
they may possess a loyalty to each other and therefore outsiders may become less effective 
monitors.    Further, as outsiders become more prestigiously powerful, the time that board 
members must spend on monitoring the focal firm may decrease.  In studying the way in which 
participation on multiple boards influences bank risk, Cooper & Uzun (2012) examined the 
reputation versus busyness hypothesis, finding support for the busyness hypothesis.  Specifically, 
bank boards whose members are on more boards have increased risk compared to boards with 
less busy directors.  
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6.2.2.2.   The Contextual Implications of Prestige Power 
Prestige power is contextual because the relationship between outsiders’ prestige power 
and monitoring effectiveness depends on the firm’s context and the degree of insiders’ prestige 
power.  I find that government regulation, world events, firm size, firm performance, the degree 
of board independence, board size, CEO tenure, and the level of CEO equity alignment affects 
this relationship.  
 
6.2.2.2.1.   Prestige Power and Environmental Characteristics: Government Regulation 
and World Events 
First, government regulations such as SOX are relevant when examining how prestige power 
affects board monitoring. The ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is positively 
associated with total compensation pre-SOX but not post-SOX. Why, then, is the ratio of the 
outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power positively associated with total compensation and pay-for-
performance sensitivity pre-SOX but not post-SOX?  Public accountability associated with the 
post-SOX era motivated prestigiously powerful directors to make sure that compensation 
packages were not excessive. Boards reduced the incentive-based, contingent compensation that 
forced managers to accept risk after SOX and increased the salary proportion (Cohen, Dey, & 
Lys, 2004). I can speculate that the prestige power of outsiders had a significant effect pre-SOX 
because the contingent-based proportion of executive pay, combined with the board’s motivation 
to protect its reputation, may have incentivized boards to monitor. However, as the structure of 
the pay package changed post-SOX, the immediate years following SOX may reflect less of an 
association between prestige power and pay for performance. Further, the interaction regression 
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analyses indicate that outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power bases create a complementary 
effect pre-SOX with total compensation and a substitution effect post-SOX with pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  Total compensation during the pre-SOX period is suppressed when 
both outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power bases are high (Figure AA-15a).  Before and after 
SOX, pay for performance increases both when outsiders’ prestige power is high and insiders’ 
prestige power is low and when outsiders’ prestige power is low and insiders’ prestige power is 
high (Figure AA-15b). 
 
Similarly, we find that the relationship between prestige power and monitoring 
effectiveness changed as world events such as the World Trade Center attacks of 2001 affected 
the economy.  We find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is positively 
associated with total compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity before the attacks but not 
after the attacks.  Further, outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power interacted similarly pre- and 
post-WTC.  Supplementary analyses indicate that a complementary interaction effect existed 
because total compensation was suppressed when both outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power 
was high (Figure z-16a). However, a substitution effect existed in regards to pay for performance 
because pay for performance increased both when outsiders’ prestige power was high and 
insiders’ prestige power was low and when outsiders’ prestige power was low and insiders’ 
prestige power was high (Figure Z-16b).
5
 
 
6.2.2.2.2.   Prestige Power and Firm Characteristics: Firm Size and Performance 
                                                 
5
 Although not present with the fixed-effects model, the random-effects regression model found that when industry 
pressures are present, outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power bases interact with each other in such a way to create a 
complimentary effect in suppressing compensation (Figure AA-17a), but a substitution effect with pay-for-
performance, such that pay-for-performance increases both when outsiders’ prestige power is high and insiders’ 
prestige power is low and when outsiders’ prestige power is low and insiders’ prestige power is high (Figure AA-
17b). 
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Secondly, firm characteristics such as firm size and performance influence how prestige 
power affects monitoring effectiveness.  The results indicate that the ratio of outsiders’ to 
insiders’ prestige power was positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity in 
smaller firms but not in larger firms, illustrating that board members, such as CEOs, may be 
more influential in smaller companies that in larger companies (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
Interestingly, however, larger firms are affected by the interaction between outsiders’ and 
insiders’ prestige power bases.  Outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power bases interact in a 
complementary way to suppress compensation in both smaller and larger firms (Figure AA-18a). 
However, these bases substitute for each other to enhance pay for performance in larger firms; 
i.e., pay-for-performance sensitivity increases both when the average outsiders’ prestige power is 
high and the average insiders’ prestige power is low and when the average outsiders’ prestige 
power is low and the average insiders’ prestige power is high (Figures AA-18b). 
Firm performance is relevant to prestige power.  The ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ 
prestige power is positively associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity in high-performing 
firms rather than lower-performing firms. Supplemental analyses reveal that better firm 
performance also affects the interaction of outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power bases to create 
a substitution effect, such that  pay-for-performance sensitivity improves when outsiders’ 
prestige power is high and insiders’ prestige power is low and when insiders’ prestige power is 
low and outsiders’ prestige power is high (Figure AA-19).    
 
6.2.2.2.3.   Prestige Power and Board Characteristics: Board Size and Independence 
Thirdly, board characteristics such as board size and the degree of board independence 
affect how prestige power affects monitoring effectiveness.  Larger boards may have more 
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prestigiously powerful outsiders, and the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is 
positively associated with pay for performance on larger boards rather than smaller boards. 
Further, board size affects how outsiders’ prestige power interacts with that of insiders, creating 
a substitution effect. Pay for performance is enhanced on larger boards both when outsiders’ 
prestige power is high and insiders’ prestige power is low and when outsiders’ prestige power is 
low and insiders’ prestige power is high (Figure AA-21a). Similarly, as the degree of board 
independence increases, we find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is 
positively associated with pay for performance on boards with a larger presence of outsiders. 
 
6.2.2.2.4.   Prestige Power and CEO Characteristics:  CEO ownership and Tenure 
Fourth, CEO characteristics such as CEO ownership affect the way in which prestige 
power affects monitoring effectiveness.  The ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ prestige power is 
positively associated with total compensation and pay for performance when CEO incentives are 
more closely aligned.  Further, the impact of this incentive alignment is reflected in how 
outsiders’ and insiders’ prestige power interact with each other to enhance pay for performance 
when outsiders’ prestige power is high and insiders’ prestige power is low (Figure AA-22a). 
Similarly, CEO tenure affects these power bases, such that more managerial entrenchment is 
associated with a substitution effect. Pay for performance is enhanced both when outsiders’ 
prestige power is high and insiders’ prestige power is low and when outsiders’ prestige power is 
low and insiders’ prestige power is high (Figure AA-23a). 
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6.2.3. Structural Power is Contextual 
Structural power has implications regarding how the board’s authoritative structure 
affects the unity of command, which affects monitoring effectiveness. When outsiders become 
more structurally powerful relative to insiders, the board’s authoritative structure (e.g., the 
chairperson of a committee or the board) may become less concentrated in the hands of the CEO. 
Structurally powerful board members are more likely to be able to control the CEO to act in 
alignment with shareholder interests, although that control is somewhat limited.  When board 
outsiders are structurally powerful to a lower degree, the CEO may still control some aspects of 
the board decision-making structure; consequently, potential problems with the decision-making 
structure of the board (e.g., who is in charge) may exist. As a result, total compensation and pay-
for-performance sensitivity may decline.  Firms whose leadership structure is characterized by a 
diffused decision-making structure or the lack of unity of command can inhibit clear, strong, 
decision making by the CEO, thus threatening a firm’s performance (Miller & Friesen, 1977).  
Although boards may be subject to manipulation by the CEO, CEO duality conveys a unity of 
command, “establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility within the firm, helping to 
avoid confusion among top managers as to who is the boss, (and) facilitating effective decision 
making” (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994, p. 1083).   When decision-making structures are unclear, 
communication may become more complex and assumptions may be made, such that board 
members may prefer to avoid conflict threatening effective governance (Jensen, 1993).   As 
outsiders become more structurally powerful at a higher degree, the potential increases for non-
CEOs to chair the board and committees. This scenario makes it clear that outsiders control 
relevant aspects of the board’s decision-making structure, positively influencing pay for 
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performance. When insiders are less powerful, they are in a reduced position to sabotage the 
control of discussion topics within the board.  
Although the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power was not significantly 
associated with total compensation or pay-for-performance sensitivity, in our main models the 
supplemental analyses indicate that contextual conditions affect the relationship between 
structural power and monitoring.   
 
6.2.3.1.   Structural Power and Environmental Characteristics:  Government Regulation, 
World Events, and Industry Forces 
Environmental characteristics, including government regulation, world events, and 
industry forces, affect the relationship between structural power and monitoring effectiveness.  
First, government regulations such as SOX legitimized specific board structural characteristics, 
thus affecting monitoring. I find that the impact of outsiders’ structural power depends on the 
degree of insiders’ structural power present on the board.  Specifically, before SOX, I find that 
outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power complement each other to suppress compensation 
(Figure BB-24a).  However, after SOX, these power sources substitute for each other to improve 
pay-for-performance sensitivity both when outsiders’ structural power is high and insiders’ 
structural power is low and when outsiders’ structural power is low and insiders’ structural 
power is high (Figure BB-24b). 
World events such as the World Trade Center attacks affected the impact of structural 
power.  We find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is positively associated 
with total compensation and pay for performance before the attacks but not after the attacks. In 
examining interaction effects, I find that outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power bases interact 
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with other in a complementary way to suppress compensation before the attacks (Figure BB-
25a).  Pay-for-performance sensitivity at that time improved both when outsiders’ structural 
power is high and insiders’ structural power is low and when outsiders’ structural power is low 
and insiders’ structural power is high (Figure BB-25b). 
Industry forces are important in understanding the relationship between structural power 
and monitoring.  Specifically, we find that the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is 
positively associated with total compensation when industry mimetic forces are not present. 
When industry mimetic forces are not in play, these results suggest that a substitution effect 
exists because pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher both when outsiders’ structural power is 
high and insiders’ structural power is low and when outsiders’ structural power is low and 
insiders’ structural power is high (Figure BB-26).
6
 
 
6.2.3.2.   Structural Power and Firm Characteristics: Firm Size and Performance 
Secondly, I find that firm characteristics are relevant to understanding the way in which 
structural power affects the monitoring relationship.  However, this impact is reflected in the 
analyses not of the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power, but rather in their interaction.  
Firm characteristics affect the structural power of insiders, which affects how structurally 
powerful a board can be, thereby affecting monitoring.  Firms that are smaller or less financially 
profitable result in outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power bases substituting for each other to 
improve pay for performance both when outsiders’ structural power is high and insiders’ 
structural power is low and when outsiders’ structural power is low and insiders’ structural 
power is high (Figures BB-28a and BB-28b). 
 
                                                 
6
 Results for industry mimetic pressures are similar with the random-effects model (Figure BB-27). 
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6.2.3.3.   Structural Power and Board Characteristics: Board Size and Independence 
Board characteristics such as board size and board independence are relevant to 
understanding the relationship between power and monitoring.  First, in line with previous 
research, we find that ineffectiveness associated with board size (e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) 
affects how structural power is related to monitoring.  Smaller boards may be more easily 
manipulated by the CEO because the ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is positively 
associated with total compensation in smaller boards. However, larger boards characterized by 
more conflict are negatively associated with pay for performance.  Board size affects the 
structural power of both insiders and outsiders differently; therefore, we find insight in their 
interaction.  When boards are larger, these power bases interact to have a complementary effect 
with total compensation. Total compensation is suppressed when both outsiders’ and insiders’ 
structural power is high (Figure BB-31a); structurally powerful outsiders and insiders may work 
together more efficiently and outsiders can hold insiders’ more accountable.   However, the way 
in which pay is structured on larger boards may affect incentive-based pay that is related to 
monitoring effectiveness so that a more passive monitoring approach is appropriate. When 
boards are larger, pay for performance is enhanced when insiders’ structural power is high and 
outsiders’ structural power is low (Figure BB-31b).  Further research might consider how 
behavioral and contingent-based pay is structured on larger versus smaller boards with 
structurally powerful outsiders. 
Second, board independence can affect the relationship between structural power and 
monitoring effectiveness by affecting the degree of structural power by outsiders and insiders.  
When boards have a larger number of outsiders, there may exist a point at which they are less 
involved in leadership roles because of time commitments; thus, the degree of independence may 
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compromise monitoring.   When board independence increases, we find that that the ratio of 
outsiders’ to insiders’ structural power is negatively associated with pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. However, pay-for-performance is enhanced when insiders’ structural power is high 
and outsiders’ structural power is less present (Figure BB-30), further illustrating the importance 
of considering how the unity of command is related to monitoring in future research. 
 
6.2.3.4.   Structural Power and CEO Characteristics: CEO Ownership and Tenure 
CEO characteristics such as CEO ownership and tenure affect the relationship between 
structural power and monitoring effectiveness.  The ratio of outsiders’ to insiders’ structural 
power is positively associated with compensation when managerial incentives are not aligned, 
but is not significant when managerial incentives are aligned.   The impact of managerial 
incentives is apparent in the interaction between outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power.  When 
managerial incentive alignment is less present, these power bases interact to have a 
complementary effect with total compensation; total compensation is suppressed when both 
outsiders’ and insiders’ structural power is high (Figure BB-32a).   When CEO ownership is 
higher, pay for performance is enhanced when insiders’ structural power is high and outsiders’ 
structural power is low (Figure BB-32b). When CEO tenure is lower, CEOs are paid more when 
outsiders’ structural power is high and insiders’ structural power is low; boards may try to 
incentivize CEOS to take risks earlier in their careers (Figure BB-33).    
 
6.3.  Theoretical Implications 
In addition to my empirical findings, this study makes important theoretical contributions to 
research. Although the previous research finds no systematic differences in the relationship 
between board composition and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998), I 
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find that power bases influence outsiders and insiders differently in their monitoring 
effectiveness. This finding lends support to my theoretical framework that models board power 
by integrating agency and upper echelon theories, specifically by using board structural and 
compositional characteristics based in theory as proxy indicators for the potential for board 
members to become more powerful. Thus, the two key theoretical implications of my study are 
as follows: my theoretical and empirical modeling of board power bases and my theoretical and 
empirical extension of the role of context in studying board power. 
 
6.3.1. The Theoretical and Empirical Modeling of Board Power Bases 
My study supports the perspective of scholars who recommend using a multi-theoretical 
perspective (Daily et al., 2003) to examine how boardroom dynamics influence decision making 
(e.g., Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999) because single theoretical perspectives limit 
our understanding of how composition affects performance (Dalton et al., 1998).  More 
specifically, this study supports scholars who argue that research should look more in depth to 
the characteristics of the monitors to understand their ramifications on monitoring (e.g., 
Dharwadkar et al., 2008).  This integrated agency–upper echelon theoretical model of power 
creates a foundation for considering power as related to the behavioral view of the firm, which 
suggests that decision making is rational but affected by cognitive characteristics and limitations 
(Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 1958; and Cyert and March, 1963).  In this paper, the 
theoretical contributions of my study are examined in terms of the conceptualization and 
measurement of board ownership, prestige, and structural power, of how board power affects 
monitoring, and of how the monitoring and decision-making process affects executive 
compensation.    
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First, my study and its findings lend support to theoretically conceptualized board power 
bases using board structural and compositional characteristics as proxy indicators.   Ownership 
power is conceptualized and empirically validated using equity differences between the director 
and the CEO; equity by members of the compensation and nomination committee; and, equity 
ownership by those who were not founders, employed by the firm, or related to the CEO.  
Prestige power was conceptualized and empirically validated using the quantity and quality of 
board experiences as proxy indicators:  accumulated board seats, S&P credit ratings of boards on 
which the focal member served, experience on boards that reduced total compensation, and 
experience on boards that increased board independence.   Structural power was conceptualized 
and empirically validated using board hierarchical authority rankings, overlapping committee 
membership, and seniority on the compensation and nomination committees.  
Second, my study demonstrates that board power bases should be considered when assessing 
monitoring effectiveness. Board power bases affect monitoring and compensation decisions 
because their presence increases the likelihood that the focal board member will be able to 
influence decisions that increase control over the CEO and positively influence pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  As my findings suggest, powerful outside owners make decisions that 
are aligned with shareholder interests when CEOs have less bargaining power, as in the case of 
lower degrees of CEO tenure.  As board members become more prestigiously powerful, their 
reputations as effective monitors outside the firm increase, potentially increasing their motivation 
to monitor the CEO of the focal firm to protect this reputation; consequently, pay-for-
performance sensitivity improves. As boards become structurally more powerful, pay for 
performance changes as the context changes. 
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Third, my study demonstrates that an integrated agency and upper echelon theory can be 
used to model board power that can be examined in the corporate governance context.  My 
research is supported by agency theory in demonstrating that resolutions of the agency conflict 
vary based on board structural characteristics, how board members are classified, and how board 
characteristics affect a board’s motivation to monitor.  In addition, my research is supported by 
upper echelon theory in demonstrating that the characteristics of board members, such as 
affiliation, ownership, tenure and experience, affect decisions differently.  Pay for performance 
improves as the power of outsiders—who are often described as having less internal firm 
information and employment risk—increases relative to the power of insiders; however, that 
effect is contextual, depending on ownership, prestige, and structural power bases.  
Fourth, my study and its findings suggest that compensation and monitoring decisions are 
contextual, depending on the board’s structural and compositional characteristics. Although 
human motivation at times can be predictable, at others times it cannot.   As my study 
demonstrates, powerful independent directors are associated with increased pay for performance 
to compensate CEOs for increased risk (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
Finally, and more interestingly, these findings reflect the theoretical arguments of French and 
Raven (1959) and Raven and French (1958) that board prestige power represents a type of 
reward power, board ownership represents a type of coercive power,  and structural power 
represents a type of legitimate power.   First, ownership power may represent a form of coercive 
power that occurs when the CEO, the subordinate, perceives that the board, the superior, can 
punish him or her (French & Raven, 1958). Ownership power is associated with reduced pay 
because outsiders were structurally powerful to some extent and managers were less entrenched. 
In addition, when CEOs are less entrenched and in the presence of outsiders who are powerful in 
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terms of their ownership power base, the CEO is aware that the board can exert public influence 
or pressure on the CEO by virtue of their control of equity decisions and information via their 
control over proxies and influence in shareholder meetings.  Second, prestige power may 
represent a form of reward power, occurring when the CEO perceives that the board, the 
superior, can mediate rewards for him or her (French & Raven, 1958).  Prestige power is 
associated with increased pay and pay for performance as outsiders become more prestigiously 
powerful; thus, prestige power represents a type of reward power that is more passive yet 
effective with less behavioral-based compensation and more outcome-based compensation. 
Finally, structural power may represent a type of legitimate power that is associated with having 
recognized authority over the decision-making structures of an organization (French & Raven, 
1958). We observed that our findings changed given the implications of government regulation 
(e.g., SOX) that legitimized board structural characteristics; however, the impact of outsiders’ 
structural power depends on the degree of insiders’ structural power present. 
 
6.4.   Board Power Theoretical Framework Extension: Different Organizational Outcomes 
6.4.1. The Type of Compensation Contract: Short-Term vs. Long-Term  
Different monitoring approaches by powerful outsiders and insiders are also apparent in the 
type of compensation contract that is preferred. When boards are able to monitor management 
actively, they prefer to assign a behavioral-based compensation package (e.g., salary) rather than 
outcome-based compensation (e.g., incentive-based pay), an indicator of a passive monitoring 
approach (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
Contingent compensation involving stock options aligns CEO interests with those of 
shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, 1994) and tends to increase in times of public scrutiny regarding 
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executive pay (Kuhnen & Niessen, 2012). As I previously suggested, prestige power increases as 
the reputation of a board member as an effective monitoring increases and as the quantity and 
quality of his/her experience as a board monitor changes.  Although I find that a board 
characterized by prestigiously powerful outsiders relative to insiders may prefer a less active 
monitoring approach with an increased use of incentive-based pay, this approach is more 
associated with improved pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Hence, although risk is transferred to 
the agent, a prestigious board may be more aware that they are transferring some degree to the 
agent; however, this decision appears to be effective because prestige power is positively 
associated with pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
 
6.5.  Future Research 
 This study of the multidimensional nature of board power presents a theoretical and 
empirical framework with which to extend corporate governance research.   My theoretical and 
empirical approach to modeling board power provides a mechanism to examine how board 
power applies in other contexts.  Moreover, because context is relevant to power implications, 
the potential exists to theoretically develop and empirically examine the additional power bases 
of boards. In addition, power implications vary based on temporal and cultural considerations 
and on the degree of discretion accorded to managers.   
First, the potential exists to examine the implications of board power in other decision-
making contexts, such as research and development investment decisions, that affect the firm’s 
strategy and performance outcomes. Although research and development (R&D) investment, or 
“the degree to which a firm devotes its financial resources to research and development given its 
stock of resources” (Kor, 2006, p. 1082) can be profit-maximizing for shareholders, an inherent 
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agency conflict exists within management’s R&D decisions because managers must assume 
employment risk associated with failed investment projects (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  
Consequently, managers may choose to limit R&D investments, thus requiring active monitoring 
(Kor, 2006).  Although previous research has found that R&D investment is positively related to 
insiders on the board (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, 1991; Hill and Snell, 1988), other 
research continues to examine when and whether outsiders will have a positive or negative 
impact on R&D intensity as predicted by agency theory (e.g., Kor, 2006). Because existing 
research has been inconclusive in explaining how board composition affects R&D investment 
differently across firms, I suggest that this board power model may provide some insight 
regarding the way in which power affects these decisions. 
Second, future research may seek to explore additional board power bases and their 
implications on monitoring. Specifically, I suggest that the following two additional power bases 
may affect compensation: expertise power and referent power.  Board expertise power increases 
knowledge that helps monitor managerial decision making involving potential financial 
consequences (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999). Law, finance, and accounting 
knowledge is relevant to monitoring profitability outcomes and the effective use of firm 
resources, whereas business knowledge associated with broad management expertise is relevant 
to understanding the array of options that CEOs face in making their decisions.  Similarly, 
referent power, a scenario in which the follower identifies with the leader, increases the potential 
for the follower (e.g., the CEO) to assume attitudes, beliefs or behaviors possessed by the leader 
(French & Raven, 1959).  Executive characteristics, such as an individual’s age, ethnicity, 
functional background, or educational background, influence the decision-making process 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984).   New directors are demographically similar to the CEO when the 
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CEO is more powerful and are similar to the existing board when the board is more powerful 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995).  Because directors’ identities shape the way in which they identify 
with the board and the CEO (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008), their identities influence 
compensation (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). Westphal & Zajac (1995) found that when CEOs are 
powerful, directors appointed during their tenure are more demographically similar to them; 
consequently, this demographic similarity between the CEO and the newly appointed board 
members is associated with increased compensation.  Age is associated with decisions, such that 
compensation committee members who are less than 65 years old are associated with increased 
compensation (Main et al., 1995).  
Third, future research may want to consider how cultural context moderates the 
relationship between these board power bases and their compensation effects. Cultural context is 
relevant to the decision-making process. Cultural values and wealth characteristics affect the way 
in which decision makers evaluate problems and solutions (Brechin, 1999) and can moderate 
power implications. Geographically, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms differs 
between developed and emerging economies (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000), which 
affects compensation differently (Su, Li, & Li, 2010).  Similarly, research on diversity has been 
inconclusive regarding the relationship between board diversity and firm value. Although 
Shrader, Blackburn, & Iles (1997) find that women are associated with increased firm value, 
Zahra & Stanton (1988) did not find any significant relationship. Carter et al. (2003) find that as 
the percentage of insiders increases on the board, the presence of women and ethnic minorities 
decreases, suggesting that more outsiders on the board are associated with greater diversity. 
Some scholars find board diversity to be associated with “less insular decision making” and 
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change (Westphal & Milton, 2000), whereas other scholars find board diversity to be associated 
with more conflict (Clegg, 1990).   
Fourth, future research may consider how temporal patterns affect the relationship 
between power and monitoring outcomes. MacAvoy & Millstein (1999) found that timing is 
relevant for considering when, what, and how outsiders will affect outcomes. Research on boards 
should consider using a greater than one-year time lag when examining board compensation 
decisions and their effects on performance (Daily, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
Fifth, future research may consider the type of knowledge that is passed among board 
social networks. These networks influence firm decisions, such that firms may mimic the 
behavior of other firms within an industry to gain organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  More importantly, board interlocks affect compensation decisions.  For example, 
executive compensation increases as board member interlocks with firms that have highly paid 
CEOs increase (Hallock, 1997). For example, Davis (1991) found that the adoption of poison 
pills increased as boards were interlocked with boards of other firms. Board characteristics, such 
as whether executives and non-executives sit on each other’s compensation committees, 
compromise monitoring effectiveness (Ezzamel & Watson, 1997). 
Finally, future research may want to consider how the degree of discretion afforded to 
managers affects the relationship between monitoring and outcomes.  Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) 
found that as managerial discretion increases, as in the case of increased competition and 
uncertainty, boards may have to pay managers for their willingness to accept increased risk.  
Similarly, Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990) found that the relationship between TMT tenure and 
strategic persistence varied based on the level of managerial discretion.  Because the relationship 
between tenure and decision making varies based on discretion and because I found that the 
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relationship between ownership power and monitoring effectiveness differs when CEO tenure is 
more or less present, I anticipate that the level of managerial discretion increases environmental 
uncertainty and may afford managers increased power to influence outcomes, thus affecting 
monitoring effectiveness. 
 
6.6.  Limitations 
 First, some limitations I note in my study concern the development of my power 
constructs.  While my analysis demonstrates that the variables I use as proxy indicators for board 
power are valid in measuring board power base constructs, there may be alternative 
measurements for these same concepts.  For example, board members who have been CEO’s 
may increase the board’s prestige power because CEOs are considered members of the 
managerial elite (Giddens, 1972).  By changing examining board compensation in terms of stock 
ownership,  we may learn how incentive-based compensation affects directors differently.  
Further, other factors may moderate the impact of power on compensation, such as  SOX’s 
requirement for non-management directors to meet without management (Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2009).  
 Secondly, my study is limited in that I do not have access to the cognitive processes that 
individual directors use to frame their decisions.  Evaluating performance of individuals is a 
complex process requiring skill sets specific to the type of performance evaluated (Lee & Gillen, 
1989). Monitoring involves  using specific data points to arrive at a decision, and then 
developing alternatives based on how boards processed that information; therefore, 
understanding cognitive processes is key to assessing monitoring effectiveness (Lerch &Harter, 
2001).  Wowak and Hambrick (2010) explain that incentive-based pay impacts performance 
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depends on the CEO’s individual-level attributes (e.g., executive motives and drives, cognitive 
frame, and self-confidence), arguing that incentive-based pay will enhance performance of 
executives who are “more talented”, and decrease performance of those with less ability (p. 803).   
Third, my study is limited in that it does not consider specific types of information (internal 
and external to the firm) or how they flow within the board to affect compensation. External 
information and information control relevant to monitoring includes knowledge about 
environmental limitations that inhibit the firm’s strategy implementation (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 
1985), regulations affecting managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), institutional 
forces and isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983),  risk in the firm’s task environment 
(Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), and compensation of peer groups (Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2009).  
This information is only as powerful as the board member’s ability to control its flow internally 
with firm executives and with other board members.  Similarly, the external context effects the 
flow of information, such that powerful board members will communicate information with 
other board members about resources available externally, as well as will communicate 
information with external constituencies about firm operations.  
Fourth, how outsiders and insiders are defined and the degree to which they are present on 
the board may limit my results.  Research has inconsistently defined the two (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996); rather, there may be degrees of “insiderness” and “outsiders” particularly with top 
management team members (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  The percentage of outsiders and 
insiders on the board may influence the degree to which they have power implications because 
board classification is associated with board structure and composition.  Audit committee 
independence is positively associated with board size and the percentage of outsiders on the 
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board, and decreases with the “firm’s growth opportunities, when the firm experiences two or 
more consecutive losses, and in the presence of alternate monitoring mechanisms (Klein, 2002).” 
Finally, my study is limited by some concerns with endogeneity, particularly omitted variable 
bias. Specifically, I do not consider here how CEO’s may interpersonally manipulate boards to 
taper their powerful influence over them.  CEOs protect and enhance their power base by 
blaming others for poor performance (Walsh & Seward, 1990),  by  ingratiatory behavior toward 
outsiders (Westphal, 1998), separating themselves from directors who challenge them (Westphal 
& Khanna, 2003), and/or by making it appear they are acting as directors want them to act when 
they are not actually doing that (Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001). Compensation can 
affect board structure and compensation, which then can affect board structure. 
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusion 
Board power cannot be considered as an uni-dimensional construct in isolation; rather, it 
is a multi-dimensional construct with implications that vary as board structural and composition 
characteristics change, thus affecting the potential for the board to control the CEO to act in 
alignment with shareholder interests.  Powerful board members  have the capacity to enhance 
pay-for-performance sensitivity.   
While my main results indicate the necessity of examining board power as a multi-
dimensional construct because the implication of board power for  monitoring effectiveness 
change as board structural and composition characteristics change, my supplemental analysis 
indicates that power is relative and contextual. This study has provided preliminary evidence that 
outsiders and insiders differ in their monitoring because board power bases can potentially affect 
their approaches to compensation decisions differently.  Specifically, I examine the power of 
outsiders and insiders’ relative to each other, and find that prestigiously powerful board members 
tend to use a passive, yet effective monitoring approach as pay-for-performance improves when 
outsiders’ prestige power increases relative to insiders.  Although the ratios of outsiders’ to 
insiders’ ownership and structural power bases were insignificantly associated with pay-for-
performance in my main model, I find that these relationships change as environmental, firm, 
board, and CEO contextual characteristics vary.   Overall, this study provides a new conceptual 
and empirical framework to examine not only board power and monitoring effectiveness, but 
more interestingly, how this relationship varies as context changes. 
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TABLE 1.  Theoretical Foundations for Board Monitoring, Power and Pay Decisions 
Monitoring, Power and Pay Decisions 
 AGENCY THEORY UPPER ECHELON THEORY 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Managers are self-interested and opportunistic. 
 
Principals and agents differ in their goals and 
risk preferences because managers are risk 
averse and shareholders are risk neutral. 
 
Principals and boards of directors are bounded 
by their rationality. 
 
Information asymmetry exists between 
managers and boards. 
 
Managers will act opportunistically unless 
monitored. 
Managerial characteristics reflect the 
firm’s internal and external contexts. 
 
Background characteristics (e.g., 
demographics, age, tenure, functional 
background, education, socioeconomic 
roots, and financial position)  reflect 
values and cognitive bases of the 
decision-makers, and can predict 
strategic decisions and outcomes,  
 
 
FOUNDATIONS 
Economics 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
Management 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) 
UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS 
The contract between agent and principal Top management team as a dominant 
coalition 
RESEARCH FOCUS 
How  the agency conflict develops, impacts 
performance, and is resolved through 
monitoring and incentive alignment. 
How top managers influence strategic 
decisions and outcomes 
KEY FACTORS 
RELEVANT TO 
MONITORING 
Information asymmetry between CEO and 
board inhibits monitoring effectiveness. 
 
Manager (agent) makes decisions that differ 
from shareholders (principals) in terms of goal 
interests and risk-preferences. Boards make 
incentive and monitoring decisions that align 
managerial and shareholder interests. 
Background characteristics affect how 
the board monitors managers. 
 
Managers and boards make decisions 
with a behavioral element (e.g., reward 
systems and structure) that are key 
components of the monitoring process. 
FACTORS 
RELEVANT TO A  
POWER MODEL IN 
CONTEXT OF PAY  
Board structural components affect board’s 
influence in executive compensation decisions. 
 
Boards have the potential to influence pay 
decisions that are associated with pay-for-
performance. 
 
Optimal contracting to minimize uncertainty. 
Board composition and demographic 
characteristics influence pay decisions. 
 
FACTORS NOT 
CONSIDERED  
FOR A  
POWER MODEL IN 
CONTEXT OF PAY 
Situation when managers act in ways that do 
not benefit their self-interest. 
Demographic indicators are more 
complex in meaning than what they 
represent (e.g.., person’s educational 
background can also reflect socio-
economic background) 
 
Limitations in researching causality: 
executives not randomly hired, limiting 
variance in executive characteristics 
within industries. 
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TABLE 2.  Comparing and Contrasting Power Frameworks Relevant to Board Monitoring  
 
 
BOYD 
(1994) 
 
FINKELSTEIN 
(1992) 
FRENCH & RAVEN 
(1959); RAVEN (1990) 
LEBRÓN 
(2012) 
THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATION 
 
Agency theory 
 
Agency theory 
 
Social Psychology perspective  
Political perspective  
 
Agency theory 
Upper echelon theory 
Socio-political perspective 
 
 
UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS 
 
Board of directors  Top management team Individual or group   Board of directors 
OBJECTIVE 
 
Control the CEO3 
 
Control board of directors 
 
Reduce managerial risk and 
uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Psychological change 
 
Control the CEO 
 
 
POWER 
DEFINITION 
 
Board control of CEO 
 
 
 
Capacity of top management team 
members to exert their will   
 
 
Influencing psychological change 
(behavior, opinions, attitudes, 
goals, needs, and values) 
 
Capacity of the board to compel 
CEO to act in alignment with 
shareholder interests 
KEY DECISIONS 
Executive compensation Strategic decisions  
(e.g., diversification) 
Required level of monitoring of 
subordinate 
 
Reward or punishment decisions 
Required level of monitoring of 
subordinate 
 
Executive compensation decisions 
 
 
DIMENSIONS 
 
Uni-dimensional 
 
Multi-dimensional Multi-dimensional Multi-dimensional 
 
RESEARCH 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
 
Control model of 
CEO/board relations 
 
Multi-dimensional model of top 
management team power  
Social power bases 
Multi-dimensional model of 
board  of directors’ power 
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 BOYD (1994) FINKELSTEIN (1992) 
FRENCH & RAVEN 
(1959); RAVEN (1990) 
LEBRÓN 
(2012) 
CONSTRUCTS 
Board control Top Management Team Power 
Bases: 
 
Structural: formal organizational 
structure and hierarchical 
authority, increasing management 
of uncertainty  
 
Ownership: “strength of 
manager’s position in the agent-
principal relationship” 
 
Prestige:  “status”; manager’s 
reputation in the institutional 
environment 
 
Expert: “ability to deal with 
environmental dependencies” 
Social Power Bases: 
 
 
Legitimate:  legitimate right; 
structural relationship 
 
Expert: knowledge 
 
Coercive: mediate punishments 
 
Reward: mediate rewards 
 
Referent: identification 
 
Informational: information 
relevant to decision 
Board Social Power Bases 
 
 
Structural: Hierarchical 
decision-making authority 
increasing board’s control over 
the CEO 
 
Ownership: strength of the board 
member’s position in the agent-
principal relationship; capacity to 
influence equity decisions 
 
Prestige: board member’s 
reputation outside the firm. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCES 
Increases board’s 
monitoring effectiveness 
 
Reduces informational 
uncertainty 
 
Reduces managerial 
opportunism 
 
Reduces excessive 
executive compensation 
Increases executive’s control over 
the board 
 
Reduces informational 
uncertainty 
 
Reduces managerial risk 
Expert power: subordinate 
accepts that superior knows best  
 
Legitimate power: less 
monitoring over subordinate 
needed. 
 
Coercive power: increased 
monitoring over subordinate 
needed 
 
Reward power: positive outcomes 
with limited monitoring needed. 
 
Referent power: subordinate and 
superior see goals similarly  
 
Informational power:  more trust; 
less monitoring over subordinate 
needed.  
Increases board’s control of CEO 
 
Increases  pay-for-performance 
sensitivity 
 
 
Ownership power: Increases 
board control over equity 
decisions 
 
Prestige power:  Incentivizes 
board member to be an active 
monitor to protect reputation. 
 
Structural power: CEO accepts 
board’s decision making authority 
as legitimate. 
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TABLE 3.  Board Power Basesoard Power Bases. 
 
POWER 
BASE 
STRUCTURAL POWER OWNERSHIP PRESTIGE POWER 
DEFINITION 
 
Hierarchical decision-making authority 
recognized by other board members, 
increasing board member’s control over 
executive compensation decisions; 
organizational position factors in the 
decision-making process.  
 
 
Strength of the board member’s position in 
the agent-principal relationship; board 
member has capacity to influence equity 
decisions. 
 
 
 
Board member’s reputation outside the firm 
as an active monitor of the CEO. 
 
AGENCY 
CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION  
 
 
Potentially increases board member control 
over decisions on the board, thus, limiting 
potential manipulation by the CEO of  
compensation decision. 
 
 
Potentially increases alignment of board 
interests with those of shareholders, thus 
potentially increasing monitoring that 
benefits shareholder profit-maximizing goals. 
 
Potentially increases board motivation to 
monitor to protect reputation as an active, 
effective monitor of the CEO. 
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TABLE 4.   Board Power - Principal Components Factor Analysis, Promax RotationBoard Power - Principal Components 
Factor Analysis, Promax Rotation  
 
VARIABLES FACTOR 1:   
STRUCTURAL 
POWER 
FACTOR 2:   
OWNERSHIP 
POWER 
FACTOR 3:     
PRESTIGE 
POWER 
Overlapping committee membership  0.8190 -0.0396 0.0316 
Compensation committee seniority 0.8065 0.0156 -0.0089 
Nomination committee seniority 0.6333 0.0506 -0.0482 
Board hierarchical authority 0.6384 -0.0310 -0.0097 
Not related, founder, employee 
ownership 
-0.0245 0.8163 0.0101 
Compensation committee ownership 0.0828 0.7656 0.0166 
Nomination committee ownership 0.0507 0.6667 0.0127 
Difference between director ownership 
& CEO ownership 
-0.1163 0.6257 -0.0440 
Accumulated board seats 0.0875 0.0033 0.7818 
S&P credit rating -0.0687 0.0115 0.7063 
Board experience increasing board 
independence 
-0.0227 -0.0018 0.6674 
Board experience decreasing executive 
compensation 
-0.0263 -0.0159 0.6476 
    
Variance Explained 2.19 2.10 2.00 
Proportional 0.1827 0.1750 0.1669 
Cumulative  0.3577 0.5246 
N=37,066 observations 
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TABLE 5.   Board Power - Principal Factor Analysis, Promax Rotation 
  
Variables Factor 1:  
Structural Power 
Factor 2: 
Ownership Power 
Factor 3: 
Prestige Power 
Overlapping committee membership 0.7344 -0.0385 0.0180 
Compensation committee seniority 0.7228 0.0128 -0.0189 
Nomination committee seniority 0.4739 0.0383 -0.0287 
Board hierarchical authority 0.4682 -0.0168 0.0006 
Not related, founder, employee 
ownership 
-0.0237 0.7017 0.0068 
Compensation committee ownership 0.0691 0.6503 0.0112 
Nomination committee ownership 0.0338 0.5104 0.0102 
Difference between director ownership 
& CEO ownership 
-0.0831 0.4609 -0.0368 
Accumulated board seats 0.0631 0.0016 0.6523 
S&P credit rating -0.0546 0.0077 0.5523 
Board experience increasing board 
independence 
-0.0173 -0.0034 0.4993 
Board experience decreasing executive 
compensation 
-0.0177 -0.0138 0.4762 
    
Variance Explained 1.57 1.40 1.25 
Proportional 0.4839 0.4334 0.3863 
N=37,066observations 
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TABLE 6.   Board Power Validity Measures 
 
Variables Cronbach 
Alphas 
Average 
Item-Scale 
Correlations 
Average  
Inter-item 
Correlation 
Prestige Power 0.6549 0.6331 0.3217 
Accumulated board seats    
S&P credit rating    
Board experience increasing board 
independence 
   
Board experience decreasing 
executive compensation 
   
    
Structural Power 0.7029 0.7272 0.3717 
Overlapping committee membership     
Compensation committee seniority    
Nomination committee seniority    
Board hierarchical authority    
    
Ownership Power 0.6903 0.7200 0.3578 
Not related, founder, employee 
ownership 
   
Compensation committee ownership    
Nomination committee ownership    
Difference between director 
ownership & CEO ownership 
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TABLE 7.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Items Measuring Power and Main Dependent Variables 
No. Variable Mean S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  
1 Total 
  Compensation ($M) 
5.87 6.48  
1              
        
2 Pay-for-performance 
Sensitivity 
1.27 2.52  
0.054 *** 1.000           
        
3 Salary Proportion 24.64 18.62  -0.570 *** 0.006 1.000                
4 Contingent Comp 
(LTIP + Bonus) 
43.11 25.84  
0.243 *** 0.163 *** -0.500 *** 1.000       
      
5 Contingent Comp 
(LTIP) 
55.04 24.93  
0.360 *** 0.181 *** -0.544 *** 0.665 *** 1.000     
      
6 Compensation Own  
(%) 
0.13 1.39  
-0.034 *** 0.022 *** 0.038 *** -0.010 * -0.025 *** 1.000    
      
7 Nomination Own  (%) 0.15 1.52  -0.023 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 *** -0.014 ** -0.027 *** 0.338 *** 1.000        
8 Dir-CEO Own diff 
(%) 
-0.64 4.34  
0.007  -0.052 *** -0.052 *** 0.002 0.020 *** 0.273 *** 0.263 *** 1.000        
9 Unrelated Owner  (%) 0.21 1.78  -0.031 *** 0.033 *** 0.036 *** -0.017 *** -0.028 *** 0.552 *** 0.373 *** 0.348 *** 1.000      
10 Eff Bd Practice (TC) 
(%) 
9.14 14.67  
-0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.046 *** -0.010 + -0.002 -0.005  -0.010  + -0.027 *** -0.011 * 1.000   
11 Eff Bd Practice (Out) 
(%) 
8.93 15.91  
0.002  0.009 + -0.005 0.004 0.010 + -0.003  -0.005  -0.017 *** -0.002  0.278 *** 1.000 
12 Accum Bd Seats (%) 10.92 7.81  -0.068 *** 0.147 *** 0.054 *** 0.024 *** 0.012 * 0.015 ** 0.018 *** -0.033 *** -0.006  0.342 *** 0.373 *** 
13 SP Credit (%) 10.92 7.38  -0.071 *** 0.156 *** 0.058 *** 0.026 *** 0.012 * 0.016 ** 0.018 *** -0.049 *** 0.003  0.247 *** 0.250 *** 
14 Compensation 
Committee Seniority 
1.80 1.25  
-0.008  -0.033 *** 0.007 0.008 -0.010 + 0.145 *** 0.010  + -0.033 *** 0.037 *** 0.033 *** 0.035 *** 
15 Nomination Committee 
Seniority 
1.79 1.32  
0.028 *** -0.078 *** -0.035 *** -0.030 *** -0.009 0.020 *** 0.157 *** 0.029 *** 0.009 + 0.008 0.022 *** 
16 Hierarchical Status 45.49 28.14  0.015 ** -0.040 *** -0.016 ** -0.003 0.003 0.048 *** 0.036 *** -0.066 *** 0.009 + 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 
17 Overlapping 
Membership 
1.32 0.56  
-0.013 * 0.010 * 0.009 + 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.066 *** 0.022 *** -0.064 *** 0.002  0.050 *** 0.046 *** 
N= 37,066 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
    149 
TABLE  7 (cont’d).  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Items Measuring Power and Main Dependent Variables 
 
No. Variable 12  13  14  15  16  17            
12 Accum Bd Seats (%) 1.000                      
13 SP Credit (%) 0.441 *** 1.000                    
14 Compensation 
Committee Seniority 0.125 *** 0.002  1.000       
           
15 Nomination Committee 
Seniority 0.088 *** -0.025 *** 0.278 *** 1.000    
           
16 Hierarchical Status 0.072 *** 0.007  0.340 *** 0.310 *** 1.000             
17 Overlapping 
Membership 0.139 *** 0.064 *** 0.636 *** 0.361 *** 0.306 *** 1 
           
N= 37,066 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE  8.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Power Bases 
Table 8a. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Power 
No. Variable Mean SD  1  2  3  
1 Ownership Power 0.00 0.82  1.000     
2 Prestige Power 0.00 0.79  -0.013 ** 1.000   
3 Structural Power 0.00 0.85  0.102 *** 0.226 *** 1.00 
N= 37,066 observations
7
 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
Table 8b. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Outsiders’ Power 
No. Variable Mean SD  1  2  3  
1 Ownership Power -0.03 0.67  1.000     
2 Prestige Power 0.05 0.82  -0.027 *** 1.000   
3 Structural Power 0.24 0.85  0.078 *** 0.212 *** 1.000 
N= 25, 551 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
Table 8c. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Insiders’ Power 
No. Variable Mean SD  1  2  3  
1 Ownership Power -0.05 0.48  1.000     
2 Prestige Power -0.14 0.66  0.066 *** 1.000   
3 Structural Power -0.71 0.22  0.550 *** 0.303 *** 1.000 
N= 6,914  observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Of the 37, 066 observations in the sample, 25, 551 are outsiders, 6,914 are insiders, and 4, 601 are affiliated. 
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TABLE  9. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings and Goodness-of-Fit Statistics 
 
Dimension Variable CFA (p-value) 
Alpha 
(.60) 
Max 
r_xy 
Χ
2 
RMSEA 
(≤.06 to 
.08) 
CFI 
(≥ 
0.95) 
TLI 
(≥ 0.95) 
SRMR 
(≤.08) 
CD 
 
 
 
 
Prestige 
Board experience 
decreasing executive 
compensation 
Board experience 
increasing board 
independence 
Accumulated Board 
Seats 
S&P Credit Rating 
0.46 (0.00) 
 
 
0.49 (0.00) 
 
 
0.77 (0.00) 
 
0.56 (0.00) 
0.66 0.44 252 0.058 0.989 0.963 0.016 0.712 
 
 
 
 
Structural 
Overlapping committee 
membership 
Compensation 
committee seniority 
Nomination committee 
seniority 
Board hierarchical 
authority 
0.82 (0.00) 
 
0.77 (0.00) 
 
0.43 (0.00) 
 
0.42 (0.00) 
0.70 0.63 1569 0.145 0.950 0.851 0.039 0.80 
Ownership Difference b/t director 
ownership & CEO 
ownership 
Compensation 
Committee ownership 
Nomination Committee 
ownership 
Not related, founder, 
employee ownership 
0.44 (0.00) 
 
 
0.69 (0.00) 
 
0.49 (0.00) 
 
0.79 (0.00) 
0.69 0.55 252 0.058 0.99 0.97 0.016 0.759 
3-Factor   0.60 0.63 5628 0.054 0.932 0.912 0.034 0.986 
Note: Highest max rxy in Finkelstein (1992) was 0.64 in structural power and 0.54 in ownership power 
Cutoff criteria for acceptance follows Schreiber, Stage, King, Nora, & Barlow (2006).  
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TABLE  10.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in Regression Analysis 
No. Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 
1 Total 
  Compensation ($M) 
$5.48 $6.12 
1.000                      
2 Pay-for-performance 
Sensitivity 
$1.56 $3.04 
0.095 *** 1.000                    
3 Salary Proportion (%) 25.43 19.35 -0.565 *** -0.020  1.000                  
4 Contingent 
Compensation (LTIP + 
Bonus) 
55.70 25.25 
0.258 *** 0.174 *** -0.523 *** 1.000               
5 Contingent 
Compensation (LTIP) 
43.73 26.42 
0.360 *** 0.204 *** -0.553 *** 0.681 *** 1.000             
6 Firm Size (assts)($B) 5.92 12.45 0.332 *** -0.147 *** -0.193 *** 0.033 * 0.079 *** 1.000           
7 Market Growth 1.63 1.55 0.255 *** 0.113 *** -0.208 *** 0.311 *** 0.306 *** -0.084 *** 1.000          
8 Firm Performance 4.09 10.09 0.140 *** -0.184 *** -0.152 *** 0.077 *** 0.047 ** 0.012 0.324 *** 1.000        
9 Liquidity 2.20 1.61 -0.070 *** 0.246 *** 0.041 * 0.107 *** 0.119 *** -0.229 *** 0.270 *** -0.050 ** 1.000      
10 Leverage 0.22 0.16 0.003  -0.170 *** 0.003  -0.137 *** -0.125 *** 0.165 *** -0.410 *** -0.161 *** -0.354 *** 1.000   
11 Risk 0.52 0.20 0.055 *** -0.240 *** -0.039 * -0.158 *** -0.140 *** 0.229 *** -0.419 *** -0.131 *** -0.604 *** 0.793 *** 1.000  
12 Institutional Ownership 
(%) 
68.59 17.58 
0.040 * 0.068 *** -0.174 *** 0.086 *** 0.121 *** -0.146 *** 0.104 *** 0.155 *** 0.115 *** -0.127 *** -0.145 *** 
13 Large Owner (%) 9.08 4.00 -0.100 *** 0.088 *** 0.054 *** -0.039 * -0.030 + -0.154 *** -0.060 *** -0.046 ** 0.114 *** -0.006 -0.033 * 
14 Salary Exceed $1 
million 
0.13 0.34 
0.355 *** -0.149 *** -0.180 *** 0.004 0.057 *** 0.381 *** -0.050 ** 0.063 *** -0.184 *** 0.111 *** 0.202 *** 
15 CEO Change 0.07 26.00 -0.011  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010 -0.009 0.030 + -0.017  -0.039 * -0.013  0.015 0.034 * 
16 Post-SOX 0.43 0.49 0.020  -0.093 *** -0.075 *** -0.178 *** -0.114 *** 0.033 * -0.003  0.089 *** 0.035 * -0.120 *** -0.071 *** 
17 Lagged total 
compensation ($M) 
5.78 6.58 
0.664 *** 0.035 * -0.366 *** 0.203 *** 0.236 *** 0.330 *** 0.250 *** 0.098 *** -0.030 + -0.021 0.029 + 
18 Lagged salary 
proportion 
22.22 15.10 
-0.468 *** -0.105 *** 0.553 *** -0.329 *** -0.359 *** -0.203 *** -0.280 *** -0.157 *** -0.032 * 0.051 *** 0.021  
19 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip 
+bonus) 
64.13 20.68 
0.232 *** 0.232 *** -0.287 *** 0.504 *** 0.419 *** 0.025 0.373 *** 0.090 *** 0.194 *** -0.204 *** -0.245 *** 
20 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip) 
51.38 23.19 
0.226 *** 0.271 *** -0.238 *** 0.406 *** 0.534 *** 0.063 *** 0.330 *** -0.043 ** 0.212 *** -0.159 *** -0.208 *** 
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21 Ownership Power (out) 1.97 0.36 -0.060 *** -0.002  0.031 * -0.006 -0.017 -0.025 -0.004  0.006  0.016  0.020 0.002  
22 Ownership Power (in) 1.93 0.24 
-0.047 * 0.069 *** 0.043 ** -0.003 -0.020 -0.032 * -0.001  -0.020  0.011  -0.033 * -0.036 * 
23 Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
1.02 0.19 
-0.039 * -0.021  0.012 -0.006 -0.012  -0.012  0.000  0.012 0.011 0.030 + 0.019 
24 Prestige Power (out) 2.14 0.43 -0.117 *** 0.282 *** 0.108 *** 0.070 *** 0.040 * -0.219 *** 0.172 *** -0.081 *** 0.283 *** -0.219 *** -0.280 *** 
25 (Prestige Power (in) 1.90 0.60 -0.086 *** 0.172 *** 0.089 *** 0.022 0.006  -0.135 *** 0.072 *** -0.048 ** 0.161 *** -0.139 *** -0.203 *** 
26 Prestige Power (out/in) 1.21 0.36 -0.004  0.043 ** -0.027 + 0.032 * 0.026 + -0.030 + 0.058 *** 0.003 0.032 * -0.043 ** -0.009 
27 Structural Power(out) 2.26 0.47 -0.006  -0.010  0.018 0.022 -0.049 ** -0.057 *** 0.032 * 0.044 ** 0.029 + -0.042 ** -0.031 * 
28 Structural Power(in) 1.29 0.13 -0.053 *** 0.121 *** 0.085 *** 0.016 0.013  -0.045 ** 0.044 ** -0.025 0.067 *** -0.061 *** -0.114 *** 
29 Structural Power 
(out/in) 
1.78 0.41 
0.018  -0.056 *** -0.024 0.016 -0.049 ** -0.031 * 0.010  0.049 ** -0.003 -0.008  0.025 
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    154 
TABLE 10 (CONT’D) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in Regression Analysis 
 
No. Variable 12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  
12 Institutional Ownership 
(%) 
1.000                        
13 Large Owner (%) 0.431 *** 1.000                      
14 Salary Exceed $1 
million 
0.005  -0.051 *** 1.000                    
15 CEO Change -0.004  0.044 ** -0.050 ** 1.000                  
16 Post-SOX 0.237 *** 0.060 *** 0.086 *** -0.029 + 1.000                
17 Lagged total 
compensation ($M) 
0.028 + -0.102 *** 0.358 *** 0.036 * -0.013  1.000              
18 Lagged salary 
proportion 
-0.216 *** 0.044 ** -0.192 *** -0.047 ** -0.032 * -0.598 *** 1.000            
19 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip 
+bonus) 
0.159 *** -0.021  -0.010  0.032 * -0.113 *** 0.281 *** -0.558 *** 1.000          
20 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip) 
0.122 *** -0.020  0.032 * 0.033 * -0.162 *** 0.356 *** -0.541 *** 0.742 *** 1.000        
21 Ownership Power (out) -0.017  0.072 *** -0.042 ** 0.026  0.024  -0.076 *** 0.060 *** -0.031 * -0.036 * 1.000      
22 Ownership Power (in) -0.091 *** -0.019  -0.015  0.048 ** -0.074 *** -0.006  0.024  0.025  0.030 * -0.012  1.000    
23 Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
0.012  0.075 *** -0.032 * 0.003  0.057 *** -0.062 *** 0.046 ** -0.035 * -0.042 ** 0.934 *** -0.312 *** 1.000  
24 Prestige Power (out) 0.101 *** 0.086 *** -0.221 *** -0.015  -0.074 *** -0.084 *** 0.022  0.145 *** 0.132 *** -0.046 ** 0.038 * -0.049 ** 
25 (Prestige Power (in) 0.048 ** 0.062 *** -0.109 *** -0.080 *** -0.017  -0.050 ** 0.018  0.074 *** 0.071 *** 0.005  0.058 *** 0.001  
26 Prestige Power (out/in) 0.035 * 0.015  -0.065 *** 0.082 *** -0.022  -0.032 * 0.012  0.018  0.005  -0.013  -0.031 * -0.010  
27 Structural Power(out) -0.012  -0.017  -0.056 *** -0.029 + 0.041 ** -0.032 * 0.046 ** -0.007  -0.041 ** 0.021  0.017  0.027 + 
28 Structural Power(in) -0.086 *** 0.005  -0.060 *** 0.000  -0.169 *** -0.042 ** 0.065 *** 0.040 * 0.052 *** -0.062 *** 0.521 *** -0.225 *** 
29 Structural Power 
(out/in) 
0.024  -0.019  -0.025  -0.021  0.100 *** -0.010  0.009  -0.020  -0.056 *** 0.046 ** -0.166 *** 0.108 *** 
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE 10 (CONT’D) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in Regression Analysis 
 
No. Variable 24  25 26 27 28 29        
24 Prestige Power (out) 
1.000                    
25 (Prestige Power (in) 
0.168 *** 1.000                  
26 Prestige Power (out/in) 
0.479 *** -0.702 *** 1.000                
27 Structural Power(out) 
0.251 *** 0.039 * 0.119 *** 1.000                
28 Structural Power(in) 
0.042 ** 0.295 *** -0.230 *** -0.046 ** 1.000              
29 Structural Power 
(out/in) 0.204 *** -0.097 *** 0.211 *** 0.918 *** -0.421 *** 1.000            
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE 10 (CONT’D) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in Regression Analysis 
 
No. Variable 24  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32     
24 Ownership Power 
(out/in) 1.000                     
25 Prestige Power (avg) 
-0.054  1.000                  
26 Prestige Power (out) 
-0.058 
+
 0.853 
***
 1.000                
27 Prestige Power (in) 
-0.014  0.474 
***
 0.163 
***
 1.000              
28 Prestige Power (out/in) 
-0.010  0.134 
***
 0.486 
***
 -0.699 
***
 1.000            
29 Structural Power (avg) 
0.084 
***
 0.175 
***
 0.152 
***
 0.027 0.085 
***
 1.000          
30 Structural Power (out) 
0.078 
***
 0.210 
***
 0.244 
***
 0.029 0.122 
***
 0.872 
***
 1.000        
31 Structural Power (in) 
-0.322 
***
 0.145 
***
 0.058 
+
 0.318 
***
 -0.236 
***
 -0.045 -0.067 
**
 1.000      
32 Structural Power 
(out/in) 0.180 
***
 0.127 
***
 0.193 
***
 -0.108 
***
 0.211 
***
 0.810 
***
 0.923 
***
 -0.430 
***
 1.000    
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE  11.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-performance 
Sensitivity 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -0.29* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Market Growth 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary > $1 Million -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.06+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
           
Ownership Power(OUT/IN)  0.01   0.01  0.00   0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.07***  0.07***   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.04* 0.03    -0.01 -0.02 
           
Constant 5.88*** 5.83*** 5.59*** 5.77*** 5.49*** 6.73*** 6.73*** 6.33** 6.92*** 6.34** 
F 10.23*** 9.58*** 10.49*** 9.70*** 9.56*** 3.99*** 3.94*** 3.94*** 3.85*** 3.64*** 
R
2 
7.91 7.88 8.49 8.07 8.60 3.12 3.28 3.44 3.30 3.48 
Adjusted R
2 
7.45 7.39 8.00 7.58 8.06 2.66 2.80 2.95 2.81 2.94 
Δ Adjusted R
2
  -0.06 0.55*** 0.13* 0.61***  0.14 0.29* 0.15 0.28* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model.  N=950 firms (unbalanced) 
Power variables are not winsorized. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  12.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Winsorized Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-
performance Sensitivity 
 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -0.29* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Market Growth 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary > $1 Million -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.06+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
           
Ownership Power(OUT/IN)  0.02   0.02  0.00   0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.06***  0.06**   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.04* 0.02    -0.01 -0.02 
           
Constant 5.88*** 5.66*** 5.63*** 5.77*** 5.38*** 6.73*** 6.72*** 6.36** 6.93*** 6.26** 
F 10.23 9.5762 10.2638 9.6979 9.3478 3.9848 3.9794 3.9488 3.8479 3.7025 
R
2 7.91 7.93 8.35 8.06 8.5 3.12 3.28 3.42 3.3 3.46 
Adjusted R
2 7.45 7.44 7.86 7.57 7.96 2.66 2.79 2.93 2.81 2.92 
Δ Adjusted R
2
  -0.01 0.41*** 0.12* 0.51**  0.13 0.27* 0.15 0.26* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model.  N=950 firms (unbalanced) 
Power variables winsorized at p=0.01. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  13.  Extending Theoretical Framework:  Contextual Implications for Outsider/ Insider Board Power & Monitoring 
Effectiveness 
Characte
ristics Context 
 
Monitoring Impact 
 
Ownership Prestige Structural 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 
2002 
 
Pre 
 Less regulatory oversight Less association with 
pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (PPS) due to 
lack of government 
oversight. 
Less association with 
PPS due to lack of 
government oversight. 
Less association with 
PPS due to lack of 
government oversight. 
Post  Increased regulations for 
corporate governance 
practices 
 
 Increased public 
accountability 
 
 Less contingent-based pay 
and more  salary-based pay 
following 2002 
Less association with 
PPS due to reduced 
incentive alignment. 
More association with 
PPS because increased 
accountability motivated 
directors to protect 
reputation. 
More association with 
PPS because increased 
regulation intended to 
improve structural 
power of outsiders. 
World Trade 
Center 
Attacks of 
2001 
Pre  Economy more profitable More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
Post  Negatively impacted 
economy. 
 Economic/world events may 
limit managerial discretion. 
 Less connection with pay-
for-performance due to 
economic uncertainty; firm 
profitability negatively 
affected (may be industry-
specific) 
Less association with 
PPS because WTC 
attacks limited 
managerial discretion 
Less association with 
PPS because WTC 
attacks limited 
managerial discretion 
Less association with 
PPS because WTC 
attacks limited 
managerial discretion 
Industry 
Mimetic 
Pressures 
No  Monitoring independent of 
industry pressures. 
More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
More  association with 
PPS 
Yes  Increased legitimacy by 
mimicking industry practices 
 Executive action matters 
less; reduces PPS 
Less association with 
PPS; depends on industry 
More association with 
PPS due to reputation 
impact; depends on 
industry 
Less association with 
PPS; depends on 
industry 
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Characte
ristics Context 
 
Monitoring Impact 
 
OWNERSHIP PRESTIGE STRUCTURAL 
F
ir
m
 
Size 
 
Small 
 More  managerial 
discretion/CEO control over 
outcomes; more PPS 
 Less uncertainty; therefore, 
less  of need for contingent-
base, but greater potential for 
more actively involved 
boards. 
Less association with 
PPS; active board 
monitoring replaces 
managerial incentive 
alignment, less 
contingent-based pay. 
 
More association with 
PPS;  smaller firms are 
associated with more 
active boards 
More associated with 
PPS; smaller firms are 
more associated with 
tenure and strategic 
change, may see more 
active boards 
 
Large 
 Less managerial discretion/ 
CEO control over outcomes; 
affects PPS. 
 More uncertainty; therefore, 
greater need for incentive 
alignment. 
 However, due to size, boards 
may be limited in ability to 
monitor effectively due to 
complexity of firm. 
More associated with 
PPS because larger firms 
are associated with more 
uncertainty, should see 
greater use of  incentive 
alignment 
More associated with 
PPS because larger firms 
are associated with more 
uncertainty, should see 
greater motivation to 
protect reputation 
Less associated with 
PPS because larger firms 
are more complex and 
associated with more 
uncertainty. More 
manipulation by CEO. 
Performance 
Low 
 CEO may be more 
committed to change in low-
performing firm 
 May have to pay CEO more 
to recruit/retain; depends on 
when CEO is hired 
 Directors incur cost of 
monitoring a low performing 
firm; therefore, may see 
directors resign to protect 
reputation. 
Less association with 
PPS due to low financial 
performance. 
Less association with 
PPS because prestigious 
directors may not remain 
long in low performing 
firms due to risk to 
reputation. 
More association with 
PPS because structurally 
powerful board has more 
oversight over CEO. 
High 
 Increases CEO bargaining 
power 
 More committed to status 
quo; self-motivated to 
continue high performance. 
 
More association with 
PPS due to incentive 
alignment implications. 
More association with 
PPS due to impact on 
reputation.  Success of 
firm attributed to leader 
of the firm 
Less association with 
PPS because higher 
performing firms need 
less monitoring. 
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Characte
ristics Context 
 
Monitoring Impact 
 
Ownership Prestige Structural 
B
o
a
rd
 
Size 
Small 
 Less conflict on boards, less 
skills on board.  
  Easier to manage. 
Association with PPS less 
impacted by board size; 
but may depend on level 
of incentive alignment 
Less association with 
PPS 
More associated with 
PPS 
Large 
 More conflict on boards; 
greater reputation of skills on 
board.  
 More difficult to manage. 
Association with PPS less 
impacted by board size; 
but may depend on level 
of incentive alignment 
More associated with 
PPS; board members 
forced to accept 
reputational cost of not 
monitoring effectively. 
Less associated with 
PPS because greater 
conflicts on a 
structurally powerful 
board. 
Outsiders 
(%) 
Low  Increases potential for 
managerial opportunism, less 
objective monitoring. 
Less association with 
PPS 
Less association with 
PPS 
Less association with 
PPS 
High  Increases objective 
monitoring on the board, but 
may also result in too many 
directors who have more 
outside commitments, less 
focused on monitoring 
More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
More associated with 
PPS 
C
E
O
 
Ownership 
Low 
 No managerial incentives to 
make decisions in the best 
interests of shareholders; 
needs more active 
monitoring 
High association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
High association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
High association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
High 
 Increases managers 
incentives to make decisions 
in the best interests of 
shareholders; reduces need 
for active board monitoring 
Less association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
Less association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
Less association with 
PPS; substitution effect 
Tenure 
Low  More likely to change 
strategic direction 
 Less managerial bargaining 
power 
More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
More association with 
PPS 
High  More likely to conform to 
strategic direction 
 Increases managerial 
bargaining power 
Less association with 
PPS 
Less association with 
PPS 
Less association with 
PPS 
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TABLE  14.  Extending Theoretical Framework: Interaction Effects of Outsiders & Insider Power Bases 
 
 
OUTSIDERS’  
POWER 
BASE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH 
 
Effective monitoring: minimal managerial 
opportunism and greater PPS. 
 
 Ownership: Incentives aligned for directors, 
but not for managers. 
 Prestige: Strong motivation to protect 
reputation for directors, but not for 
managers. 
 Structural: Control over decision-making 
authority for directors. 
                                       
Q-1 
 
Effective monitoring: minimal managerial 
opportunism and greater PPS. 
 
 Ownership:  Incentives aligned for both 
directors and managers. 
 Prestige:  Strong motivation to protect 
reputation for directors and managers. 
 Structural: Board has oversight over CEO 
decision-making. 
 
 
Q-2 
 
 
 
 
LOW 
Q-4 
 
Ineffective monitoring; 
 potential for  
managerial opportunism  
increases 
 
 
Q-3 
 
Board monitoring limited; however, greater PPS 
due to managerial incentive alignment and/or 
CEO’s motivation to protect reputation. 
 
 Ownership: Incentives aligned for 
managers, but not for directors 
 Prestige: Strong motivation to protect 
reputation for managers, but not for 
directors 
 Structural: Greater CEO control over 
decision-making. 
   
LOW 
 
HIGH 
  INSIDERS’  POWER  BASE 
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TABLE  15.  Summary of Contextual Implications from Regression Analyses 
 
Table 15a.  Firm’s External Environment:  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, World Trade Center Attacks of 2001, and Industry 
Mimetic Pressures 
 
  Ownership Power Prestige Power Structural Power 
  TC PPS TC PPS TC PPS 
Sox 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Isolated 
Model 
0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.07* 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
Full Model 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.07* 0.01 0.06+ -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
             
Out 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.014 -0.00 
In 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06* 
Interaction 0.10*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.03+ -0.06** -0.04 -0.06* -0.05* -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 -0.05* 
              
WTC 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Isolated 
Model 
0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05* -0.04 -0.01 
Full Model 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 0.08+ 0.01 -0.02 0.05* -0.05 -0.01 
             
Out 0.07* -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.07** -0.08 -0.00 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.01 
In 0.07* 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.08* -0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04* 
Interaction 0.13** 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.08*** -0.03+ -0.05+ -0.06* -0.06+ -0.02 -0.00 -0.03+ 
              
Industry 
 < 1SD >1SD < 1SD >1SD < 1SD >1SD < 1SD >1SD < 1SD >1SD < 1SD >1SD 
Isolated 
Model 
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.08** 0.08* 0.05* 0.02 0.04+ 0.07 -0.00 
Full Model -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.06* 0.07** 0.07+ 0.06* 0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.01 
             
Out -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.06* 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00 
In 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.10** -0.08** -0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 
Interaction -0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.06* -0.04* -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03+ 
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Table 15b.  Firm’s Characteristics:  Size and Performance 
 
  Ownership Power Prestige Power Structural Power 
  TC PPS TC PPS TC PPS 
Firm 
Size 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Isolated 
Model 
-0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.00 0.09** 0.10*** 0.06+ 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Full Model -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.09** 0.09*** 0.06+ 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
             
Out -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
In 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09** -0.12*** -0.01 -0.09* -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.00 
Interaction 0.02 0.11*** 0.01 -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.03 -0.12* -0.03+ -0.08** -0.04* -0.01 
              
Firm 
Perform
ance 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low  High Low High Low High 
Isolated 
Model 
0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 0.06+ 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 
Full Model 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07* 0.08** 0.04 0.06* 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
             
Out -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05+ -0.00 0.00 
In -0.06* 0.04* -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11*** -0.00 -0.06* -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.00 
Interaction 0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05* -0.10*** -0.00 -0.09** -0.03 -0.00 -0.04* 0.01 
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Table 15c.  Board’s Characteristics:  Size and Outsiders’ % 
 
  Ownership Power Prestige Power Structural Power 
  TC PPS TC PPS TC PPS 
Board 
Size 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Isolated 
Model 
-0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.08* 0.07** 0.04 0.07* 0.09** 0.00 0.01 -0.04 
Full Model -0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.06+ 0.07** 0.04 0.08* 0.09* -0.01 0.01 -0.05+ 
             
Out -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.08* -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
In 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.07* -0.13** 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Interaction 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.07** -0.11** -0.05+ -0.03 -0.01 -0.04** -0.03 -0.02+ 
              
Outsider
s 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low  High Low High Low High 
Isolated 
Model 
0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.06+ 0.07** 0.05 0.06* 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.05+ 
Full Model 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06+ 0.06* 0.05 0.07* 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06* 
             
Out 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.07+ 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.05 
In 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.09** -0.05+ -0.06* -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
Interaction 0.00 0.10** 0.01 -0.13** -0.06* -0.05* -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 
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Table 15d.  CEO Characteristics: Ownership and Tenure 
 
  Ownership Power Prestige Power Structural Power 
  TC PPS TC PPS TC PPS 
CEO 
Own 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low  High Low High Low High 
Isolated 
Model 
-0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08** 0.00 0.08* 0.06* 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
Full Model -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.08** 0.01 0.08* 0.06* -0.00 -0.03 0.01 
             
Out 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.05+ -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 
In 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11*** 0.00 -0.07* -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
Interaction -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.06* -0.03 -0.05+ -0.07** -0.01 -0.07* 0.00 
              
CEO 
Tenure 
 Low  High Low High Low High Low  High Low High Low High 
Isolated 
Model 
0.00 0.01 -0.10* 0.01 0.08** 0.07* 0.03 0.06 0.06* 0.01 -0.08** 0.04 
Full Model -0.01 0.01 -0.08* 0.01 0.07* 0.07* 0.05 0.05 0.05+ -0.00 -0.08** 0.03 
             
Out -0.05+ 0.02 -0.07** -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.09* 0.04 
In -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.09** -0.07* 0.01 -0.06* -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
Interaction 0.10*** 0.00 -0.06+ -0.03 -0.04* -0.05+ -0.00 -0.05+ -0.06* -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
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TABLE  16.  Substitution & Complimentary Contextual Implications of Outsider & Insider Interaction Power Bases 
*Based on supplemental analysis regression results 
 OWNERSHIP POWER PRESTIGE POWER STRUCTURAL POWER 
 TC PPS TC PPS TC PPS 
 
NO CONTEXT 
 
  Compliment Substitute Compliment Substitute 
EXTERNAL 
Pre/            
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Pre/          
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Pre/          
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Pre/          
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Pre/          
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Pre/          
No 
Post/         
Yes 
Sox                
(Pre/Post) 
 
Substitute   
High Out          
Low In 
Compliment   Substitute Compliment   Substitute 
WTC 
(Pre/Post) 
 
Substitute    Compliment Compliment Substitute Substitute Compliment   Substitute 
Industry 
Pressures 
(No/Yes) 
          Substitute  
FIRM Small/     Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Size            
(Small/Large) 
 
 Substitute  Substitute Compliment Compliment   Substitute   Substitute  
Performance 
(High/Low) 
       Substitute   Substitute  
BOARD Small/     Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Small/     
Low 
Large/    
High 
Size            
(Small/Large) 
 
    Compliment Compliment  Substitute  Compliment  
Low Out  
High In 
Outsiders (%) 
(High/Low) 
 Substitute  Substitute        
Low Out           
High In 
CEO Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Ownership             
 
        
High Out    
Low In 
Compliment  Substitute  
Tenure  
Substitute  
Incentive 
Alignment 
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FIGURE 1.  A Model of Boards Of Directors 
 (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009, p. 228)   
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1. What are the determinants of board characteristics? 
2. What determines the vigilance and behavior of boards? 
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FIGURE 2.  Research Contribution - Board Power Influence on Monitoring 
(bold box adding to Finkelstein et al., 2009) 
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FIGURE 3.  Board Ownership Power Path Diagram 
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FIGURE 4.  Board Prestige Power Path Diagram  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p-values in parenthesis) 
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FIGURE 5.  Board Structural Power Path Diagram 
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FIGURE 6.  Board Power Path Diagram –Three Factor Model 
 (Default Standard Errors) 
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FIGURE 7.  Board Power Path Diagram –Three Factor Model  (Robust Standard Errors) 
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FIGURE 8.  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure 8a: Total Compensation and Prestige Power   Figure 8b: Pay-for-performance Sensitivity and Prestige Power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8c: Total Compensation and Structural Power   Figure-8d: Pay-for-performance Sensitivity and Structural Power 
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APPENDIX  A.  SAMPLE FORMATION – BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ POWER, 2000-
2006 
Note:  Execucomp = 12196 firm-year observations; 2292 firms; Exec Comp with all PPS data = 8,672 firm-year observations, 
1886 firms (note: PPS data for 8831 firm year observations and 2043 firms); S&P 1500 with information in Compustat for 16, 
609 firms; 82001 firm-year observations; S&P Credit ratings for 14840 firms; 73421 firm-year observations; 58315 observations 
from S&P Register Net Advantage & hand inputted from S&P Corporate Register; 1065 hand-entered from Lexis Nexxus; 35 
hand-entry of Obituaries/University Alumni News. 
 
 
 Subtotal # Firms Subtotal # firm-
year observations 
Subtotal # firm-
year director 
observations 
S&P 1500 firms in Risk 
Metrics – Directors 
database 
3180 12433 105457 
Exec Comp + Risk 
Metrics + Codirfin _ 
compratio  
1818 7355 51, 778 
S&P 1500 firms with 
information in 
Compustat 
1607 6886 42110 
Thomson Reuters 13f 1249 5121 40836 
S&P Credit Ratings 1249 5121 40836 
CEO duality 1114 4310 39172 
 
Education Data: 
S&P Register Data 
Lexis Nexxus 
Obituaries/University 
Alumni News 
1024 3982 37891 
After predicting factor 
scores 
962 3666 37106 
After removing all 
observations where 
average outsiders/ 
insiders’ power =0 
950 3581 37066 
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APPENDIX  B.   BOARD STRUCTURE – BOARD HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY 
 
The chair of the board who is not the CEO is ranked highest and the CEO is ranked lowest. 
Ranking of titles on board were based on the theoretical argument that board members are able to 
control the CEO when they have more structural authority; therefore, these board members on a 
non-CEO controlled board have the highest ranking. 
 
Note: High number indicates highest ranking 
 
BOARD MEMBER IS NOT THE CEO 
 
*NON-DUALITY BOARD 
10: Non-CEO board chair, Chair of a committee 
9:   Non-CEO board chair, not chair of a committee 
8:   Not chair of board, but chair of a committee 
7:   Not chair of board, not chair of a committee, but member of a committee 
 
*CEO-DUALITY BOARD 
6:  Not chair of board, chair of a committee, and member of a committee 
5:  Not board chair; not chair of a committee; member of a committee 
 
 
BOARD MEMBER IS THE CEO 
 
*NON-DUALITY BOARD 
4:  CEO, not chair of board, not chair of a committee 
3:  CEO, not chair of board, chair of committee 
 
*CEO-DUALITY BOARD 
2:  Board chair, chair of board, not chair of a committee 
1:  Board chair, chair of committee 
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APPENDIX C.  MULTIVARIATE NORMALITY DIAGNOSTICS 
 
Multivariate Normality Assumption: Residuals fit the line of best fit; Residuals are 
independently and identically distributed. 
 
 
Residuals (Not transformed variables)   Residuals (transformed variables) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagnostics: Show residuals are iid 
Multivariate Normality Assumption: Residuals fit the line of best fit; Residuals are 
independently and identically distributed. 
Graph shows distribution of the residuals for each year and overall. 
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APPENDIX  D:  RANDOM-EFFECTS REGRESSION RESULTS 
TABLE D - 17.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.39*** -
0.31*** 
-
0.31*** 
-
0.31*** 
-
0.31*** 
-
0.31*** 
Market Growth 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07+ 0.07 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Salary > $1 Million 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***      
Ownership Power (OUT/IN)  0.02   0.02  -0.01   -0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.04***  0.04**   0.03  0.04* 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.02* 0.01    -0.03+ -0.04* 
Constant 2.80*** 2.72*** 2.66*** 2.73*** 2.51*** 6.76*** 7.06*** 6.50*** 7.24*** 6.93*** 
χ 
2
 4241 4292 4234 4281 4313 318 316 335 316 337 
Δ χ 
2
  51 -7*** 40 72**  -2 17 -2+ 19* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
                
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE D - 18.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Winsorized Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-
Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
Market Growth 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.05+ 0.05 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07+ 0.07 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Salary > $1 Million 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.09+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***      
Ownership Power (OUT/IN)  0.02+   0.02+  -0.02   -0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.04**  0.04**   0.03  0.03+ 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.02* 0.01    -0.03+ -0.03+ 
Constant 2.80*** 2.57*** 2.67*** 2.72*** 2.39*** 6.75*** 7.54*** 6.55*** 7.25*** 7.29*** 
χ 
2
 4270 4266 4241 4282 4291 318 316 336 316 339 
Δ χ 
2
  -4+ -29** 12 21**  -2 18 -2+ 21+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
                
 Change in χ 
2
with respect to control model 
Power variables winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE D - 19.  Non-Linear Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-
Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** 
Market Growth 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Institutional Ownership 0.04* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.03+ 0.04+ 0.03+ 
Salary > $1 Million 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Firm Size 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38***      
Ownership Power (OUT/IN)  0.04*   0.04*  -0.00   0.01 
Ownership Power 
(OUT/IN)^2 
 -0.03*   -0.03*  -0.01   -0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.02  0.02   0.00  0.01 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN) ^2   0.06***  0.05***   0.06**  0.06** 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.01 0.00    -0.04+ -0.04* 
Structural Power (OUT/IN) 
^2 
   0.01 0.01    0.04* 0.04* 
χ 
2
 4401 4453 4520 4420 4568 372 374 397 364 395 
Δ χ 
2
  52* 119*** 19 167*   2 25** -8* 23** 
n=3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
  
Change in χ 
2
with respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  E:  ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) REGRESSION 
TABLE  E - 20.  Resu lts of OLS Analyses of Board Power, Total Compensation, and Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 
Leverage -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.09** -0.09** -0.10** -0.09* -0.09** 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51***      
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.02   0.02  -0.02   -0.01 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.03**  0.03**   0.03  0.04+ 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.01 0.01    -0.02 -0.03+ 
           
F 143*** 141*** 141*** 141*** 136*** 13.31*** 16.02*** 16.21*** 16.02*** 15.66*** 
 R 
2 
63.91 63.94 64.02 63.93 64.05 21.66 21.69 21.76 21.69 21.85 
Adjusted R 
2 
63.40 63.42 63.50 63.41 63.51 20.57 20.58 20.65 20.59 20.70 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 0.02 0.10** 0.01 0.11**  0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  E - 21.  Results of OLS Analyses of Winsorized Board Power, Compensation, and Pay-for-Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09** 0.09*** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 
Leverage -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.09** -0.09* -0.09** -0.09* -0.09** 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51***      
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.02   0.02  -0.03+   -0.03 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.03**  0.03**   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.02 0.01    -0.02 -0.02 
           
F 143.07*** 140.83*** 140.73*** 140.63*** 136.11*** 16.31*** 16.08*** 16.22*** 16.02*** 15.71*** 
 R 
2 
63.91 63.94 64.00 63.93 64.03 21.66 21.76 21.72 21.69 21.86 
Adjusted R 
2 
63.40 63.42 63.48 63.41 63.49 20.57 20.65 20.61 20.58 20.71 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.09  0.08 0.04 0.01 0.14 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  F:  CHANGE IN TOTAL COMPENSATION 
TABLE F - 22.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Change in Total Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 
Tobin’s Q 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Firm Performance -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Liquidity -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** 
Leverage 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21* 0.22* 
Institutional Ownership 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Large Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10* 
Risk -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
CEO Change -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01   -0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.11***  0.11*** 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.02 0.01 
      
F 3.48*** 3.30*** 4.87*** 3.31*** 4.38*** 
 R 
2 
1.51 1.51 1.93 1.54 1.93 
Adjusted R 
2 
1.04 1.02 1.43 1.04 1.38 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.02 0.39 0.00 0.34 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for 
space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE F - 23.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Winsorized Board Power and Change in Total 
Compensation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Firm Size -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 
Tobin’s Q 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Firm Performance -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Liquidity -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** 
Leverage 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.21* 0.22* 
Institutional Ownership 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Large Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** 
Risk -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
CEO Change -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.02   0.02 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.09***  0.09*** 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.02 0.01 
      
F 3.48*** 3.31*** 4.47*** 3.31*** 4.07*** 
 R 
2 
1.51 1.53 1.83 1.54 1.85 
Adjusted R 
2 
1.04 1.03 1.33 1.04 1.29 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.01 0.29 0.00 0.25 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for 
space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
  Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE F- 24.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Change in Total Compensation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Tobin’s Q 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
Firm Performance -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
Liquidity -0.05* -0.05** -0.06** -0.05** -0.06** 
Leverage 0.06+ 0.07+ 0.07* 0.07+ 0.07* 
Institutional Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
Risk -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
CEO Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.02*   0.02* 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.00 -0.01 
      
χ 
2
 63* 65* 79*** 67* 85*** 
Δ χ 
2
  2* 16 4 22* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls  
that are not shown for space constraints.  
Change in χ 
2
with respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  F - 25.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power  and Change in Total Compensation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Tobin’s Q 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 
Firm Performance -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
Liquidity -0.05* -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.06** 
Leverage 0.06+ 0.07+ 0.07* 0.07+ 0.07* 
Institutional Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
Risk -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
CEO Change 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.02   0.03+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.00 -0.01 
      
χ 
2
 63* 63* 76** 67* 79** 
Δ χ 
2
  0 13 4 16+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls  
that are not shown for space constraints.  
Change in χ 
2
with respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  G:  ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR PRESTIGE 
 
Variables Structural Power Ownership Power Prestige Power Uniqueness 
Overlapping Audit & Compensation 
Committee Membership 
0.7331   
0.4660 
Status on compensation committee 0.7207   0.4858 
Status on nomination committee 0.4737   0.7740 
Title Ranking 0.4693   0.7728 
Not related, founder, employee ownership  0.6512  0.5767 
Compensation Committee Ownership  0.5890  
0.6443 
Nomination Committee Ownership  0.4901  0.7565 
Difference between director ownership & CEO 
ownership 
 0.5652  
0.6789 
Accumulated board seats   0.7012 0.4933 
S&P Credit Rating   0.4769 0.7800 
Effective Board Practices (Increased Outsiders 
Percentages) 
  0.5212 
0.7335 
Effective Board Practices (Decreased 
Executive Compensation) 
  0.4883 
0.7659 
     
Industry Experience   -0.5667 0.6599 
Expertise Education    0.9597 
Ratio of Director Tenure/CEO Tenure    0.9956 
Variance Explained 1.5840 0.3449 1.6475  
Proportional 0.4260 0.3617 0.4431  
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APPENDIX  H.  NON-LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
TABLE H - 26:  Non-Linear Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Board Power, Compensation, and Pay for  
Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.38*** -0.28* -0.28* -0.26* -0.28* -0.26* 
Market Growth 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary > $1 Million -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03+ 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 -0.02+ 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0.06* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03      
           
Ownership Power (OUT/IN)  0.03   0.03  0.01   0.03 
Ownership Power (OUT/IN)2  -0.02   -0.02  -0.01   -0.02 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)   0.05**  0.05*   0.02  0.02 
Prestige Power (OUT/IN)2   0.04*  0.04*   0.05*  0.05* 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)    0.02 0.01    -0.03 -0.03 
Structural Power (OUT/IN)2    0.04* 0.04*    0.03+ 0.03+ 
           
F 10.23*** 9.38*** 10.48*** 9.45*** 9.31*** 4.08*** 3.76*** 3.96*** 3.64*** 3.39*** 
R
2 7.91 7.94 8.74 8.29 9.15 3.12 3.29 3.73 3.42 3.91 
Adjusted R
2 7.45 7.42 8.22 7.78 8.53 2.66 2.78 3.22 2.91 3.29 
Δ Adjusted R
2
  -0.03 0.77 0.33 1.08  0.12 0.56* 0.25 0.63* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  R2 and their tests are with 
respect to the control model. 
Data was demeaned in order to correct for multicollinearity. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE H - 27:  Non-Linear Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses of Winsorized Board Power, Compensation, and 
Pay-for-Performance 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** -0.28* -0.28* -0.26* -0.28* -0.26* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.02+ 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06+ 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03      
           
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.03   0.02  0.00   0.01 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.03   -0.03  0.00   -0.00 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.05**  0.05*   0.02  0.03 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.04*  0.04*   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.02 0.00    -0.03 -0.04 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.04** 0.04**    0.04* 0.04* 
F 10.13*** 9.14*** 10.24*** 9.49*** 8.86*** 4.08*** 3.77*** 3.99*** 3.66*** 3.44*** 
R
2 7.91 8.04 8.54 8.33 9.11 3.12 3.28 3.63 3.47 3.84 
Adjusted R
2 7.45 7.53 8.03 7.81 8.50 2.66 2.77 3.12 2.95 3.22 
Δ Adjusted R
2
  0.08 0.58** 0.36** 1.05**  0.11 0.46* 0.29* 0.56* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  R2 and their tests are with 
respect to the control model. 
Data was demeaned in order to correct for multicollinearity. 
Winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  I.  HIERARCHICAL LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
TABLE I -  28.  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in HLM Regression Analysis 
No. Variable Mean S.D. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11  
1 Total 
  Compensation ($M) 
$5.48 $6.12 
1.000                      
2 Pay-for-Performance 
Sensitivity 
$1.56 $3.04 
0.095 *** 1.000                    
3 Salary Proportion 25.43 19.35 
-0.565 *** -0.020  1.000                  
4 Contingent Compensation 
(LTIP + Bonus) 
55.70 25.25 
0.258 *** 0.174 *** -0.523 *** 1.000               
5 Contingent Compensation 
(LTIP) 
43.73 26.42 
0.360 *** 0.204 *** -0.553 *** 0.681 *** 1.000             
6 Firm Size (assts) 5.92 12.45 
0.332 *** -0.147 *** -0.193 *** 0.033 * 0.079 *** 1.000           
7 Market Growth 1.63 1.55 
0.255 *** 0.113 *** -0.208 *** 0.311 *** 0.306 *** -0.084 *** 1.000          
8 Firm Performance 4.09 10.09 
0.140 *** -0.184 *** -0.152 *** 0.077 *** 0.047 ** 0.012 0.324 *** 1.000        
9 CEO change 0.07 26.00 
-0.011  -0.003  -0.003  -0.010 -0.009 0.030 + -0.017  -0.039 * 1.000      
10 CEO tenure 7.46 6.21 
0.010  0.039 * 0.047 ** 0.030 + 0.013 -0.087 *** 0.064 *** 0.012  -0.289 *** 1.000   
11 Liquidity 2.20 1.61 
-0.070 *** 0.246 *** 0.041 ** 0.107 *** 0.119 *** -0.229 *** 0.270 *** -0.050 ** -0.013  0.088 *** 1.000  
12 Leverage 0.22 0.16 
0.003  -0.170 *** 0.003  -0.137 *** -0.125 *** 0.165 *** -0.410 *** -0.161 *** 0.015  -0.050 ** -0.354 *** 
13 Salary Exceed $1 million 0.13 0.34 
0.355 *** -0.149 *** -0.180 *** 0.004 0.057 *** 0.381 *** -0.050 ** 0.063 *** -0.050 ** 0.010 -0.184 *** 
14 Risk 0.52 0.20 
0.055 *** -0.240 *** -0.039 * -0.158 *** -0.140 *** 0.229 *** -0.419 *** -0.131 *** 0.034 * -0.095 *** -0.604 *** 
15 Lagged total 
compensation ($M) 
5.78 6.58 
0.664 *** 0.035 * -0.366 *** 0.203 *** 0.236 *** 0.330 *** 0.250 *** 0.098 *** 0.036 * -0.001 -0.030 + 
16 Lagged salary proportion 22.22 15.10 
-0.468 *** -0.105 *** 0.553 *** -0.329 *** -0.359 *** -0.203 *** -0.280 *** -0.157 *** -0.047 ** 0.063 *** -0.032 * 
17 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip 
+bonus) 
64.13 20.68 
0.232 *** 0.232 *** -0.287 *** 0.504 *** 0.419 *** 0.025 0.373 *** 0.090 *** 0.032 * 0.040 ** 0.194 *** 
718 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip) 
51.38 23.19 
0.226 *** 0.271 *** -0.238 *** 0.406 *** 0.534 *** 0.063 *** 0.330 *** -0.043 ** 0.033 * 0.011 0.212 *** 
19 Institutional Ownership 
(%) 
68.59 17.58 
0.040 * 0.068 *** -0.174 *** 0.086 *** 0.121 *** -0.146 *** 0.104 *** 0.155 *** -0.004  0.026 0.115 *** 
20 Large Owner (%) 9.08 4.00 
-0.100 *** 0.088 *** 0.054 *** -0.039 * -0.030 + -0.154 *** -0.060 *** -0.046 ** 0.044 ** 0.037 * 0.114 *** 
21 Ownership – 
Compensation Comm 
(average outsider) (%) 
0.09 0.25 
-0.117 *** 0.071 *** 0.119 *** -0.005 -0.060 *** -0.101 *** 0.044 ** 0.004  -0.013  0.072 *** 0.078 *** 
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22 Ownership – Nomination 
Comm (avg outsider) % 
0.06 0.15 
-0.109 *** 0.045 ** 0.073 *** -0.041 ** -0.059 *** -0.094 *** 0.034 * 0.014  -0.009  0.042 ** 0.073 *** 
23 Ownership – Difference 
between director and CEO 
(average outsider) % 
-1.20 3.37 
0.029 + -0.084 *** -0.095 *** 0.007 0.047 ** 0.083 *** -0.075 *** -0.013  0.070 *** -0.401 *** -0.056 *** 
24 Ownership  - Not related, 
founder, employee (avg 
out) % 
0.18 0.46 
-0.115 *** 0.070 *** 0.128 *** -0.026 -0.064 *** -0.099 *** 0.016  -0.010 -0.001 0.047 ** 0.078 *** 
25 Accumulated board seats 
(avg outsider) 
0.12 0.04 
-0.120 *** 0.313 *** 0.092 *** 0.088 *** 0.057 *** -0.232 *** 0.180 *** -0.095 *** -0.007 0.039 * 0.296 *** 
26 Effective bd practice 
(decrease TC) (avg out) 
0.10 0.07 
-0.060 *** 0.055 *** 0.101 *** -0.016 -0.009  -0.052 *** 0.029 + -0.035 * 0.021 -0.042 ** 0.112 *** 
27 SP Credit Rating (avg out) 0.12 0.04 
-0.143 *** 0.343 *** 0.108 *** 0.085 *** 0.048 ** -0.257 *** 0.207 *** -0.062 *** -0.049 ** 0.082 *** 0.325 *** 
28 Effective bd practice 
(increase out) (avg out) 
0.10 0.07 
0.006  0.032 * -0.002 0.011 0.022  -0.034 * 0.043 ** -0.024 0.033 * -0.055 *** 0.045 ** 
29 Comm Overlap (avg out) 1.48 0.39 
-0.025  0.052 *** 0.030 + 0.030 + -0.041 ** -0.094 *** 0.054 *** 0.021 -0.024 0.027 + 0.080 *** 
30 Compensation Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
2.08 0.57 
-0.016  -0.050 ** 0.030 + 0.051 *** -0.037 * -0.064 *** 0.013  0.033 * -0.018 0.018  -0.010 
31 Nomination Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
1.88 0.74 
0.066  -0.155  -0.080 -0.083 -0.038  0.118  -0.053  0.092 *** 0.010 -0.069 *** -0.098 *** 
32 Hierarchical Status 0.56 0.10 
0.051 *** -0.056 *** -0.018 0.007 -0.037 * 0.039 * -0.039 * 0.028 + -0.076 *** 0.122 *** -0.059 *** 
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE I 28 (CONT’D) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in HLM Regression Analysis 
 
No. Variable 12  13  14  15 16 17 18  19  20  21 22  23  
12 Leverage 
1.000                       
 
13 Salary Exceed $1 million 
0.111 *** 1.000                    
 
14 Risk 
0.793 *** 0.202 *** 1.000                   
 
15 Lagged total 
compensation ($M) -0.021  0.358 *** 0.029 + 1.000                
 
16 Lagged salary proportion 
0.051 *** -0.192 *** 0.021  -0.598 *** 1.000              
 
17 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip 
+bonus) -0.204 *** -0.010 -0.245 *** 0.281 *** -0.558 *** 1.000            
 
18 Lagged contingent 
compensation (ltip) -0.159 *** 0.032 * -0.208 *** 0.356 *** -0.541 *** 0.742 *** 1.000           
 
19 Institutional Ownership 
(%) -0.127 *** 0.005 -0.145 *** 0.028 + -0.216 *** 0.159 *** 0.122 *** 1.000         
 
20 Large Owner (%) 
-0.006  -0.051 *** -0.033 * -0.102 *** 0.044 ** -0.021 -0.020  0.431 *** 1.000        
21 Ownership – 
Compensation Comm 
(average outsider) -0.065 *** -0.094 *** -0.103 *** -0.119 *** 0.145 *** -0.029 + -0.057 *** -0.081 *** 0.097 *** 1.000     
22 Ownership – Nomination 
Comm (average outsider) -0.107 *** -0.095 *** -0.115 *** -0.107 *** 0.101 *** -0.033 * -0.049 ** -0.014  0.007  0.481 *** 1.000    
23 Ownership – Difference 
between director and CEO 
(average outsider) 0.127 *** 0.036 * 0.133 *** 0.014 -0.095 *** -0.015 0.031 * 0.128 *** 0.028 + -0.021 0.049 ** 1.000  
24 Ownership  - Not related, 
founder, employee (avg 
out) -0.061 *** -0.095 *** -0.092 *** -0.120 *** 0.165 *** -0.051 *** -0.069 *** -0.106 *** 0.073 *** 0.779 *** 0.498 *** 0.041 ** 
25 Accumulated board seats 
(avg outsider) 
-0.209 *** -0.244 *** -0.287 *** -0.100 *** 0.036 * 0.148 *** 0.131 *** 0.109 *** 0.101 *** 0.090 *** 0.044 ** -0.115 *** 
26 Effective bd practice 
(decrease TC) (avg out) 
-0.082 *** -0.042 ** -0.082 *** 0.025 -0.083 *** 0.091 *** 0.126 *** 0.034 * 0.028 + -0.015 -0.043 ** -0.025  
27 SP Credit Rating (avg out) 
-0.273 *** -0.262 *** -0.355 *** -0.131 *** 0.062 *** 0.140 *** 0.112 *** 0.146 *** 0.103 *** 0.101 *** 0.044 ** -0.144 *** 
28 Effective bd practice 
(increase out) (avg out) 
-0.022  -0.036 * -0.011  0.023 -0.039 * 0.049 ** 0.046 ** 0.029 + 0.004  -0.008 -0.026 + -0.009  
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29 Comm Overlap (avg out) 
-0.080 *** -0.094 *** -0.093 *** -0.051 *** 0.054 *** 0.018 -0.024  0.018  0.000  0.107 *** 0.159 *** -0.095 *** 
30 Compensation Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
0.023  -0.040 ** 0.024  -0.034 * 0.058 *** -0.014 -0.028 + -0.079 *** -0.029 + 0.131 *** 0.051 *** -0.054 *** 
31 Nomination Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
0.035 * 0.084 *** 0.106 *** 0.036 * -0.043 ** -0.087 *** -0.089 *** 0.058 *** -0.033  -0.024 0.275  0.135  
32 Hierarchical Status 
0.015  0.075 *** 0.066 *** 0.048 ** -0.022 -0.014 -0.033 * -0.004  -0.023  -0.034 * -0.019  -0.060 *** 
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE I- 28 (CONT’D) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables in HLM Regression Analysis 
 
No. Variable 24  25  26  27 28 29 30  31  32       
24 Ownership  - Not related, 
founder, employee (avg 
out) 1.000                    
25 Accumulated board seats 
(avg outsider) 
0.050 ** 1.000                  
26 Effective bd practice 
(decrease TC) (avg out) 
-0.030 + 0.362 *** 1.000                
27 SP Credit Rating (avg out) 
0.076 *** 0.793 *** 0.309 *** 1.000                
28 Effective bd practice 
(increase out) (avg out) 
-0.005  0.327 *** 0.284 *** 0.264 *** 1.000              
29 Comm Overlap (avg out) 
0.018  0.281 *** 0.085 *** 0.288 *** 0.085 *** 1.000            
30 Compensation Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
0.032 * 0.055 *** -0.007  0.027 + 0.036 * 0.627 *** 1.000           
31 Nomination Committee 
Seniority (avg out) 
-0.031  -0.138  -0.063  -0.156 *** -0.018 0.415 *** 0.241 *** 1.000         
32 Hierarchical Status 
-0.092 *** -0.038 * -0.027 + -0.066 *** -0.002 0.136 *** 0.252 *** 0.191 *** 1.000       
N= 3,581 firm-year observations  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE I - 29.  Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) fixed-effects Regression Analysis: Average Outsiders’ 
Variables 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** -0.28* -0.28* -0.23+ -0.28* -0.22+ 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
Leverage -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03+ 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.04 -0.05* -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0.07* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.07* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04      
           
Ownership – Not related, founder, 
employee (Avg Out) 
 -0.01   -0.01  0.03   0.03 
Ownership – Compensation 
Committee (Avg Out) 
 -0.01   -0.01  -0.02   -0.01 
Ownership- Nomination Committee 
(Avg Out) 
 0.01   0.01  -0.01   -0.00 
Director – CEO Ownership (Avg 
Out) 
 0.05   0.05  0.01   0.01 
Accumulated Board Seats (AvgOut)   0.02  0.01   0.03  0.03 
Effective Board Practice (Decrease 
TC) (Avg Out) 
  -0.08***  -0.08***   -0.06***  -0.06*** 
SP Credit Rating (Avg Out)   0.01  0.01   0.06  0.05 
Effective Board Practice (Increase 
Out 5) (Avg Out) 
  -0.01  -0.01   -0.00  -0.00 
Committee Overlap (Avg Out)    0.05* 0.05*    0.06+ 0.05+ 
CompensationCommittee Seniority 
(Avg Out) 
   0.00 0.01    -0.03+ -0.03 
Nomination Committee Seniority 
(Avg Out) 
   -0.00 -0.01    -0.03 -0.03 
Hierarchical Status (Avg Out)    -0.02 -0.02    -0.01 -0.01 
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F 10.13*** 8.57*** 1.31*** 8.76*** 8.14*** 4.07*** 3.41*** 3.71*** 3.41*** 2.81*** 
R
2 7.87 8.09 9.37 8.27 9.90 3.28 3.32 4.25 3.51 4.47 
Adjusted R
2 7.41 7.52 8.81 7.70 9.14 2.82 2.75 3.68 2.94 3.69 
Δ Adjusted R
2
  0.11 1.40*** 0.29 1.73***   -0.07 0.86*** 0.12+ 0.87*** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  R2 and their tests are with 
respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE I - 30.  Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Random-Effects Regression Analysis: Average Outsiders’ 
Variables 
                                                  Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.22*** 
Market Growth 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.07* -0.07** -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Salary > $1 Million 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03+ 
Risk 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03 -0.03 
SOX 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03* -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
Lagged TC 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39***      
Ownership – Not related, founder, 
employee (Avg Out) 
 -0.01   -0.01  0.03   0.02 
Ownership – Compensation Committee 
(Avg Out) 
 -0.02   -0.01  -0.02   -0.02 
Ownership- Nomination Committee 
(Avg Out) 
 0.01+   0.01  -0.01   -0.00 
Director – CEO Ownership (Avg Out)  0.04*   0.04*  -0.00   0.00 
Accumulated Board Seats (AvgOut)   0.03  0.02   0.05  0.05 
Effective Board Practice (Decrease TC) 
(Avg Out) 
  -0.10***  -0.10***   -0.06***  -0.06*** 
SP Credit Rating (Avg Out)   0.02  0.01   0.10*  0.09* 
Effective Board Practice (Increase Out 
5) (Avg Out) 
  0.00  0.01   -0.01  -0.01 
Committee Overlap (Avg Out)    0.03+ 0.04*    0.07* 0.04 
Compensation Committee Seniority 
(Avg Out) 
   -0.01 -0.01    -0.05** -0.04* 
Nomination Committee Seniority (Avg 
Out) 
   -0.00 -0.01    -0.05** -0.04* 
    199 
Hierarchical Status (Avg Out)    -0.01 -0.01    -0.00 -0.00 
χ 
2 
4372*** 4534*** 4538*** 4382*** 4729*** 348*** 355*** 373*** 340*** 378*** 
Δ χ 
2
  162* 166*** 10+ 357***   7 25*** -8*** 30*** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
                
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  J:  INTERACTIONS- OUTSIDERS * INSIDERS POWER BASES 
TABLE J- 31.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Regression Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power 
Interactions and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.32** 0.36*** 0.33** -0.29* -0.29* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.05+ 0.07* 0.06+ -0.06+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.07* 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04      
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 0.01   0.01  0.01   0.02 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 -0.00   -0.01  -0.01   -0.02 
Ownership Power(out*in)  0.04   0.03  -0.03   -0.04 
Prestige Power (avg out)   -0.04+  -0.04*   0.01  0.02 
Prestige Power (avg in)   -0.07***  -0.07***   -0.02  -0.02 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.05***  -0.05**   -0.03+  -0.03+ 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.03+ 0.04*    -0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power (avg in)    -0.01 0.01    0.02 0.02 
Structural Power(out*in)    -0.03* -0.01    -0.02+ -0.03+ 
F 10.23*** 8.72*** 9.77*** 8.88*** 7.75*** 3.99*** 3.65*** 3.55*** 3.53*** 2.98*** 
 R 2 7.91 8.21 9.26 8.18 9.77 3.12 3.37 3.44 3.44 3.77 
Adjusted R 2 7.45 7.67 8.72 7.64 9.08 2.66 2.83 2.90 2.90 3.06 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.22 1.27*** 0.19* 1.63***  0.17 0.24+ 0.24+ 0.40+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model.  *** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE J - 32.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Regression Analyses Examining Winsorized Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Power Interactions and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.32** 0.36*** 0.32** -0.29* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.04+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.05+ 0.06* 0.05+ -0.06+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.08* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04      
Ownership Power (avg out)  0.03   0.02  0.02   0.02 
Ownership Power (avg in)  -0.00   -0.01  -0.00   -0.02 
Ownership Power(out*in)  0.03   0.02  -0.01   -0.02 
Prestige Power (avg out)   -0.05*  -0.06**   0.01  0.01 
Prestige Power (avg in)   -0.07***  -0.07***   -0.02  -0.02 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.05**  -0.04**   -0.03+  -0.03+ 
Structural Power (avg out)    0.03 0.04+    -0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power (avg in)    -0.01 0.00    0.02 0.03 
Structural Power(out*in)    -0.02* -0.02    -0.02+ -0.02+ 
           
F 10.23*** 8.70*** 10.09*** 8.86*** 7.97*** 3.98*** 3.73*** 3.59*** 3.52*** 3.11*** 
 R 
2 
7.91 8.13 9.34 8.17 9.80 3.12 3.32 3.45 3.44 3.67 
Adjusted R 
2 
7.45 7.59 8.80 7.62 9.12 2.66 2.78 2.91 2.90 2.96 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 0.14 1.35*** 0.17* 1.67***  0.12 0.25+ 0.24+ 0.30+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power variables winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE J - 33.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Regression Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power 
Interactions and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.28*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38***      
Ownership Power (avg out)  0.01   0.01  -0.00   0.00 
Ownership Power (avg in)  -0.02+   -0.02  -0.00   -0.02 
Ownership Power(out*in)  0.02   0.02  -0.03   -0.05 
Prestige Power (avg out)   -0.03+  -0.03*   0.06*  0.07** 
Prestige Power (avg in)   -0.03**  -0.03*   0.02  0.01 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.05***  -0.05***   -0.03  -0.03 
Structural Power (avg out)    0.01 0.02+    -0.02 -0.03+ 
Structural Power (avg in)    -0.02 0.00    0.03+ 0.02 
Structural Power(out*in)    -0.01 0.00    -0.03* -0.04** 
           
χ
2
 4270 4319 4307 4283 4391 318 319 343 322 357 
Δ χ
2 
          
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
                
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control model 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE J - 34.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Regression Analyses Examining Winsorized Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Power Interactions and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.28*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38***      
Ownership Power (avg out)  0.02   0.01  -0.01   0.00 
Ownership Power (avg in)  -0.03*   -0.02+  0.01   -0.01 
Ownership Power(out*in)  0.01   0.01  -0.01   -0.02 
Prestige Power (avg out)   -0.03*  -0.04**   0.05*  0.06** 
Prestige Power (avg in)   -0.03**  -0.03**   0.01  0.01 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.05***  -0.05***   -0.03  -0.03 
Structural Power (avg out)    0.01 0.02+    -0.02 -0.03 
Structural Power (avg in)    -0.02 0.00    0.03+ 0.03+ 
Structural Power(out*in)    -0.01 -0.01    -0.03* -0.03* 
Constant .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .** 
           
χ
2
 4270 4319 4307 4283 4391 318 319 343 322 357 
Δ χ
2  49 37 13 121   1 25 4 39 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
                
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control model 
            Power variables winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  K:  SHORT TERM & LONG TERM COMPENSATION 
TABLE K - 35.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power, Short-Term and Long-Term 
Compensation 
 Salary Proportion Contingent Compensation (LTIP + Bonus) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.21+ -0.22+ -0.22+ -0.21+ -0.21+ 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Tobin’s Q -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Firm Performance -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Institutional Ownership -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Risk -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CEO Change 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
CEO Tenure 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55*** 
Lagged Salary Proportion -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00      
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.01   0.02  -0.00   -0.00 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.09***  -0.08***   0.05+  0.05+ 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04+ -0.03    0.01 0.00 
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
F 3.64*** 3.48*** 4.18*** 3.53*** 3.87*** 29.65*** 28.64*** 28.90*** 28.64*** 26.15*** 
 R 
2 
2.64 2.63 3.19 2.78 3.29 20.35 20.6 20.75 20.61 20.75 
Adjusted R 
2 
2.11 2.11 2.68 2.26 2.72 19.95 20.17 20.33 20.18 20.28 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 0.00 0.53*** 0.11+ 0.57***  0.22 0.38+ 0.23 0.33+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE K - 36.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Winsorized Board Power,  Short-Term and Long-
Term Compensation 
 
 Salary Proportion Contingent Compensation (LTIP + Bonus) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.21+ -0.22+ -0.22+ -0.21+ -0.21+ 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Tobin’s Q -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Firm Performance -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Institutional Ownership -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Risk -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CEO Change 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
CEO Tenure 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.54*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.56*** 
Lagged Salary Proportion -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.00   0.01  0.03   0.03 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.08***  -0.07**   0.05+  0.05+ 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04+ -0.03    0.01 -0.01 
F 3.6443 3.4244 4.0102 3.5249 3.6726 29.6516 28.6620 28.9020 28.6400 26.1634 
 R 
2 
2.64 2.62 3.1 2.77 3.19 20.35 20.65 20.74 20.6 20.8 
Adjusted R 
2 
2.15 2.11 2.58 2.25 2.62 19.95 20.22 20.32 20.18 20.33 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.04 0.43*** 0.1+ 0.47**  0.27 0.37+ 0.23 0.38+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
All power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  K - 37.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power, Short-term and Long-Term 
Compensation 
 Salary Proportion Contingent Compensation (LTIP + Bonus) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.31*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
Firm Performance -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 
Institutional Ownership -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Large Owner 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Risk -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.07* -0.08* -0.07* -0.08* 
CEO Change 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Lagged Salary Proportion 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01   -0.01  0.01   0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.06***  -0.05**   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03* -0.02    0.03+ 0.02 
χ
2
 1409 1400 1266 1418 1316 976 981 981 1004 1005 
Δ χ
2 
 -9 -143*** 9* -93**  5 5* 28+ 29* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control mode 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  K - 38.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Winsorized Board Power Ratios,  Short-term and 
Long-Term Compensation 
 Salary Proportion Contingent Compensation (LTIP + Bonus) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.31*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
Firm Performance -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 
Institutional Ownership -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Large Owner 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03 
Risk -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07* -0.07* -0.08* -0.07* -0.08* 
CEO Change 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Lagged Salary Proportion 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01   -0.01  0.01   0.00 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.05***  -0.05**   0.04*  0.03+ 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03+ -0.02    0.03+ 0.02 
χ
2
 1409 1380 1269 1418 1312 976 979 981 1003 1004 
Δ χ
2 
 -29 -140*** 9+ -97**  3 5* 27+ 28+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control mode 
Power variables winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE K - 39.  Summary of Power Bases, Short Term, and Long Term Pay Components 
 
 Salary Proportion Contingent Compensation 
 FE RE FE RE 
  Full Model   Full Model  Full Model  Full Model 
Ownership Power 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
Prestige Power 
 
  
-0.09*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.05** 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.04* 0.04* 
Structural Power -0.04+ -0.03 -0.03* -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03+ 0.02 
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APPENDIX  L:  ALTERNATIVE LONG-TERM COMPENSATION (LTIP) 
TABLE L - 40.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power. Short-Term, Long-Term Pay 
Components 
 Salary Proportion of the Pay Mix Contingent Compensation  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.21+ -0.22+ -0.22+ -0.21+ -0.21+ 0.30* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 
Tobin’s Q -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
Firm Performance -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Institutional Ownership -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Risk -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
CEO Change 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 
CEO Tenure 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Sox 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Lagged Salary 
Proportion 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.01   0.02  0.01   0.02 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.09***  -0.08***   0.06*  0.06* 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04+ -0.03    0.00 -0.01 
           
F 3.64*** 3.48*** 4.18*** 3.53*** 3.87*** 9.68*** 9.35*** 9.51*** 9.36*** 8.63*** 
 R 
2 
2.64 2.63 3.19 2.78 3.29 9.05 9.17 9.36 9.16 9.37 
Adjusted R 
2 
2.15 2.11 2.68 2.26 2.72 8.59 8.68 8.87 8.67 8.84 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.04 0.53*** 0.11+ 0.57***  0.09 0.28* 0.08 0.25* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE L - 41.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Winsorized Board Power. Short-Term, Long-Term 
Pay Components 
 Salary Proportion of the Pay Mix Contingent Compensation  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.21+ -0.22+ -0.22+ -0.21+ -0.21+ 0.30* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 0.31* 
Tobin’s Q -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
Firm Performance -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Institutional Ownership -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 0.04* 0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Risk -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
CEO Change 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 
CEO Tenure 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Sox 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Lagged Salary 
Proportion 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.00   0.01  0.05   0.05+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.08***  -0.07**   0.05*  0.06* 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04+ -0.03    -0.00 -0.02 
           
F 3.64*** 3.42*** 4.01*** 3.53*** 3.67*** 9.68*** 9.45*** 9.47*** 9.36*** 8.73* 
 R 
2 
2.64 2.62 3.10 2.77 3.19 9.05 9.27 9.33 9.16 9.47 
Adjusted R 
2 
2.15 2.11 2.58 2.25 2.62 8.59 8.78 8.85 8.67 8.94 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.04 0.43*** 0.10+ 0.47**  0.19 0.26* 0.08 0.35* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  L - 42.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power. Short-Term, Long-Term Pay 
Components 
 Salary Proportion of the Pay Mix Contingent Compensation  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.31*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
Firm Performance -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Institutional Ownership -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Large Owner 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Risk -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
CEO Change 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 
CEO Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Lagged Salary Proportion 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.35*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01   -0.01  0.00   0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.06***  -0.05**   0.03*  0.04* 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03* -0.02    -0.03+ -0.04* 
           
χ 
2
 1409 1400 1266 1418 1316 1041 1029 1030 1026 1017 
Δ χ 
2
  -9 -143*** 9* -93**   -12 -11* -15+ -24* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control mode 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  L - 43.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Winsorized Board Power. Short-Term, Long-
Term Pay Components 
 
 Salary Proportion of the Pay Mix Contingent Compensation  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.31*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
Firm Performance -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Leverage 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Institutional Ownership -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.06*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Large Owner 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Risk -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
CEO Change 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 
CEO Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Lagged Salary Proportion 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***      
Lagged Contingent 
Compensation 
     0.35*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01   -0.01  0.00   0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.05***  -0.05**   0.03+  0.04* 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03+ -0.02    -0.03* -0.04* 
           
χ 
2
 1409 1380 1269 1418 1312 1041 1030 1030 1026 1018 
Δ χ 
2
  -29 -140*** 9+ -97**   -11 -11+ -15* -23* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.   
 Change in χ 
2
 respect to control mode 
Power variables winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  M:  PRE AND POST SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
After integrating agency and upper echelon theory to examine the relationship between 
power and monitoring effectiveness, I consider how institutional theory compliments this 
theoretical integration framework to explain pay-for-performance. Relevant then to board power, 
institutional pressures affect board decisions.  For example, powerful CEOs try to appoint 
directors who were on passive, not active, monitoring boards because active monitoring board 
members have experiencing in reducing compensation or making decisions that enhance 
monitoring effectiveness (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Consequently, board members from active 
monitoring boards try to appoint board members from other active boards.  Similarly, increased 
institutional pressure has resulted in increased gender diversity on boards (Milliken & Martin, 
1996). 
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 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Formal structures (e.g., rules, norms, 
routines) are both symbolic and action-
oriented. 
 
Structures have socially-accepted 
meanings that communicate information 
about the firm to the external 
environment. 
 
Environment drives managers to align 
strategy and structure with the 
environment for legitimacy 
FOUNDATIONS 
Sociology 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983)  
UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS 
Group, firm or industry 
RESEARCH 
FOCUS 
How firms become similar. 
KEY FACTORS 
RELEVANT TO 
MONITORING 
Rules, norms and routines in the firm’s 
institutional environment affect 
managerial decisions and should be 
considered in the monitoring process. 
 
Managers and boards make decisions to 
adopt practices that are considered to be 
acceptable by players within the firm’s 
institutional field to increases firm 
legitimacy. 
 
 
FACTORS 
RELEVANT TO A 
POWER MODEL 
IN THE 
CONTEXT OF 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
Firm’s external environment influences 
its pay structure, and explains why pay 
across firms is similar. 
 
FACTORS NOT 
CONSIDERED  
FOR A POWER 
MODEL IN THE 
CONTEXT OF 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
Context of how pay decisions are 
determined by the board. 
 
How individuals perceive and make 
decisions differently. 
 
Why firms differ in their pay packages, 
and whether these pay packages are 
efficient. 
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TABLE M - 44.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness Pre and Post 
Sarbanes Oxley 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Pre-Sox Post-Sox Pre-Sox Post-Sox 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.29* 0.29* 0.30* 0.29* 0.30* 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.17 -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.28 -0.28 
Tobin’s Q 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* 
Liquidity -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.12+ -0.11+ -0.12+ -0.11+ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.19* 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* 0.17* -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
Institutional Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ 
Large Owner 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
CEO Tenure -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17***           
Ownership Power (out/in)  0.02   0.02  -0.00   -0.01  -0.01   -0.01  0.03   0.03 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.07*  0.07*   0.01  0.01   0.05  0.06+   -0.01  -0.01 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.02 0.01    0.02 0.02    -0.01 -0.02    -0.03 -0.03 
                     
Observations 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 
Number of Firms 806 806 806 806 806 744 744 744 744 744 806 806 806 806 806 744 744 744 744 744 
F 3.97*** 3.72*** 4.13*** 3.75*** 3.65*** 6.14*** 5.69*** 5.76*** 5.51*** 4.85*** 1.94* 1.78* 1.93* 2.03* 1.81* 1.67+ 1.67+ 1.55+ 1.70+ 1.70+ 
 R 2 6.59 6.67 7.21 6.7 7.24 5.93 5.93 5.95 6.02 6.03 2.5 2.51 2.72 2.51 2.78 5.43 5.52 5.46 5.56 5.7 
Adjusted R 2 5.94 5.98 6.52 6 6.46 5.13 5.07 5.09 5.16 5.05 1.87 1.83 2.05 1.84 2.01 4.69 4.72 4.66 4.76 4.78 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.04 0.58* 0.06 0.52*  -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.08  -0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.14   0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.09 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE M -45.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness Pre and Post Sarbanes Oxley 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Pre-Sox Post-Sox Pre-Sox Post-Sox 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.29* 0.29* 0.29* 0.29* 0.29* 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.17 -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 
Tobin’s Q 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08+ -0.07+ 
Liquidity -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.12+ -0.11 -0.12+ -0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.19* 0.16* 0.19* 0.17* 0.18* -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ 
Large Owner 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03+ 0.02+ 
Risk -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 
CEO Tenure -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.16** -0.17*** -0.16**           
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 0.00   0.00  0.01   0.01  0.03   0.03  0.03   0.03 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 0.01   0.03  0.01   0.02  0.03   0.03  -0.00   -0.02 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.10***   0.10***  0.00   -0.02  -0.05   -0.05  -0.01   -0.03+ 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.00  -0.00   -0.02  -0.03   -0.06  -0.05   0.02  0.02 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.05  -0.04   -0.02  -0.02   -0.06  -0.06   0.01  -0.00 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.06**  -0.05**   -0.04  -0.03   -0.06*  -0.06*   -0.06*  -0.05* 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   -0.00 -0.00    0.02 0.03    -0.01 -0.01    -0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   -0.03 -0.03    0.01 -0.00    0.01 -0.00    0.06* 0.06* 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.05* -0.05+    -0.02 -0.05    -0.02 -0.01    -0.05* -0.06 
                     
Observations 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 
Number of Firms 806 806 806 806 806 744 744 744 744 744 806 806 806 806 806 744 744 744 744 744 
F 3.97*** 4.07*** 4.05*** 3.70*** 3.98*** 6.14*** 5.86*** 5.73*** 5.14*** 5.02*** 1.94* 2.09** 1.80* 1.80* 1.81* 1.67+ 1.53+ 1.42 1.60+ 1.46+ 
 R 2 6.59 8.40 7.45 7.16 9.56 5.93 5.97 6.54 6.13 6.94 2.50 3.15 3.55 2.59 4.26 5.43 5.55 6.41 6.49 7.56 
Adjusted R 2 5.94 7.63 6.67 6.38 8.52 5.13 4.99 5.56 5.15 5.60 1.87 2.38 2.79 1.82 3.22 4.69 4.63 5.49 5.58 6.29 
Δ Adjusted R 2  1.69*** 0.73** 0.44* 2.58***  -0.14 0.43 0.02 0.47  0.51 0.92* -0.05 1.35*   -0.06 0.80* 0.89* 1.60* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  N:  PRE & POST WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACKS (WTC) 
TABLE  N - 46.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness Pre and Post 
World Trade Center Attacls 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Pre-WTC Post-WTC Pre-WTC Post-WTC 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.51** 0.50** 0.51** 0.53** 0.52** -0.72** -0.68** -0.68** -0.70** -0.68** -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.38 -0.37 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ 
Liquidity -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.22+ 0.21+ 0.21+ 0.21+ 0.21+ -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ 
Large Owner 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Risk 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
CEO Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
CEO Change 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.04* -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.10*           
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.06   0.05  -0.01   -0.02  -0.04   -0.03  0.01   0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.11***  0.12***   0.01  0.01   0.07  0.08+   0.01  0.01 
Structural 
Power(out/in) 
   0.01 -0.02    0.05* 0.05*    -0.04 -0.05    -0.01 -0.01 
                     
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 
Number of Firms 695 695 695 695 695 816 816 816 816 816 695 695 695 695 695 816 816 816 816 816 
F 4.58*** 4.31*** 5.31*** 4.27*** 4.73*** 4.62*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 4.57*** 4.04*** 1.22 1.10 1.16 1.09 1.05 2.52** 2.35** 2.35** 2.46** 2.16** 
 R 2 9.01 9.33 10.48 9.05 10.76 6.08 6.09 6.10 6.42 6.45 3.24 3.32 3.53 3.33 3.81 5.10 5.11 5.11 5.12 5.14 
Adjusted R 2 8.19 8.45 9.61 8.17 9.77 5.46 5.42 5.43 5.75 5.70 2.44 2.45 2.67 2.46 2.81 4.52 4.49 4.48 4.49 4.43 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.26 1.42 -0.02 1.58  -0.04 -0.03 0.29 0.24  0.01 0.23 0.02 0.37   -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  N- 47.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness Pre and Post World Trade Center Attacks 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Pre-WTC Post-WTC Pre-WTC Post-WTC 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.51** 0.51** 0.47* 0.54** 0.50* -0.72** -0.69** -0.71** -0.67** -0.71** -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.35 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17** 0.18*** 0.17** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21*** -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.07+ 
Liquidity -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.22+ 0.19 0.22+ 0.20 0.20 -0.14* -0.14* -0.13* -0.13* -0.12* 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08* 
Large Owner 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.07* -0.06* -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Risk 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.15 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09 
CEO Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
CEO Change 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.04* -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.28*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.10* -0.10* -0.09* -0.10** -0.09*           
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 0.07*   0.08*  -0.01   -0.01  0.04   0.05  0.01   0.01 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 0.07*   0.07*  0.00   0.01  0.08   0.06  0.00   -0.02 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.13***   0.13***  0.01   0.01  -0.03   -0.04  0.00   -0.01 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.00  0.00   -0.07**  -0.09**   -0.08  -0.08   -0.00  -0.00 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.08*  -0.07*   -0.02  -0.03   -0.07  -0.08   0.01  -0.00 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.08***  -0.08***   -0.03+  -0.03   -0.05+  -0.06+   -0.06*  -0.06* 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.01 -0.00    0.05* 0.07**    0.01 0.00    0.01 0.01 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   -0.01 -0.01    0.01 0.01    0.06 0.02    0.04* 0.04* 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.06+ -0.05+    -0.02 -0.01    -0.00 0.00    -0.03+ -0.02 
                     
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 1,457 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 2,124 
Number of Firms 695 695 695 695 695 816 816 816 816 816 695 695 695 695 695 816 816 816 816 816 
F 4.58*** 6.06*** 5.17*** 4.64*** 6.39*** 4.62*** 3.86*** 5.00*** 4.06*** 3.92*** 1.22 1.93* 1.15 1.07 1.60* 2.52** 2.11** 2.57*** 2.50*** 2.28*** 
 R 2 9.01 12.77 11.27 9.57 15.32 6.08 6.09 7.22 6.53 7.88 3.24 4.60 4.49 3.65 5.97 5.10 5.12 6.04 5.61 6.52 
Adjusted R 2 8.19 11.81 10.28 8.57 14.02 5.46 5.33 6.47 5.77 6.87 2.44 3.61 3.50 2.65 4.60 4.52 4.40 5.33 4.90 5.54 
Δ Adjusted R 2  3.62 2.09 0.38 5.83  -0.13 1.01 0.31 1.41  1.17 1.06 0.21 2.16   -0.12 0.81 0.38 1.02 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  O:  INDUSTRY MIMETIC PRESSURES 
TABLE O - 48.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: Industry Mimetic 
Pressures 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 <1 SD >1SD <1 SD >1 SD 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** -0.35 -0.35 -0.34 -0.37 -0.34 -0.34** -0.33* -0.33* -0.33* -0.32* 
Tobin’s Q 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Leverage -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03 0.03+ 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Large Owner 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04+ 0.04* 0.05* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03+ 0.03 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Risk -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
CEO Change 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03* -0.03* -0.04** -0.03* -0.04** 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.03 0.04+ 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 -0.02+ 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.07 0.07 0.08+ 0.07 0.08+ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01           
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 -0.02   -0.02  0.01   0.01  -0.02   -0.04  0.02   0.02 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.06*  0.06*   0.08**  0.07**   0.08*  0.07+   0.05*  0.06* 
Structural Power(out/in)    0.02 0.01    0.04+ 0.03    0.07 0.06    -0.00 -0.01 
                     
Observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 589 589 589 589 589 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 
Number of Firms 542 542 542 542 542 816 816 816 816 816 237 237 237 237 237 859 859 859 859 859 
F 6.25*** 6.07*** 6.69**** 5.98*** 6.14*** 7.10*** 7.05*** 7.61*** 6.83*** 7.37*** 1.54+ 1.47 1.53+ 1.47 1.41 3.72*** 3.75*** 4.09*** 3.73*** 3.74*** 
 R 2 14.18 14.22 15.00 14.26 15.09 7.37 7.33 8.05 7.54 8.16 4.77 4.80 5.51 5.25 5.95 3.25 3.46 3.74 3.44 3.79 
Adjusted R 2 
12.96 12.98 13.72 12.98 13.67 6.72 6.73 7.36 6.85 7.40 2.10 2.13 2.69 2.43 2.81 2.74 2.92 3.20 2.90 3.19 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.02 0.76* 0.02 0.71*  0.01 0.64** 0.13+ 0.68**  0.03 0.59* 0.33 0.71+   0.18 0.46* 0.16 0.45* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE O- 49.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness:  Industry Mimetic Pressures 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 <1 SD >1SD <1 SD >1SD 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.13 -0.00 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.39** 0.44*** 0.38** -0.35 -0.33 -0.36 -0.38 -0.36 -0.34** -0.33* -0.33* -0.33* -0.32* 
Tobin’s Q 0.17*** 0.21** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.10** 0.03 0.05+ 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Leverage -0.09 -0.26* -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.04* 0.08 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03+ 0.04* 0.04+ 0.03+ 0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Large Owner 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04+ -0.03+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.05* 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03 0.03+ 
Risk -0.05 0.34** -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.13 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
CEO Change 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04 0.04* 0.05+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 -0.02+ 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.07 -0.03 0.10* 0.07 0.10* 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02           
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 -0.01   -0.02  0.02   0.01  -0.02   -0.04  0.02   0.03 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 0.01   -0.01  0.01   -0.02  -0.00   0.01  -0.01   -0.02 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 -0.03   -0.01  0.06   0.05  0.07   0.08  -0.04   -0.06 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.03  -0.04   -0.06*  -0.07**   0.01  -0.02   0.02  0.03 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.10**  -0.11***   -0.08**  -0.08**   -0.08  -0.08   -0.03  -0.04 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.06*  -0.06*   -0.04*  -0.04+   -0.08  -0.08   -0.03  -0.03 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.03 0.05+    0.04 0.05*    0.06 0.09    0.00 -0.00 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   0.01 0.04    -0.01 0.01    -0.02 -0.01    0.02 0.02 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.01 0.00    -0.01 0.02    -0.01 -0.00    -0.03+ -0.04* 
                     
Observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 589 589 589 589 589 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 
Number of Firms 542 542 542 542 542 816 816 816 816 816 237 237 237 237 237 859 859 859 859 859 
F 6.27*** 4.93*** 6.49*** 5.45*** 5.49*** 7.09*** 6.53*** 6.70*** 6.29*** 5.68*** 1.54+ 1.37 1.37 1.33 1.16 3.71*** 3.44*** 3.60*** 3.38*** 2.90*** 
 R 2 14.18 19.69 16.42 14.38 17.10 7.37 7.56 9.11 7.53 10.02 4.77 5.10 5.79 5.27 6.82 3.25 3.63 3.62 3.62 4.17 
Adjusted R 2 12.96 16.85 15.02 12.95 15.29 6.72 6.95 8.36 6.77 9.04 2.10 1.94 2.64 2.10 2.69 2.74 3.03 3.02 3.02 3.38 
Δ Adjusted R 2  3.89 2.06 -0.01 2.33  0.23 1.64 0.05 2.32  -0.16 0.54 0.00 0.59   0.29 0.28 0.28 0.64 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model.  
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  O - 50.  Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: Industry 
Mimetic Pressures 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 <1 SD >1SD <1 SD >1SD 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** -
0.26*** 
-
0.26*** 
-0.25** -
0.26*** 
-0.26** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.27*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Firm 
Performance 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Liquidity -0.05 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.05 -0.06+ -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed 
$1M 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03+ 0.02 0.03 
Risk -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.08* 0.07+ 0.07+ 0.07+ 0.07+ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.03+ -0.02+ -0.03+ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28***           
Ownership 
Power (out/in) 
 -0.00   -0.00  0.01   0.01  -0.02   -0.03  -0.01   -0.00 
Prestige 
Power(out/in) 
  0.08***  0.08***   0.02  0.02   0.08  0.08   0.03  0.04+ 
Structural 
Power(out/in) 
   0.01 -0.01    0.02 0.01    0.04 0.03    -0.02 -0.03+ 
Constant .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** 
Observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 589 589 589 589 589 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 
Number of 
Firms 
542 542 542 542 542 817 816 816 816 816 237 237 237 237 237 860 859 859 859 859 
χ
2
 2672 2665 2616 2711 2631 2072 2086 2043 2055 2074 . . . . . 417 424 445 501 568 
Δ χ
2 
 -7 -56 39 -41   14 -29 -17 2 . . . . .  7 27 84 151 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  O -51. Results of Random-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness: Industry Mimetic Pressures 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 <1 SD >1SD <1 SD >1SD 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.39*** -
0.26*** 
-
0.26*** 
-0.23** -
0.26*** 
-0.22** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.14** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Firm Performance -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08* -0.07* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* 
Liquidity -0.05 -0.10** -0.06+ -0.05 -0.06+ -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Leverage -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03* 0.02 0.04* 0.03+ 0.04* 0.05* 0.04** 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.03+ -0.02 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.03+ 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.08* 0.03 0.07* 0.07+ 0.07+ -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.03+ -0.02+ -0.02+ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.42*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.28*** 0.39*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28***           
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 -0.02   -0.01  0.01   0.01  -0.03   -0.04  0.00   0.00 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 -0.02   -0.01  -0.02   -0.03  0.00   -0.01  -0.01   -0.02 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.01   -0.00  0.01   0.01  0.03   0.03  -0.06   -0.08* 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  0.01  0.01   -0.05**  -0.06**   0.10  0.10   0.05+  0.06* 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.07***  -0.08***   -0.03+  -0.03+   -0.03  -0.04   0.01  0.00 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.06**  -0.07**   -0.04*  -0.04*   -0.07  -0.08   -0.02  -0.02 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.01 0.01    0.01 0.02    0.05 0.04    -0.02 -0.03 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   0.00 0.03    -0.01 0.01    0.03 0.06    0.02 0.01 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.00 0.01    -0.01 0.00    -0.02 -0.01    -0.03* -0.05** 
                     
Observations 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 1,217 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 2,364 589 589 589 589 589 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 2,992 
Number of Firms 542 542 542 542 542 817 816 816 816 816 237 237 237 237 237 860 859 859 859 859 
χ2 2672 . 2817 2698 2720 2072 2074 2057 2145 2203 . . . . . 417 443 431 447 456 
Δ χ2  . 145*** 26 48**  2 -15** 73 131** . . . . .  26 14+ 30* 39** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  P:  FIRM SIZE – SMALL VS. LARGE 
TABLE  P- 52.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness in Large vs. Small 
Firms 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Small Large Small Large 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.21* 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 0.31** 0.32** 0.31** 0.30** 0.31** -0.20+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
Tobin’s Q 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Liquidity -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Large Owner -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.05+ -0.06+ -0.05 -0.05+ -0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Risk -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.08+ -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
CEO Change -0.04* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04           
Sox 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.12+ -0.12+ -0.12+ -0.12+ -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 -0.01   -0.03  0.04   0.05  0.01   0.01  -0.00   0.00 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.09**  0.09**   0.10***  0.09***   0.06+  0.06+   0.02  0.02 
Structural 
Power(out/in) 
   0.04 0.03    0.05 0.03    0.00 -0.01    0.00 -0.00 
Observations 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 
Number of Firms 570 568 568 568 568 470 470 470 470 470 571 569 569 569 569 470 470 470 470 470 
F 5.66*** 5.31*** 6.30*** 5.38*** 5.69*** 4.76*** 4.52*** 5.25*** 4.60*** 4.92*** 3.00*** 3.10*** 3.09*** 2.95*** 2.87*** 2.50*** 2.39*** 2.42*** 2.36*** 2.20*** 
 R 2 9.15 9.18 9.91 9.32 10.05 6.86 6.97 7.8 7.07 8.02 3.96 4.25 4.5 4.25 4.51 3.04 3.04 3.07 3.04 3.07 
Adjusted R 2 8.26 8.26 8.97 8.38 9 5.99 6.05 6.89 6.15 7.01 3.08 3.31 3.56 3.31 3.46 2.18 2.13 2.16 2.13 2.05 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.00 0.71** 0.12 0.74**  0.06 0.90*** 0.16 1.02***  0.23 0.48+ 0.23 0.38+   -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low performing firms using median per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    224 
TABLE  P - 53.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness in Large vs. Small Firms 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Small Large Small Large 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.21* 0.22* 0.19* 0.22* 0.20* 0.31** 0.30** 0.28* 0.30** 0.28* -0.20+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18+ -0.18 -0.16 -0.20 -0.17 -0.18 
Tobin’s Q 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Liquidity -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Large Owner -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.06+ 0.05+ 0.06* 0.05+ 0.06* 0.06* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Risk -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.08+ -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
CEO Change -0.04* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04           
Sox 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.12* -0.11+ -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 -0.02   -0.02  0.04   0.05+  0.01   0.01  0.01   0.04 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 0.00   0.00  0.00   -0.00  -0.01   -0.04  -0.02   -0.04 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.02   0.00  0.11***   0.10**  0.01   -0.00  -0.14***   -0.16*** 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.04  -0.05   -0.01  -0.01   0.03  0.03   -0.04  -0.03 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.09**  -0.09**   -0.12***  -0.11***   -0.01  -0.01   -0.09*  -0.11** 
Prestige Power(out*in)   -0.08***  -0.08**   -0.07**  -0.06*   -0.03  -0.02   -0.12*  -0.14** 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.04 0.05+    -0.00 -0.01    0.02 0.01    -0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   -0.01 -0.01    -0.04 -0.02    0.03 0.05    0.00 -0.00 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.03+ -0.02    -0.08** -0.07**    -0.04* -0.03+    -0.01 -0.00 
Observations 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,745 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 
Number of Firms 570 568 568 568 568 470 470 470 470 470 571 569 569 569 569 470 470 470 470 470 
F 5.66*** 4.82*** 5.38*** 5.18*** 4.40*** 4.77*** 7.06*** 5.55*** 4.44*** 6.87*** 3.00*** 2.93*** 2.94*** 2.72*** 2.40*** 2.50*** 52.59*** 2.42*** 2.25*** 35.21*** 
 R 2 9.15 9.22 11.3 9.47 11.63 6.86 8.71 8.1 7.87 10.53 3.96 4.31 4.39 4.57 4.79 3.04 5.32 4.95 3.06 7.69 
Adjusted R 2 8.17 8.17 10.27 8.42 10.29 5.99 7.71 7.08 6.86 9.25 3.08 3.26 3.34 3.52 3.41 2.18 4.33 3.95 2.04 6.41 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.00 2.01*** 0.16+ 2.03**  1.72*** 1.09*** 0.87** 3.26***  0.18 0.26 0.44* 0.33+   2.15*** 1.77* -0.14 4.23*** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low performing firms using median per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  Q:  HIGH VS. LOW PERFORMING FIRMS 
TABLE  Q - 54.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power  and Monitoring Effectiveness in High vs. Low 
Performing Firms 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low Performing High Performing Low Performing High Performing 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.44** 0.44** 0.42* 0.44** 0.43* 0.44** 0.46** 0.47** 0.45** 0.46** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.59*** -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -
0.53*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Liquidity -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Leverage -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Large Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05* -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* -0.05+ 0.04+ 0.04 0.04+ 0.04 0.04+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
CEO Tenure -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
CEO Change -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00           
Sox 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.04   0.03  -0.00   -0.01  0.01   0.01  0.04   0.05 
Prestige 
Power(out/in) 
  0.08**  0.07*   0.08**  0.08**   0.04  0.04   0.06+  0.06* 
Structural 
Power(out/in) 
   0.04 0.02    0.03 0.02    -0.02 -0.02    -0.00 -0.02 
                     
Observations 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 
Number of Firms 684 684 684 684 684 625 625 625 625 625 684 684 684 684 684 625 625 625 625 625 
F 4.66*** 4.47*** 4.98*** 4.49*** 4.66*** 4.06*** 3.94*** 4.34*** 3.94*** 4.27*** 1.58+ 1.55+ 1.49+ 1.50+ 1.41 3.17*** 3.32*** 3.45*** 3.33*** 3.27*** 
 R 2 9.67 9.8 10.33 9.85 10.51 6.34 6.31 7.18 6.49 7.26 2.3 2.3 2.42 2.33 2.48 6.2 7.01 7.26 6.88 7.43 
Adjusted R 2 8.76 8.83 9.37 8.88 9.45 5.31 5.31 6.18 5.48 6.15 1.37 1.31 1.44 1.34 1.38 5.3 6.06 6.32 5.93 6.39 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.07 0.61** 0.12 0.69*  0.00 0.79** 0.09 0.76**  -0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.01   0.76 1.02+ 0.63 1.09* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
 
 
 
    226 
TABLE  Q - 55.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness in High vs. Low Performing Firms 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low Performing High Performing Low Performing High Performing 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.44** 0.46** 0.41* 0.44** 0.43** 0.44** 0.47** 0.40** 0.46** 0.39* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.59*** -0.54*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.56*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
Liquidity -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11+ -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Leverage -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Large Owner -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04+ 0.05+ 0.05* 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Salary Exceed $1M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05* -0.05* -0.04+ -0.05* -0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04 0.04+ 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
CEO Tenure -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
CEO Change -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02           
Sox 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Ownership Power 
(avg out) 
 -0.00   -0.01  0.03   0.02  0.01   0.01  0.05   0.05 
Ownership Power 
(avg in) 
 -0.06*   -0.06+  0.04*   0.04+  -0.03   -0.04  -0.01   -0.01 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.02   0.02  -0.00   0.00  -0.06   -0.08  -0.03   -0.03 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.00  -0.01   -0.03  -0.04   0.01  0.02   0.01  0.01 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.05  -0.04   -0.11***  -0.11***   -0.00  -0.02   -0.06*  -0.06* 
Prestige 
Power(out*in) 
  -0.05*  -0.05*   -0.10***  -0.10***   -0.00  0.00   -0.09**  -0.09** 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.01 0.02    0.05+ 0.05+    -0.00 -0.01    0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   -0.04 -0.01    0.02 0.01    0.03 0.03    -0.00 0.00 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
   -0.03 0.00    -0.00 0.01    -0.04* -0.06*    0.01 0.01 
Observations 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,787 
Number of Firms 684 684 684 684 684 625 625 625 625 625 684 684 684 684 684 625 625 625 625 625 
F 1.66*** 4.66*** 4.47*** 4.15*** 4.16*** 4.06*** 3.82*** 4.63*** 3.80*** 4.06*** 1.58+ 1.53+ 1.43+ 1.47+ 1.43+ 3.17*** 3.14*** 3.15*** 3.09*** 2.70*** 
 R 2 9.67 10.87 10.43 10.17 11.66 6.34 6.65 9.46 6.75 10.16 2.3 2.59 2.31 2.62 3.17 6.2 7.13 8.32 6.89 8.6 
Adjusted R 2 8.76 9.81 9.37 9.1 10.31 5.39 5.54 8.39 5.64 8.79 1.37 1.49 1.21 1.52 1.75 5.3 6.08 7.28 5.84 7.26 
Δ Adjusted R 2  1.05* 0.61* 0.34 1.55*  0.15 3.00*** 0.25+ 3.40***  0.12 -0.16 0.15* 0.38*   0.78 1.98** 0.54 1.96** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low performing firms using median per year.  Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  R:  MOST POWERFUL BOARD MEMBER 
TABLE R - 56.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness Most Powerful 
Board Member 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** -0.29* -0.29* -0.29* -0.29* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed $1M -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.05+ 0.06* 0.05+ -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.07+ -0.06+ -0.07+ 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04      
Ownership Power (lg out/lg 
in) 
 0.01   0.00  0.01   0.01 
Prestige Power (lg out/lg 
in) 
  0.10***  0.10***   0.03+  0.04+ 
Structural Power (lg out/lg 
in) 
   0.04* 0.03    -0.01 -0.02 
F 10.23*** 9.76*** 12.16*** 9.87*** 11.16*** 3.98*** 3.83*** 3.77*** 3.79*** 3.46*** 
 R 
2 
7.91 7.93 9.42 8.15 9.52 3.12 3.13 3.26 3.14 3.29 
Adjusted R 
2 
7.45 7.44 8.94 7.66 8.99 2.66 2.64 2.77 2.65 2.75 
Δ Adjusted R 
2 
 -0.01 1.49*** 0.21* 1.54***  -0.02 0.11+ -0.01 0.09+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a
 Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE R- 57.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness Most Powerful Board Member 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.32** 0.32** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.33** -0.29* -0.28* -0.29* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Firm 
Performance 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed 
$1M 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.03 -0.05* -0.05+ -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.06** 0.07* 0.06+ -0.06+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04         
Ownership Power 
(avg out) 
 0.01 0.01     0.01  0.01 0.01     0.02 
Ownership Power 
(avg in) 
 -0.03 -0.00     -0.01  0.01 -0.01     -0.02 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
  0.04     0.03   -0.03     -0.04 
Prestige Power 
(avg out) 
   -0.05* -0.04+   -0.04*    0.00 0.01   0.02 
Prestige Power 
(avg in) 
   -0.07*** -0.07***   -0.07***    -0.01 -0.02   -0.02 
Prestige 
Power(out*in)  
   -0.05***   -0.05**     -0.03+   -0.03+ 
Structural Power 
(avg out)  
    0.03+ 0.03+ 0.04*      -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
Structural Power 
(avg in) 
     -0.01 -0.01 0.01      0.02 0.02 0.02 
Structural 
Power(out*in) 
      -0.03* -0.01       -0.02+ -0.03+ 
F 10.23*** 9.10*** 8.72*** 10.01*** 9.77*** 11.39*** 8.88*** 7.75*** 3.99*** 3.70*** 3.65*** 3.70*** 3.55*** 3.65*** 3.53*** 2.98*** 
 R 2 7.91 8.01 8.21 8.78 9.26 8.03 8.18 9.77 3.12 3.31 3.37 3.3 3.44 3.35 3.44 3.77 
Adjusted R 2 7.45 7.5 7.67 8.27 8.72 7.53 7.64 9.08 2.66 2.79 2.83 2.79 2.9 2.84 2.9 3.06 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.05 0.22 0.82*** 1.27*** 0.08+ 0.19* 1.63***  0.13 0.17 0.13 0.24+ 0.18 0.24+ 0.4+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  S:  OUTSIDERS PERCENTAGE 
TABLE  S - 58.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: High vs. Low 
Outsiders % 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Outsiders (%) High CEO Outsiders (%) Low CEO Outsiders (%) High CEO Outsiders (%) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** -0.65** -0.62** -0.62** -0.62** -0.62** -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Tobin’s Q 0.18** 0.18** 0.17** 0.17** 0.17** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09+ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12+ -0.12+ -0.11+ -0.12+ -0.11+ 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
Institutional Ownership 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.09* -0.09* 
Large Owner -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02+ 0.02* 0.02* 0.02+ 0.03* 
Risk -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
CEO Tenure -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.07 -0.07+ -0.07 -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.03 -0.06+ -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07           
Sox 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.10* 0.10* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.01   0.01  0.05   0.04  0.02   0.02  0.00   0.02 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.06+  0.06+   0.07**  0.06*   0.05  0.05   0.06*  0.07* 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.03 0.02    0.04 0.03    0.03 0.02    -0.05+ -0.06* 
                     
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
Number of Firms 614 614 614 614 614 619 619 619 619 619 616 615 615 615 615 619 619 619 619 619 
F 3.4577 3.2411 3.6564 3.2522 3.4467 6.2711 6.0617 6.1135 5.9275 5.6511 3.0133 2.8293 3.0760 2.8479 2.7792 2.5869 2.5026 2.4754 2.6163 2.5101 
 R 2 6.74 6.59 6.96 6.70 7.04 9.90 10.01 10.46 10.10 10.65 5.24 5.75 5.98 5.80 6.06 4.34 4.34 4.67 4.59 5.04 
Adjusted R 2 5.69 5.48 5.86 5.59 5.82 9.06 9.13 9.58 9.23 9.68 4.24 4.69 4.92 4.74 4.89 3.51 3.46 3.79 3.71 4.06 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.21 0.17+ -0.10 0.13+  0.07 0.52** 0.17 0.62*  0.45 0.68 0.50 0.65   -0.05 0.28* 0.20+ 0.55* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE S - 59.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness: High vs. Low Outsiders % 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Outsiders (%) High CEO Outsiders (%) Low CEO Outsiders (%) High CEO Outsiders (%) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.45** -0.65** -0.62** -0.64** -0.62** -0.63** -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Tobin’s Q 0.18** 0.18** 0.17** 0.18** 0.17** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06+ 0.04 0.05 0.06+ 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Leverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12+ -0.13+ -0.11+ -0.12+ -0.11+ 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 
Institutional Ownership 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.09* -0.09* 
Large Owner -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02+ 0.03* 0.02 0.02+ 0.02+ 
Risk -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 
CEO Tenure -0.08+ -0.07+ -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07           
Sox 0.11* 0.11* 0.10* 0.10* 0.09+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
Ownership Power (avg 
out) 
 0.02   0.02  -0.02   -0.03  0.03   0.03  0.05   0.08 
Ownership Power (avg 
in) 
 0.01   0.02  0.01   0.00  0.01   0.01  -0.07   -0.11+ 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.00   -0.00  0.10**   0.09**  0.01   0.01  -0.13**   -0.16*** 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.05  -0.05   -0.04  -0.05   -0.01  -0.01   0.07+  0.09* 
Prestige Power (avg in)   -0.09**  -0.09**   -0.05+  -0.05+   -0.06*  -0.06*   -0.01  -0.02 
Prestige Power (out*in)   -0.06*  -0.06*   -0.05*  -0.05*   -0.05  -0.05   -0.01  -0.01 
Structural Power (avg 
out) 
   0.02 0.02    0.03 0.04    0.03 0.02    -0.05 -0.07* 
Structural Power (avg 
in) 
   -0.02 -0.02    -0.02 0.01    -0.01 -0.01    0.02 0.03 
Structural Power 
(out*in) 
   -0.02 -0.02    -0.04 -0.03    -0.00 0.00    -0.04 -0.06* 
Observations 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,619 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
R-squared 0.0674 0.0662 0.0874 0.0677 0.0899 0.0990 0.1164 0.1076 0.1031 0.1290 0.0524 0.0579 0.0644 0.0581 0.0662 0.0434 0.0585 0.0463 0.0485 0.0718 
Number of Firms 615 614 614 614 614 619 619 619 619 619 616 615 615 615 615 619 619 619 619 619 
F 3.4577 2.9690 3.8214 3.0958 3.1393 6.2711 7.3084 6.1102 5.4227 6.7819 3.0133 2.5952 2.8793 2.5592 2.2296 2.5869 4.0822 2.4298 2.5623 3.3490 
 R 2 6.74 6.62 8.74 6.77 8.99 9.90 11.64 10.76 10.31 12.90 5.24 5.79 6.44 5.81 6.62 4.34 5.85 4.63 4.85 7.18 
Adjusted R 2 5.69 5.39 7.54 5.55 7.45 9.06 10.69 9.79 9.34 11.69 4.24 4.62 5.27 4.64 5.10 3.51 4.89 3.65 3.87 5.93 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.30 1.85** -0.14 1.76**  1.63** 0.73* 0.28** 2.63**  0.38 1.03* 0.40 0.86*   1.38** 0.14+ 0.36 2.42*** 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  T: BOARDSIZE 
TABLE T - 60.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: Large vs. Small 
Board Size 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low Board Size High Board Size Low Board Size High Board Size 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.24* 0.25* 0.24* 0.25* 0.24* 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.58*** -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 
Tobin’s Q 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Liquidity -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large Owner -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Salary Exceed > 
$1 M 
-0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
CEO Tenure -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
CEO Change -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03           
Sox 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.11* -0.12* 
                     
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 -0.01   -0.02  0.01   0.02  -0.00   -0.00  0.01   0.03 
Prestige Power 
(out/in) 
  0.08*  0.06+   0.07**  0.07**   0.04  0.04   0.07*  0.08* 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.09** 0.09*    0.00 -0.01    0.01 0.01    -0.04 -0.05+ 
52o.sic2_r      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
54o.sic2_r      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 
Number of Firms 529 529 529 529 529 600 600 600 600 600 529 529 529 529 529 600 600 600 600 600 
F 4.8813 4.6781 4.9553 5.1097 5.0116 6.7448 6.5039 6.9697 6.3867 6.4451 1.80* 1.72* 1.75* 1.70* 1.61* 2.38** 2.28** 2.28** 2.34** 2.19** 
 R 2 9.19 9.20 9.78 10.10 10.51 8.66 8.67 9.27 8.66 9.31 3.85 4.02 4.13 4.03 4.13 2.51 2.52 3.00 2.67 3.31 
Adjusted R 2 8.05 7.99 8.58 8.90 9.19 7.88 7.85 8.46 7.84 8.41 2.71 2.81 2.92 2.82 2.79 1.73 1.69 2.17 1.85 2.40 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.06 0.53* 0.85** 1.14*  -0.03 0.58** -0.04 0.53**  0.10 0.21 0.11 0.08   -0.04 0.44* 0.12 0.67* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
Data separated into high and low board size  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  T - 61.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness: Large vs. Small Board Size 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low Board Size High Board Size Low Board Size High Board Size 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.24* 0.26* 0.19 0.25* 0.19 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.57*** 0.59*** -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 
Tobin’s Q 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Leverage -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Large Owner -0.04+ -0.04 -0.05+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Salary Exceed > 
$1 M 
-0.07* -0.07* -0.06+ -0.07* -0.07* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
CEO Tenure -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 
CEO Change -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03           
Sox 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.10* -0.11* 
Ownership Power 
(avg out) 
 -0.01   -0.02  0.02   0.02  -0.00   0.00  0.04   0.05 
Ownership Power 
(avg in) 
 0.01   0.01  -0.00   -0.01  -0.02   -0.03  0.05   0.04 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.06   0.07  0.02   -0.00  -0.04   -0.05  0.05   0.02 
Prestige Power 
(avg out) 
  -0.04  -0.05   -0.03  -0.03   -0.01  -0.00   0.04  0.06+ 
Prestige Power 
(avg in) 
  -0.07*  -0.05+   -0.13**  -0.13**   0.01  0.01   -0.07  -0.07 
Prestige Power 
(out*in) 
  -0.07**  -0.07**   -0.11**  -0.10**   -0.05+  -0.05+   -0.03  -0.03 
Structural Power 
(avg out) 
   0.08* 0.09**    -0.01 -0.00    0.03 0.03    -0.03 -0.05 
Structural Power 
(avg in) 
   -0.03 -0.01    0.00 0.01    0.03 0.03    0.03 0.02 
Structural Power 
(out*in) 
   -0.01 0.03    -0.04*** -0.03+    -0.03 -0.04    -0.02+ -0.02 
Observations 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 2,137 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 1,445 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 
R-squared 0.0919 0.0998 0.1133 0.1005 0.1304 0.0866 0.0878 0.0968 0.0913 0.1011 0.0385 0.0420 0.0433 0.0425 0.0482 0.0251 0.0291 0.0307 0.0285 0.0387 
Number of Firms 529 529 529 529 529 600 600 600 600 600 529 529 529 529 529 600 600 600 600 600 
F 4.8813 4.4755 4.9726 4.6351 4.4729 6.7448 6.0729 6.9400 6.3729 5.9968 1.80* 1.65* 1.82* 1.58+ 1.55* 2.37** 2.20** 2.12** 2.26** 1.94** 
 R 2 9.19 9.98 11.33 10.05 13.04 8.66 8.78 9.68 9.13 10.11 3.85 4.20 4.33 4.25 4.82 2.51 2.91 3.07 2.85 3.87 
Adjusted R 2 8.05 8.65 10.02 8.72 11.38 7.88 7.87 8.78 8.22 8.96 2.71 2.86 2.99 2.91 3.07 1.73 1.99 2.16 1.93 2.69 
Δ Adjusted R 2  0.60 1.97** 0.67* 3.33**  -0.01 0.90** 0.34*** 1.08**  0.15 0.28+ 0.20 0.36+   0.26 0.43 0.20+ 0.96+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
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Data separated into high and low board size  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  U: CEO OWNERSHIP 
TABLE U - 62.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: High vs. Low 
CEO Ownership 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Ownership High CEO Ownership Low CEO Ownership High CEO Ownership 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.21 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.20** 0.21** 0.21** 0.21** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.08+ -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
Leverage -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.02 0.02 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Large Owner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* -0.06* 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Risk 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10+ -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07+ -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 
CEO Change -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01           
Sox -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10+ -0.10 -0.11+ -0.11+ 
                     
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 -0.00   -0.01  -0.01   -0.02  -0.03   -0.02  0.04   0.04 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.03  0.02   0.08**  0.08**   0.00  0.01   0.08*  0.08* 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.06* 0.06*    0.01 -0.00    -0.03 -0.03    0.02 0.01 
                     
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 
Number of Firms 593 593 593 593 593 615 615 615 615 615 593 593 593 593 593 615 615 615 615 615 
F 5.82*** 5.52*** 5.82*** 5.79*** 5.44*** 5.54*** 5.20*** 5.82*** 5.20*** 5.28*** 1.94* 1.89* 1.84* 1.84* 1.72* 2.14** 2.31** 2.47*** 2.05** 2.44*** 
 R 2 8.55 8.56 8.69 9.02 9.10 8.89 8.79 9.55 8.78 9.58 3.89 3.94 3.89 4.03 4.07 4.21 4.69 5.14 4.61 5.24 
Adjusted R 2 7.65 7.60 7.73 8.07 8.05 7.95 7.79 8.55 7.78 8.48 2.99 2.99 2.94 3.08 3.01 3.27 3.71 4.16 3.62 4.15 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.05 0.08 0.42* 0.40*  -0.16 0.60** -0.17 0.53**  0.00 -0.05 0.09 0.02   0.44 0.89* 0.35 0.88* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE U - 63.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness: High vs. Low CEO Ownership 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Ownership High CEO Ownership Low CEO Ownership High CEO Ownership 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.14 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.21 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.21** 0.21** 0.20** 0.21** 0.20** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.08+ -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Liquidity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
Leverage -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Large Owner 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Salary Exceed > 
$1 M 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06* -0.06* -0.05+ -0.06* -0.05+ 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Risk 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10+ -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07+ -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
CEO Change -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00           
Sox -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11+ -0.10 -0.11+ -0.11+ 
Ownership Power 
(avg out) 
 0.00   -0.01  -0.01   -0.01  -0.00   0.01  0.03   0.04 
Ownership 
Power (avg in) 
 0.03   0.04  0.00   0.01  0.01   -0.00  -0.04   -0.05 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 -0.02   -0.03  0.01   0.00  0.04   0.03  -0.01   -0.00 
Prestige Power 
(avg out) 
  -0.05+  -0.07*   -0.02  -0.02   -0.04  -0.03   0.04  0.04 
Prestige Power 
(avg in) 
  -0.03  -0.02   -
0.11*** 
 -
0.10*** 
  0.00  -0.00   -0.07*  -0.07* 
Prestige Power 
(out*in) 
  -0.04+  -0.03+   -0.06*  -0.06*   -0.03  -0.02   -0.05+  -0.05+ 
Structural Power 
(avg out) 
   0.04 0.05    -0.01 -0.00    -0.04 -0.03    0.02 0.01 
Structural Power 
(avg in) 
   -0.02 -0.02    -0.01 -0.01    0.02 0.02    -0.02 0.02 
Structural Power 
(out*in) 
   -0.07** -0.07**    -0.01 -0.01    -0.07* -0.06*    0.00 0.01 
                     
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,829 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 
Number of 
Firms 
593 593 593 593 593 615 615 615 615 615 593 593 593 593 593 615 615 615 615 615 
F 5.82*** 5.09*** 5.52*** 5.68*** 4.96*** 5.54*** 4.76*** 5.89*** 4.69*** 4.60*** 1.94* 1.77* 1.80* 1.81* 1.52* 2.14** 2.44** 2.25** 2.03** 2.10** 
 R 2 8.55 8.63 9.23 10.00 10.84 8.89 8.80 10.71 8.84 10.74 3.89 4.11 4.20 4.91 5.22 4.21 4.78 5.25 4.64 5.51 
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Adjusted R 2 7.65 7.57 8.18 8.96 9.51 7.95 7.69 9.63 7.73 9.34 2.99 3.05 3.14 3.86 3.86 3.27 3.68 4.16 3.54 4.09 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.08 0.53+ 1.31** 1.86**  -0.26 1.68*** -0.22 1.39***  0.06 0.15 0.87* 0.87*   0.41 0.89* 0.27 0.82* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  U -64.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Total Compensation: CEO Ownership 
Deciles 
 CONTROL 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.63+ 1.21** 1.30*** 0.83* 0.75+ 0.46 0.14 0.05 0.17 -0.37 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** -0.00 0.17+ 0.14 0.27* 0.37* 0.32** 0.11 0.34** 0.27* -0.04 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.31** -0.12+ -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.06 0.15** 0.07 -0.09 -0.06 
Liquidity -0.02 0.17 0.18 0.19+ -0.06 0.29 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 
Leverage -0.04 0.08 -0.51** -0.17 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.20 0.25 -0.19 0.26 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.14*** 0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.19* 0.05** 0.07 -0.06 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.13+ -0.08 -0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.11* 0.03 0.01 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.13** 0.10 0.08+ 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 
Risk -0.01 0.05 0.63** 0.05 0.26 0.20 -0.09 0.07 -0.46+ 0.25 -0.25 
CEO Change -0.03* 0.01 -0.09* -0.06+ 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ 0.06 -0.12 -0.23* 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.28 -0.60* -0.09 -0.02 
Sox 0.06* 0.04 -0.11 -0.06  0.07 0.18 0.23+ 0.38* 0.10 0.32* 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.11 0.12 -0.35** -0.15 -0.17 -0.19+ 0.02 0.17+ 
            
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.01 -0.13 -0.09** 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12* 0.05 -0.05 
Prestige Power (out/in)  0.02 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.17* 
Structural Power (out/in)  0.10* 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 
            
Observations 3581 349 369 376 370 363 358 362 355 339 340 
Number of Firms 950 190 189 201 201 208 198 192 171 150 138 
F 10.23*** 14.63*** 3.94*** 4.82*** 1.55*** 1.45*** 2.44*** 3.33*** 3.93*** 3.35*** 2.89*** 
 R 
2 
7.91 24.60 22.31 18.47 14.95 24.79 18.08 23.42 30.79 17.57 12.78 
Adjusted R 
2 
7.45 19.75 17.61 13.63 9.82 20.16 12.96 18.69 26.43 12.11 7.02 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
 
 
 
Deciles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
CEO Own(%) 0.002 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.30 0.48 0.88 1.96 10.95 
Obs. 349 369 376 370 363 358 362 355 339 340 
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TABLE  U -65.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity: CEO 
Ownership Deciles 
 CONTROL 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Firm Size -0.29* 0.22 -0.29 0.52 0.63+ 0.29 -0.34 -0.22 -0.64 0.05 0.09 
Tobin’s Q 0.04 -0.09 -0.15+ -0.11 0.18+ 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.07 -0.14 -0.03 
Firm Performance -0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.05* 0.03 0.06 -0.10* -0.01 -0.13 -0.24 -0.09 
Liquidity -0.05 0.37 0.08 -0.05 -0.16 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 
Leverage -0.02 0.14 0.03 -0.05 0.29 -0.03 0.03 -0.24 -0.24 -0.26 0.02 
Institutional Ownership -0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.21*** 0.08 -0.08 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.19 -0.21** 0.02 0.05 0.17* -0.00 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.03* 0.08+ 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.07 
Risk 0.03 -0.02 0.31+ -0.15 -0.33 0.20 -0.01 -0.26 0.02 0.46 0.00 
CEO Change -0.02 -0.15* -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 
CEO Tenure -0.03 -0.04 -0.10+ -0.17* -0.01 -0.02 0.25* 0.26 -0.14 -0.16+ 0.37 
Sox -0.06+ -0.24 -0.14* -0.04  0.03 -0.08 -0.30 -0.09 -0.13 -0.22 
            
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.14+ 0.51* 0.04** -0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.10 
Prestige Power (out/in)  -0.04 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.37* 0.09 
Structural Power (out/in)  0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
            
Observations 3581 349 369 376 370 363 358 362 355 339 340 
Number of Firms 950 192 189 201 201 209 198 192 171 150 139 
F 3.98*** 0.77 3.34*** 2.87*** 1.31 0.76 1.54+ 1.01 215*** 2.39** 1.15 
R-Squared 0.0312 0.2141 0.3700 0.2133 0.1715 0.1728 0.1175 0.1241 0.3327 0.2295 0.0629 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0266 0.1666 0.3339 0.1690 0.1240 0.1245 0.0651 0.0727 0.2927 0.1811 0.0047 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  U -66.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Total Compensation: CEO Ownership 
Quartiles 
 
VARIABLES Control (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size 0.36*** 0.69*** 0.91*** 0.30 0.08 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.13* 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.16 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.10* 0.01 0.12** -0.08 
Liquidity -0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
Leverage -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 0.05 0.09 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.06* -0.01 0.05 0.01 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.06+ -0.02 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08* -0.05 
Risk -0.01 0.18 0.08 -0.15 -0.10 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.06* -0.00 0.02 -0.04 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.05 
Sox 0.06* -0.03 -0.02 0.15+ 0.13+ 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.07 
      
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.05+ -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 
Prestige Power (out/in)  0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.12* 
Structural Power (out/in)  0.09** 0.01 0.03 -0.02 
      
Constant .*** .*** .** .*** .*** 
Observations 3,581 909 923 903 854 
Number of Firms 950 375 383 363 318 
F 10.23*** 3.58*** 2.73*** 6.24*** 2.52*** 
R-Squared 0.0791 0.1147 0.1451 0.1651 0.0760 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0745 0.0936 0.1252 0.1451 0.0526 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  U -67.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity: CEO 
Ownership Quartiles 
 
VARIABLES Control (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size -0.29* -0.17 0.11 -0.26 0.01 
Tobin’s Q 0.04 -0.09+ 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Firm Performance -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.10+ -0.10 
Liquidity -0.05 0.11 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 
Leverage -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.04 
Institutional Ownership -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 
Large Owner 0.04+ 0.06 0.06+ 0.00 0.00 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.03* 0.05* 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
Risk 0.03 0.18 -0.16 -0.23 0.08 
CEO Change -0.02 -0.08** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.03 -0.13** -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Sox -0.06+ -0.09+ -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 
Ownership Power (out/in)  -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Prestige Power (out/in)  0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11+ 
Structural Power (out/in)  -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Constant .*** . . .+ . 
      
Observations 3,581 909 923 903 854 
Number of Firms 950 375 383 363 318 
F 3.99*** 1.27 1.44+ 2.07** 1.29 
R-Squared 0.0312 0.0750 0.0645 0.0857 0.0543 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0266 0.0542 0.0437 0.0650 0.0316 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints.  
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  V: INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT 
TABLE  V - 68.  Results of fixed-effects Regression Analysis – Managerial Incentive Alignment 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37*** -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02+ 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
Ownership Power 
(in/out) 
 -0.05   -0.05  0.02   0.02 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.07***  0.07***   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.04* 0.02    -0.01 -0.01 
Constant .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .** .*** .** 
F 10.13*** 9.58*** 10.49*** 9.70*** 9.53*** 4.08*** 3.85*** 3.94*** 3.85*** 3.55*** 
R 
2 
7.87 8.25 8.49 8.07 8.92 3.28 3.33 3.44 3.30 3.52 
Adjusted R 
2
 7.41 7.76 8.00 7.58 8.39 2.82 2.84 2.95 2.81 2.98 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.35 0.59*** 0.17* 0.98***  0.02 0.13* -0.01 0.16* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
 
 
    242 
TABLE V - 69.  Results of fixed-effects Regression Analysis – Managerial Incentive Alignment  and Winsorized Power Ratios 
 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* -0.28* 
Tobin’s Q 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Leverage -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Institutional Ownership 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 0.04+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
CEO Change -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.05+ -0.05+ -0.03 -0.05+ -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03      
Ownership Power (in/out)  -0.04   -0.04  0.00   0.00 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.06***  0.06**   0.04*  0.04* 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.04* 0.02    -0.01 -0.02 
Constant .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .*** .** .** .*** .** 
F 10.13*** 9.58*** 10.26*** 9.70*** 9.34*** 4.07*** 3.90*** 3.95*** 3.85*** 3.61*** 
R 
2 
7.87 8.13 8.35 8.06 8.66 3.28 3.28 3.42 3.30 3.45 
Adjusted R 
2
 7.41 7.64 7.86 7.57 8.12 2.82 2.79 2.93 2.81 2.91 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.23 0.45*** 0.16* 0.71**  -0.03 0.11* -0.01 0.09* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  V -70.  Results of Random-Effects Regression Analyses:  Board Power & Managerial Incentive Alignment 
 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.39*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.05+ 0.05 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***      
Ownership Power (in/out)  -0.04*   -0.04*  0.03   0.03 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.04***  0.04**   0.03  0.04* 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.02* 0.01    -0.03+ -0.03+ 
           
χ 
2
 4241 4310 4234 4281 4331 316 317 335 326 337 
Δ χ 
2
  69* -7*** 40* 90**   1 19 10+ 21* 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE  V - 71.  Results of Random-effects Regression Analysis:  Winsorized Board Power & Managerial Incentive Alignment  
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.05+ 0.05 0.05+ 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 
Institutional Ownership 0.04** 0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Risk 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.03 -0.04+ -0.03 
Lagged Total Compensation 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***      
Ownership Power (in/out)  -0.04*   -0.04*  0.02   0.02 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.04**  0.04**   0.03  0.03+ 
Structural Power (out/in)    0.02* 0.01    -0.03+ -0.03+ 
           
χ 
2
 4241 4263 4221 4282 4288 316 318 336 316 341 
Δ χ 
2
  22* 20** 41* 47**   2 20 0+ 25+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE V - 72.  Results of OLS Regression Analysis:  Board Power &  Managerial Incentive Alignment 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 
Leverage -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.09** -0.09** -0.10** -0.09* -0.09** 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02+ -0.02* -0.02* -0.02+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51***      
Ownership Power 
(in/out) 
 -0.04*   -0.04*  0.03   0.03 
Prestige Power 
(out/in) 
  0.03**  0.03**   0.03  0.04+ 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.01 0.00    -0.02 -0.03 
F 143.07*** 140.70*** 140.72*** 140.62*** 135.94*** 16.31*** 16.00*** 16.21*** 16.02*** 15.65*** 
R 
2 
63.91 64.10 64.02 63.93 64.21 21.66 21.76 21.76 21.69 21.91 
Adjusted R 
2
 63.40 63.59 63.50 63.41 63.67 20.57 20.65 20.65 20.59 20.77 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.19* 0.10** 0.01 0.27**  0.08 0.08 0.02 0.20+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE V - 73.  Results of OLS Regression Analysis:  Winsorized Board Power & Managerial Incentive Alignment  
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Firm Size 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Tobin’s Q 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Firm Performance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.09** 0.09** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 
Leverage -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Large Owner -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 
Salary Exceed > $1 M 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
Risk 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.09** -0.09* -0.09** -0.09* -0.09** 
CEO Change -0.02* -0.02+ -0.02* -0.02* -0.02+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEO Tenure -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Sox 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51***      
Ownership Power 
in/out) 
 -0.04*   -0.04*  0.03   0.03 
Prestige Power 
(out/in) 
  0.03**  0.03**   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.02 0.00    -0.02 -0.02 
F 143.07*** 140.94*** 140.73*** 140.63*** 136.15*** 16.31*** 16.01*** 16.22*** 16.02*** 15.67*** 
R 
2 
63.91 64.03 64.00 63.93 64.11 21.66 21.73 21.72 21.69 21.84 
Adjusted R 
2
 63.40 63.51 63.48 63.41 63.57 20.57 20.63 20.61 20.58 20.69 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.11* 0.08** 0.01 0.17**  0.06 0.04 0.01 0.12 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
Data separated into high and low CEO ownership  using mean per year. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
Power ratios winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  W: CEO TENURE 
TABLE W - 74.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Board Power and Monitoring Effectiveness: High vs. Low 
CEO Tenure 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Tenure High CEO Tenure Low CEO Tenure High CEO Tenure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.45** 0.45** 0.43** 0.45** 0.43** 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.36 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.09+ -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.10+ -0.10+ 
Leverage -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.17+ -0.17+ -0.16+ -0.17+ -0.17+ 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.07+ 0.06+ 0.07+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 
Salary Exceed > $1 M -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Risk 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.18 0.21+ 0.18 0.19 0.21+ -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
CEO Tenure 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.04* 0.06* -0.18* -0.19* -0.18+ -0.19* -0.18+ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
Sox 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.08+ 0.07 0.11+ 0.11+ 0.12+ 0.11+ 0.11+ -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11+ -0.12+ -0.10+ -0.12* -0.11* -0.12* -0.11+ 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01      -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+      
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01           
Ownership Power 
(out/in) 
 0.00   -0.01  0.01   0.01  -0.10*   -0.08*  0.01   0.01 
Prestige Power (out/in)   0.08**  0.07*   0.07*  0.07*   0.03  0.05   0.06  0.05 
Structural Power 
(out/in) 
   0.06* 0.05+    0.01 -0.00    -
0.08** 
-
0.08** 
   0.04 0.03 
                     
F 4.5719 4.4405 4.6546 4.3918 4.3871 2.9571 2.7888 3.1504 2.7559 2.8733 2.6426 2.7763 2.4771 2.5846 2.5008 3.3567 3.4010 3.3210 3.3955 3.1365 
 R 2 10.17 10.17 10.99 10.73 11.36 5.02 5.02 5.45 5.01 5.47 10.17 10.17 10.99 10.73 11.36 5.02 5.02 5.45 5.01 5.47 
Adjusted R 2 9.15 9.09 9.92 9.66 10.18 4.20 4.15 4.59 4.14 4.50 9.15 9.09 9.92 9.66 10.18 4.20 4.15 4.59 4.14 4.50 
Δ Adjusted R 2  -0.06 0.77** 0.51* 1.03*  -0.05 0.39* -0.06 0.30*  -0.06* 0.77 0.51** 1.03**  -0.05 0.39 -0.06 0.30 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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TABLE W- 75.  Results of Fixed-Effects Panel Data Analyses Examining Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Power Interactions and Monitoring 
Effectiveness: High vs. Low CEO Tenure 
 Total Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
 Low CEO Tenure High CEO Tenure Low CEO Tenure High CEO Tenure 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Firm Size 0.45** 0.43** 0.42** 0.46** 0.42** 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.17 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
Tobin’s Q 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.20*** -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* -0.16* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Firm Performance 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 
Liquidity -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.09+ -0.10+ -0.09+ -0.10+ -0.09+ 
Leverage -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.17+ -0.18+ -0.16+ -0.17+ -0.18+ 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
Institutional 
Ownership 
0.03+ 0.03+ 0.03* 0.03+ 0.03+ 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* -0.11* 
Large Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.06+ 0.06 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06+ 0.06* 0.06+ 0.06* 
Salary Exceed > $1 
M 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Risk 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.18 0.22+ 0.18 0.19 0.21+ -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
CEO Tenure 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* -0.18* -0.18* -0.16+ -0.19* -0.16+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 
CEO Change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01      -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+ -0.04+      
Lagged Total 
Compensation 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02           
Sox 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08+ 0.07+ 0.11+ 0.11+ 0.09 0.11+ 0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12+ -0.10+ -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* -0.13* 
Ownership Power 
(avg out) 
 -0.05+   -0.06*  0.02   0.03  -0.07**   -0.06*  -0.01   0.00 
Ownership Power 
(avg in) 
 -0.02   -0.00  0.00   0.00  0.04   0.05  -0.05   -0.05 
Ownership 
Power(out*in) 
 0.10***   0.11***  0.00   -0.00  -0.06+   -0.06+  -0.03   -0.03 
Prestige Power (avg 
out) 
  -0.04  -0.05   -0.04  -0.04   0.01  0.04   -0.01  -0.02 
Prestige Power (avg 
in) 
  -0.09**  -0.09**   -0.07*  -0.07*   0.01  -0.01   -0.06*  -0.06+ 
Prestige Power 
(out*in) 
  -0.04*  -0.03+   -0.05+  -0.05+   -0.00  -0.01   -0.05+  -0.05+ 
Structural Power 
(avg out) 
   0.04 0.05    0.00 0.01    -0.09* -0.09**    0.04 0.04 
Structural Power 
(avg in) 
   -0.02 0.00    -0.00 -0.00    0.02 0.00    -0.01 0.01 
Structural Power 
(out*in) 
   -0.06* -0.06*    -0.01 -0.01    -0.03 -0.04    -0.00 -0.00 
F 4.57*** 9.27*** 4.78*** 4.03*** 9.73*** 2.96*** 2.59*** 3.21*** 2.51*** 2.57*** 2.64*** 5.14*** 2.29*** 2.31*** 3.57*** 3.36*** 3.34*** 2.90*** 3.06*** 2.50*** 
 R 2 10.17 13.43 11.73 11.50 16.35 5.02 5.04 6.22 5.04 6.31 5.83 8.05 5.85 6.99 9.04 5.69 6.30 6.81 6.27 7.17 
Adjusted R 2 9.15 12.28 10.56 10.32 14.91 4.20 4.07 5.27 4.08 5.06 4.82 6.88 4.65 5.81 7.53 4.93 5.40 5.91 5.36 5.99 
Δ Adjusted R 2  3.13*** 1.41* 1.17* 5.76***  -0.13 1.07* -0.12 0.86*  2.06+ -0.17 0.99* 2.71**   0.47 0.98* 0.43 1.06+ 
n= 3,581 firm-year observations.  All models include controls for year and two-digit SIC industry controls that are not shown for space constraints. 
a Change in R-Squared in respect to the control model. 
*** p <0.001, ** p <0.01, * p <0.05, + p <0.10 
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APPENDIX  X:  MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: OUTSIDERS/INSIDERS POWER RATIO 
TABLE X-76. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +1) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Tobin’s Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Performance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Institutional Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Board size -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.01   -0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.02  -0.01 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.03 
Observations 1,517 1,516 1,516 1,516 1,516 
F 0.8208 1.64+ 1.37+ 1.37+ 1.32+ 
R 
2 
2.12 2.15 2.15 2.24 2.27 
Adjusted R 
2
 -0.46 -0.51 -0.5 -0.41 -0.52 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X - 77. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +1) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* -0.08* 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Board size -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.06*   -0.05* 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.05  0.06+ 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.05+ 
R-squared 0.0466 0.0502 0.0491 0.0483 0.0541 
F 1.91*** 1.98*** 1.93*** 1.94*** 2.01*** 
R 
2 
4.66 5.02 4.91 4.83 5.41 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.07 2.37 2.26 2.18 2.63 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.3 0.19 0.11 0.56 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X- 78. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08+ -0.08+ -0.08* -0.07+ -0.08+ 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.10* 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.06 -0.05 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Board size -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.04*   -0.04+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.04 
F 1.78** 1.84** 1.78** 1.78** 1.85*** 
R 
2 
4.39 4.58 4.56 4.48 4.82 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.8 1.93 1.9 1.82 2.04 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.13 0.1 0.02 0.24 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X - 79. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-3, +3) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* -0.08* 
Tobin’s Q 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Firm Performance 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 
Institutional Owner 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Post Sox 2002 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Board size -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.05*   -0.04+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.04 
F 2.06*** 2.11*** 2.02*** 2.04*** 2.04*** 
R 
2 
4.96 5.19 5.1 5.07 5.4 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.38 2.55 2.45 2.43 2.63 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.25 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X -80. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.06 -0.06 -0.07+ -0.06 -0.06 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11** 0.10* 0.11** 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Institutional Owner 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.04+   -0.04 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.04 
F 1.64** 1.69** 1.62** 1.66** 1.68** 
R 
2 
4.15 4.35 4.26 4.28 4.56 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.55 1.68 1.59 1.62 1.76 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.21 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    254 
TABLE X - 81. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +3) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.06 -0.06 -0.07+ -0.06 -0.06 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11** 0.10* 0.11** 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Institutional Owner 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.04+   -0.04 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.04 
F 1.64** 1.69** 1.62** 1.66** 1.68** 
R 
2 
4.15 4.35 4.26 4.28 4.56 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.55 1.68 1.59 1.62 1.76 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.21 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X -82. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Firm Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Tobin’s Q 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Performance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Institutional Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Board size -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.02   -0.01 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.02  -0.01 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.03 
F 0.8208 1.33+ 1.37+ 1.37+ 1.31+ 
R 
2 
2.12 2.15 2.15 2.24 2.26 
Adjusted R 
2
 -0.46 -0.51 -0.5 -0.41 -0.52 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X - 83. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +1) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Firm Performance 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Board size -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.07*   -0.06+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.05  0.05 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.04+ 
F 1.91*** 1.94*** 1.93*** 1.94*** 1.97*** 
R 
2 
4.66 5.19 4.91 4.83 5.52 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.07 2.54 2.26 2.18 2.75 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.47 0.19 0.11 0.68 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X- 84. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.07+ -0.08* 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11** 0.10* 0.10* 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Board size -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.05+   -0.05 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 1.78** 1.80** 1.78** 1.78** 1.81** 
R 
2 
4.39 4.68 4.56 4.48 4.89 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.8 2.02 1.9 1.82 2.1 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.22 0.1 0.02 0.3 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X - 85. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-3, +3) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
Tobin’s Q -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Firm Performance 0.11** 0.12** 0.11** 0.11** 0.12** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Percentage Acquired -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional Owner 0.08+ 0.08* 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08* 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ 
Post Sox 2002 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Board size -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.06*   -0.05+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 1.76** 1.82** 1.74** 1.76** 1.78** 
R 
2 
0.0411 0.0447 0.0419 0.0420 0.0459 
Adjusted R 
2
 0.0151 0.0181 0.0152 0.0154 0.0179 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
     
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X -86. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* 
Tobin’s Q 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Firm Performance 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 
Institutional Owner 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Post Sox 2002 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.06*   -0.06+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 2.06*** 2.08*** 2.02*** 2.04*** 2.01*** 
R 
2 
4.96 5.35 5.10 5.07 5.52 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.38 2.72 2.45 2.43 2.75 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.34 0.07 0.05 0.37 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE X - 87. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +3) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.06 -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.06 -0.07+ 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11** 0.10* 0.11** 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional Owner 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Ownership Power(out/in)  -0.07*   -0.06+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.03 
F 1.64** 1.70** 1.62** 1.66** 1.69** 
R 
2 
4.15 4.58 4.26 4.28 4.74 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.55 1.92 1.59 1.62 1.95 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.37 0.04 0.07 0.40 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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APPENDIX  Y:  MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: INSIDERS/OUTSIDERS RATIO 
TABLEX Y- 88. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +1) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Tobin’s Q 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Performance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Institutional Owner -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
Board size -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.02   0.02 
Prestige Power(out/in)   -0.02  -0.01 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.03 
F 0.82 1.62+ 1.37+ 1.37+ 1.61+ 
R 
2 
2.12 2.18 2.15 2.24 2.28 
Adjusted R 
2
 -0.46 -0.48 -0.50 -0.41 -0.50 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE Y-89. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
Board size -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.08   0.07 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.05  0.06+ 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.04 
F 1.91*** 1.90*** 1.93*** 1.94*** 1.95*** 
R 
2 
4.66 5.24 4.91 4.83 5.58 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.07 2.60 2.26 2.18 2.82 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.53 0.19 0.11 0.75 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE Y- 90. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-2, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08+ -0.08* -0.08* -0.07+ -0.08* 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11* 0.10* 0.10* 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Hostile Takeover 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.05+ 
Institutional Owner 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.06 -0.06 -0.06+ -0.06 -0.06+ 
Post Sox 2002 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
Board size -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.06   0.05 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 1.78** 1.78** 1.78** 1.78** 1.80** 
R 
2 
4.39 4.71 4.56 4.48 4.93 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.80 2.06 1.90 1.82 2.14 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.34 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE Y-91. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-3, +3) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
Tobin’s Q -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Firm Performance 0.11** 0.12** 0.11** 0.11** 0.12** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Percentage Acquired -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional Owner 0.08+ 0.08* 0.08+ 0.08+ 0.08* 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ -0.06+ 
Post Sox 2002 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Board size -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.07*   0.06+ 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.03 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 1.76** 1.82** 1.74** 1.76** 1.78** 
R 
2 
4.11 4.55 4.19 4.20 4.67 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.51 1.89 1.52 1.54 1.87 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.38 0.01 0.03 0.36 
n=1,477 observations 
Ownership power ratio winsorized at p=0.01 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE Y- 92. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +2) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.08* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* -0.09* 
Tobin’s Q 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Firm Performance 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Hostile Takeover 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.05* 
Institutional Owner 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.06   0.06 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.04  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.03 -0.03 
F 2.06*** 2.04*** 2.02*** 2.04*** 1.99*** 
R 
2 
4.96 5.35 5.10 5.07 5.52 
Adjusted R 
2
 2.38 2.71 2.45 2.43 2.76 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.33 0.07 0.05 0.38 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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TABLE Y - 93. Board Power & Mergers & Acquisitions Activity: Cumulative Abnormal Returns(-1, +3) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm Size -0.06 -0.07+ -0.07+ -0.06 -0.07+ 
Tobin’s Q -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Firm Performance 0.10* 0.11** 0.10* 0.11** 0.11** 
Previous M&A Experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Percentage Acquired -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Same Industry Acq & 
Target 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Hostile Takeover 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Institutional Owner 0.07 0.07+ 0.07 0.07 0.07+ 
Largest Institutional Owner -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Post Sox 2002 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Board size -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 
Ownership Power(in/out)  0.07+   0.06 
Prestige Power(out/in)   0.03  0.04 
Structural Power(out/in)    -0.04 -0.03 
F 1.64** 1.67** 1.62** 1.66** 1.67** 
R 
2 
4.15 4.60 4.26 4.28 4.77 
Adjusted R 
2
 1.55 1.94 1.59 1.62 1.98 
Δ Adjusted R
2 
 0.39 0.04 0.07 0.43 
n=1,477 observations 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10 
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APPENDIX  Z.  Ownership Power: Outsiders * Insiders Interactions Summary 
 
Figure Z - 9.  Contextual Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Ownership Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure Z-9a: Total Compensation: Ownership Power Pre-Sox  Figure Z-9b: Pay-for-Performance: Ownership Power – Post-Sox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Z- 10.  Contextual Implications of World Trade Center Attacks of 2001:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Ownership Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure Z-10: Total Compensation: Ownership Power Pre-WTC   
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Figure Z- 11.  Contextual Implications of  Industry Mimetic Pressures:  Random-Effects Regression Interaction Effects of 
Outsiders’ and Insiders’  Ownership Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure  Z-11: Pay-for-Performance: Ownership Power(>1SD)   
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Figure Z- 12.  Contextual Implications of Firm Size: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Ownership Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure Z-12a: Total Compensation: Ownership Power            Figure Z-12b: Pay-for-Performance: Ownership Power              
and Large Firms      and Large Firms 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Z- 13.  Contextual Implications of Outsiders (%) on Board:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Ownership 
Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure Z-13a: Total Compensation: Ownership Power& High Out    Figure Z-13b: Pay-for-Performance: Ownership Power & High Out 
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Figure Z- 14.  Contextual Implications of  CEO Tenure:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Ownership Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure Z-14a: Total Compensation: Ownership Power&  Low CEO Tenure Figure Z-14b: Pay-for-Performance: Ownership Power & Low CEO Tenure 
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APPENDIX  AA.  Prestige Power: Outsiders * Insiders Interactions Summary 
Figure AA - 15.  Contextual Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Prestige Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -15A: Total Compensation: Prestige Power Pre-Sox  Figure AA -15B: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power – Pre & Post-Sox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AA - 16.  Contextual Implications of World Trade Center Attacks of 2001:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and 
Insiders’ Prestige Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -16A: Total Compensation: Prestige Power – Pre & Post-WTC   Figure AA -16B: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power Pre/Post-WTC 
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Figure AA - 17.  Contextual Implications of  Industry Mimetic Pressures:  Random-Effects Regression Interaction Effects of 
Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -17a: Total Compensation: Prestige Power – (<1SD)   Figure AA -17b: Total Compensation: Prestige Power – (>1SD) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AA - 18.  Contextual Implications of Firm Size: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure AA -18a: Total Compensation: Prestige Power                 Figure AA -18b: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power              
and Small/Large Firms      and Large Firms 
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Figure AA - 19.  Contextual Implications of Firm Performance: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power 
and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -19a: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power                        
and High-Performing Firms       
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure AA - 20.  Contextual Implications of Most Powerful Board Member:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Prestige Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure AA -20a: Total Compensation: Prestige Power    Figure AA -20b: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power   
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Figure AA -  21.  Contextual Implications of Board Size:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -21a: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power & Small Board  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  AA - 22.  Contextual Implications of CEO Ownership:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power 
and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure AA -22a: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power & High CEO Ownership 
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Figure AA - 23.  Contextual Implications of  CEO Tenure:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Prestige Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure AA -23a: Pay-for-Performance: Prestige Power & High CEO Tenure   
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APPENDIX  BB.  Structural Power: Outsiders * Insiders Interactions Summary 
Figure BB - 24.  Contextual Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure BB -24a: Total Compensation: Structural Power Pre-Sox  Figure BB -24b Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power – Post-Sox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure BB - 25.  Contextual Implications of World Trade Center Attacks of 2001:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and 
Insiders’ Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure BB -25a: Total Compensation: Structural Power – Pre-WTC   Figure BB -25b: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power Post-WTC   
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Figure BB - 26.  Contextual Implications of  Industry Mimetic Pressures:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure BB -26: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power (>1SD) 
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Figure BB - 27.  Contextual Implications of  Industry Mimetic Pressures:  Random-Effects Regression Interaction Effects of 
Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure BB -27: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power(>1SD)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure BB - 28.  Contextual Implications of Firm Performance: Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Structural 
Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 Figure BB -28a: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power and Small Firms       Figure BB -28a:  Structural Power and  Less-Performing Firms 
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Figure BB - 29.  Contextual Implications of Most Powerful Board Member:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure BB -29a: Total Compensation: Structural Power    Figure BB -29b: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure BB - 30.  Contextual Implications of Outsiders (%) on Board:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ 
Structural Power and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
Figure BB -30: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power & High Out  
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Figure BB -  31.  Contextual Implications of Board Size:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Structural Power and 
Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
Figure BB -31a: Total Compensation: Structural Power& Large Board    Figure BB -31b: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power & 
Large Board          Large Board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure BB - 32.  Contextual Implications of CEO Ownership:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Structural Power 
and Monitoring Effectiveness 
Figure BB -32a: Total Compensation: Structural Power& Low CEO Own  Figure BB -32b: Pay-for-Performance: Structural Power & Low CEO Own 
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Figure BB - 33.  Contextual Implications of  CEO Tenure:  Interaction Effects of Outsiders’ and Insiders’ Structural Power 
and Monitoring Effectiveness 
 
 
 Figure BB -33: Total Compensation: Structural Power&  Low CEO Tenure 
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 Executive Compensation, 2007-2009 (literature review) 
 
 Research Grants: 
 2011 Whitman Summer Research Grant ($4,000) “A Board Power Perspective on Strategic Value 
Creation:    Monitoring Implications on R&D Investment Spending” 
 2010 Whitman Summer Research Grant ($4,000) “How do CEO’s Matter? Implications of Managerial 
Discretion for the Agency Conflict and Executive Pay” 
 
 Future Professoriate Program, 2007-2010 
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AWARDS (selected) 
 
 Ideas to Innovation Challenge – World Issues Focus on Integrity Innovation Multi-
Disciplinary Course, 3
rd
 place (650 entries worldwide), Graduate Management Admission 
Challenge, Management Education for Tomorrow (MET) Fund, ($10,000 award), 2011. 
(http://www.gmac.com/gmac/AboutUs/MET-Fund/i2iWinner7.htm) 
 National First-Year Student Advocate Award, National Center for the First Year 
Experience, 2006. 
 Olympic Torchbearer, “Inspirational Torch Relay”, Olympic Games, Salt Lake, UT, 2002. 
 Outstanding Service to Commission III American College Student Personnel Association 
Housing and Residence Life Commission, 2002 (Chair, National Housing & Residential 
Life Professional Staff Recruitment and Retention Study) 
 Office of Residence Life Award for Excellence in Professional Development, Syracuse 
University, 2002. 
 Vice President’s Students First Award, Syracuse University, 2001. 
 Excellence in Advising Award, Syracuse University, 2001. 
 Staff Member of the Year, Kansas State University at Salina, 2000. 
 Advisor of the Year, Kansas State University at Salina, 1998. 
 Distinguished Alumni Service Award, Oklahoma State University, 1997. 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE  
 
    Reviewer for Academy of Management Conference, Business Policy & Strategy Division, 
2011. 
    Reviewer for Academy of Management Conference, Organization & Management Theory 
Division, 2009. 
 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
    PhD Project, Management Doctoral Student Association, 2007-Present. 
    Academy of Management, Business Policy & Strategy and Organizational Behavior 
Divisions, 2008-Present. 
    Strategic Management Society, 2010-Present. 
 
UNIVERSITY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 
 
    Syracuse University Minority Graduate Student Organization, 2007- Present.  
    Leadership Program Founder and Coordinator, AIDS Community Resources 
DiversityYouth Group, Syracuse, NY, 2006-2008. 
    Chair, Syracuse University Light the Night Walk for Cancer Research, Leukemia & 
Lymphoma Society, Syracuse, NY, 2004-2006. 
    University Committee Experiences at Syracuse University(2000-2007) and/or Kansas State 
University (1996-2000):  Retention Council, Academic Coordinating Committee, 
Alumni Relations Council; Diversity Team  
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
    Facilitator, Diversity Inc.’s Annual Event – Theme:  Corporate Citizenship, Washington, 
DC, 2011 
   Founder and Owner, Soul Vision (Leadership Consulting), 2007- present. 
   Director of Orientation, the First-Year Experience, and Transitions Services, Syracuse 
University, 2003-2007 (developed and implemented nationally-recognized program). 
   Assistant Director of Leadership Development for Residence Life, Syracuse University, 
2000-2003 (developed and implemented nationally-recognized leadership program for 
7,500 students). 
   Assistant Director of College Advancement, Kansas State University, 1996-2000 
(Responsible for $1 million budget; developed and implemented new departments and 
initiatives to enhance student retention, including residence life, orientation, student life, 
student union, recreation center, and counseling center; developed and instructed 
leadership development course, leadership certificate program proposal; implemented 
student retention study; and, developed and implemented diversity climate assessment 
study). 
 
 
 
